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Summary 
 
One of the key research questions in organisational learning is: “How can organisations 
become better at double-loop learning?”. This research question has invited scholars to find 
ways of (1) enhancing individual double-loop learning, and of (2) sharing these altered 
individual mental models throughout the organisation. To accomplish these goals the 
literature proposes many tools, such as simulation, role plays, and dialogue and discussion. 
The application of microworlds, simulation models that are locked by user-friendly interfaces, 
is one of them. Microworlds are used as learning laboratories for ex ante evaluation of 
possible policy strategies. They also serve the purpose of being a transitional object in which 
strategies are rehearsed and visualised bringing them into debate and discussion. A strong 
belief exists that some form of “learning” occurs when using microworlds. Nevertheless, this 
belief generates widespread disagreement within several scientific communities. The main 
reason for this disagreement is the absence of a well-structured body of evaluation research 
that examines whether any valuable “learning” takes place from using microworlds. 
 
This study investigates to what extent learning takes place from a self-developed microworld 
in the field of fisheries management based on the Belgian fisheries system. It describes the 
process of developing a microworld in which fisheries policy initiatives can be visualised and 
rehearsed. It first determines whether the theory of strategic groups is relevant for the Belgian 
fishing fleet. These findings are then used to develop a microworld in which stakeholders can 
discover the long term effects that policy instruments may have on the Belgian fisheries 
system. This makes the microworld a useful instrument to test whether policymakers have the 
policy instruments at their disposal to align the real fisheries system with their desired one. 
Because this microworld has been developed following a “create-and-share”-approach, the 
last part of this thesis is about reaching and informing a group larger than the model 
development team about its outcomes. This is done, in tandem with a true experiment in 
which we test if stakeholders in the Belgian fisheries system actually learn from our 
microworld. Such a test of learning is seen as the ultimate criterion for assessing the validity 
of microworlds. 
 
Our study cannot conclude that decision makers learn from playing with microworlds. This 
suggests that more work is needed to fully realise the potential of microworlds in learning 
processes, yet researchers are left with little guidance on how to develop an effective 
“learning system”. Our most valuable guideline for future evaluation research is to start 
testing which features of microworlds, “users” and “situations”, are essential for learning 
from microworlds. Crucial in this kind of future evaluation research is to apply “before-after 
with control group”-designs in which the experimental group only differs from the control 
group by exactly one characteristic of the microworld, users or environmental context. 
Finally, future evaluation research should also start adopting a “process-based approach” in 
which it aims to provide insights into the actual processes or mechanisms that explain 
learning effects from microworlds. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Eén van de belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen in organisationeel leren is: “Hoe kunnen 
organisaties beter worden in dubbel-loop leren?”. Deze onderzoeksvraag heeft 
wetenschappers aangezet manieren te vinden om (1) individueel dubbel-loop leren te 
bevorderen, en om (2) gewijzigde individuele mentale modellen te delen binnen organisaties. 
Om deze doelstellingen te verwezelijken stelt de literatuur talrijke instrumenten voor zoals 
simulatie, rollenspellen, en dialoog en discussie. Het gebruik van microworlds, simulatie 
modellen omsloten met een gebruiksvriendelijke interface, is er hier dus één van. 
Microworlds worden gebruikt als leer-laboratoria voor ex ante evaluatie van mogelijke 
beleidsstrategieën. Daarnaast fungeren ze ook als “bindingsobjecten” waarmee strategieën 
gerepeteerd en gevisualiseerd kunnen  worden om deze zo te onderwerpen aan debat en 
discussie. Er heerst een sterk geloof dat een vorm van “leren” zich voordoet bij het gebruik 
van microworlds. Desondanks blijft hierover onenigheid bestaan in verscheidene 
wetenschappelijke gemeenschappen. De belangrijkste reden voor deze onenigheid is het 
gebrek aan een goed gestructureerde geheel van evaluatieonderzoek dat nagaat of enig 
waardevol “leren” zich voordoet bij het gebruik van microworlds. 
 
Deze thesis onderzoekt in welke mate leren plaats grijpt uit een zelfgemaakte microworld met 
betrekking tot visserijmanagement gebaseerd op het Belgisch visserijsysteem. Het beschrijft 
het ontwikkelingsproces van een microworld waarin visserijbeleidsinitiatieven kunnen 
gevisualiseerd en gerepeteerd worden. Het beslist echter eerst of de theorie van strategische 
groepen relevant is voor de Belgische vissersvloot. Deze bevindingen worden dan 
meegenomen in het ontwikkelen van een microworld waarin stakeholders de 
langetermijneffecten kunnen nagaan die beleidsinstrumenten kunnen hebben op het Belgische 
visserijsystem. Dit maakt de microworld een geschikt instrument om te achterhalen of 
beleidsmakers de beleidsinstrumenten ter beschikking hebben om het bestaande 
visserijsysteem af te stemmen op dat van hun wensen. Omdat de microworld ontwikkeld is 
via een “creëer-en-deel”-benadering heeft het laatste deel van deze thesis betrekking op het 
bereiken en informeren van een groep groter dan de groep die mee heeft geholpen de 
microworld te ontwikkelen. Dit wordt gekoppeld aan een waarachtig experiment waarin 
wordt gekeken of stakeholders in het Belgische visserijsystem effectief leren uit onze 
microworld. Een dergelijke test naar leereffecten wordt aanzien als het ultieme criterium om 
de validiteit van microworlds te bepalen. 
 
Onze studie kan weliswaar niet concluderen dat besluitvormers leren door met microworlds te 
spelen. Dit suggereert dat meer werk nodig is om het potentieel van microworlds in 
leerprocessen volledig te realiseren. Onderzoekers geven elkaar echter weinig advies over hoe 
efficiënte leersystemen te ontwikkelen. Onze meest waardevolle richtlijn voor toekomstig 
evaluatieonderzoek is het opstarten van onderzoek dat nagaat welke kenmerken van 
microworlds, “gebruikers” en “situaties” essentieel zijn voor leren uit microworlds. Cruciaal 
in dit type van toekomstig evaluatieonderzoek is het toepassen van een “vóór-na met controle 
groep”-design waarbij de experimentele groep enkel verschilt van de controle groep in exact 
één karakteristiek van de microworld, gebruiker of omgeving. Ten laatste zou toekomstig 
evaluatie onderzoek zich moeten focussen op  een “proces-gebaseerde aanpak” waarbij het 
doel is inzichten verschaffen in de werkelijke processen en mechanismen die leereffecten van 
microworlds kunnen verklaren. 
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Chapter 1: General introduction: research 
questions, framework and design 
 
Microworlds, a specific form of simulation models, have been referred to as (1) insight 
generators (Morecroft, 1984), (2) tools for inquiry into dynamic decision-making processes 
(Brehmer, 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2005), (3) tools to visualise and rehearse decisions and 
strategies (Morecroft, 1999; Morecroft, 1984), (4) tools to debate and discuss strategies 
(Morecroft, 1999; Morecroft, 1984), (5) laboratories for ex ante evaluation of decision 
making (De Geus, 1997; Keys et al., 1996), (6) learning laboratories (Kim, 1993b; Romme et 
al., 1997), (7) learning environments (Wolfe, 1976), (8) learning spaces (Senge, 1996), and 
(9) educational tools (Sindre et al., 2009). In other words, various scientists believe, explicitly 
or implicitly, that some form of “learning” occurs when using microworlds. Nevertheless, this 
belief still generates widespread disagreement within several scientific communities (Bakken 
et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2008; Cavaleri et al., 1996; Langley, 1993; Langley et al., 1996). The 
main reason for this disagreement is the absence of a well-structured body of evaluation 
research that examines whether any valuable “learning” actually takes place from the use of 
microworlds (Akili, 2007; Bakken et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2008; Cavaleri et al., 1997; Gosen 
et al., 2004; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Huz et al., 1997; Raia, 1966; Sweeney et 
al., 2000; Tonks et al., 1997; Wolfe, 1976). The lack of structure in this body of evaluation 
research is unjustified and causes problems for future research on the application of 
microworlds in learning processes. It is thus vital to perform more structured evaluation 
research. 
 
I have identified this research problem in the context of the collaboration between the Institute 
for Agriculture and Fisheries Research (ILVO)
1
 and Ghent University
2
. This problem is 
crucial for ILVO, since it is planning to use microworlds to formulate a long-term strategy for 
the Belgian fisheries system (Polet et al., 2006). ILVO will use microworlds as learning 
laboratories for ex ante evaluation of possible policy strategies (De Geus, 1997; Keys et al., 
1996). Additionally, they will also serve the purpose of being a transitional object in which 
strategies are rehearsed and visualised (Morecroft, 1999) bringing them into debate and 
discussion (Morecroft, 1984) among members of ILVO and other stakeholder groups. The 
objectives of this thesis will help chart the new course ILVO is sailing, by (1) developing a 
microworld in which stakeholders of the Belgian fisheries system can “play” and gain long-
term insights in the effect policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system (i.e., 
fisheries management), (2) informing a group larger than the model development team about 
the outcome of the microworld (i.e., the “create-and-share”-approach (Kreutzer, 1995: 218)), 
and related to this (3) evaluating if stakeholders in the Belgian fisheries system actually learn 
from the developed microworld through a strictly controlled experimental design. 
                                                 
1
 www.ilvo.vlaanderen.be 
2
 www.ugent.be 
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1.1 Theory and conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework outlined below describes our approach to investigate learning 
from microworlds in fisheries management. It starts with explaining the underlying theory of 
learning at both the individual and organisational level. It also defines “microworlds” and 
states where they fit in the individual and organisational learning processes. 
 
1.1.1 Individual learning 
 
Psychologists, linguists, educators, and others have heavily researched the topic of learning at 
the individual level (Kim, 1993b). Numerous theories about the way humans learn have been 
proposed, debated and tested (e.g., Hergenhahm et al., 1993; Hilgard et al., 1966). However, 
despite all this research, relatively little is known about the human mind and the learning 
process (Kim, 1993b). Moreover, until the 1970s (former behavioural theories), learning was 
commonly defined as a product - a change in behaviour. It was the outcome of some process. 
However, over the following decades, this product-oriented definition was changed toward a 
process-oriented definition (Kim, 1993a). Despite this long-lasting tendency to see learning as 
a product, John Dewey had already described learning as a feedback process in the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century. He depicted learning as an iterative cycle of inventions, observations, 
reflection and action (Schön, 1992). This iterative cycle evolved over the years and appeared 
in many forms in a variety of research fields using different terms, but it always visualized the 
same underlying feedback process (Altman et al., 1998; Garvin, 2000). For instance, in total 
quality management literature, it showed up as the Shewhart-Deming-cycle of Plan-Do-
Check/Study-Act or PDCA (Landesberg, 1999; Sterman, 2000). In organisational 
development, the Schein‟s cycle of Observation, emotional Reaction, Judgment, and 
Intervention (ORJI-cycle) is observed (Schein, 1987, 1988) whereas in action science, Argyris 
and Schön (1978) used a Discovery-Intervention-Production-Generalization cycle of learning. 
In organisational learning theory, Kim (1993a; 1993b) refers to Kofman‟s version of the 
learning cycle: the Observe-Assess-Design-Implement (OADI) cycle. Finally, others call this 
cycle “the wheel of learning” consisting of Questions-Ideas-Tests-Reflections (Handy, 1995) 
and Vogt (1995) refers to this learning cycle as the Observe-Reflect-Abstract-Experiment-
cycle. Consequently, the process-oriented definition of learning is now widely agreed upon by 
scholars and serves as a basis for its many working definitions. In fact, most scholars define 
learning as “a process that unfolds over time and links it with knowledge acquisition, deeper 
understanding, and improved performance“ (Garvin, 2000: 9). However, there is still no 
generally accepted definition of learning since its meaning varies widely with the context 
(Garvin, 2000; Kim, 1993a). 
 
It is important to be clear that learning is distinct from memory because “learning has more to 
do with acquisition, whereas memory has more to do with retention of whatever was 
acquired” (Kim, 1993b: 39). Powers (1973: 205) defines memory as “the storage and retrieval 
of information carried by neural signals” and draws an analogy to computer memory. These 
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storage and retrieval processes are also prominent in other definitions of memory. For 
instance, Miller et al. (1960) see memory as “plans for retrieval”, without which storage 
would be meaningless, whereas Anderson (1983) divides memory into three types: (1) 
declarative memory, which contains permanent records that have been stored for retrieval, (2) 
working memory, which is basically declarative memory that has been retrieved from active 
use and (3) production memory, which is engaged when an action is being executed. 
However, each of these views on memory misses the active role memory plays in the learning 
process because what a person already has in this memory affects what he learns and what he 
learns affects his memory (Ayas et al., 1996a; Kim, 1993b; Walsh et al., 1991). This 
interaction between learning and memory is fundamental to individual learning because 
“learning without memory would require relearning everything as if it were the first time, 
while memory without learning would be like a storage drum with no inflow whose 
usefulness decays over time” (Kim, 1993a: 51). As a result, one must make a distinction 
between “stored” memory and “active” structures that affect an individual‟s thinking process. 
This thesis follows Senge‟s (1990), Kim‟s (1993a) and Ayas and Foppen‟s (1996a) views by 
referring to these active structures as an individual‟s mental models. 
 
Mental models are widely discussed in psychology and philosophy (e.g., Gentner et al., 
1983). Different theorists describe mental models as “collections of routines or standard 
operating procedures, scripts for selecting possible actions, cognitive maps of the domain, the 
typologies for categorizing experience, logical structures for the interpretation of language, or 
attributions about individuals who encounter in daily life” (Sterman, 2000: 16). As a result, 
the concept of mental models differs from the traditional notion of memory as static storage 
because “they play an active role in what an individual sees and does” (Kim, 1993a: 53). In 
fact, Senge (1990: 174) defines mental models as “deeply held internal images of how the 
world works”. Hence, mental models represent a person‟s view of the world, including both 
implicit and explicit understandings. They function as a context for viewing and interpreting 
new information, and they determine how stored information is relevant to a given situation. 
Kim (1993b: 39) makes the comparison with a computer‟s source code and states: “they are 
like a source code of a computer‟s operating system, the manager and arbiter of acquiring, 
retaining, using, and deleting new information. But they are also much more than that because 
they are also like the programmer of that source code with the know-how to design a different 
source code as well as the know-why to choose one over the other.” 
 
Including individual mental models in the working definition of learning allows 
distinguishing different levels of learning which can be seen as “a hierarchy based on the 
level of insight and association building” (Fiol et al., 1985: 807). Although these levels of 
learning are “progressively more difficult to attain and can be associated with improving the 
quality of learning” (Ayas et al., 1996b: 52), each level of learning can be optimal depending 
on the situation in which the decision maker finds him- or herself (Argyris, 1977; Argyris et 
al., 1978). Perhaps the most commonly known distinction is the one between single- and 
double-loop learning (Argyris et al., 1978; Sterman, 2000). Others have also made this 
distinction but labelled it as (1) habit-forming versus discovery learning (Hedberg et al., 
1976), (2) reactive versus proactive learning (Miles et al., 1980), (3) lower-level learning 
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versus higher-level learning (Fiol et al., 1985), (4) behavioural level and strategy level 
learning (Duncan, 1974; Dutton et al., 1987), (5) operational versus conceptual learning 
(Kim, 1993a, 1993b), (6) adaptive versus generative learning (Senge, 1990), (7) tactical 
versus strategic learning (Dodgson, 1991, 1993), and (8) learning at the level of “rules” versus 
at the level of “insights” (Swieringa et al., 1992). Single-loop learning is the learning process 
in which “decision makers compare information about the state of the real system to various 
goals, perceive discrepancies between desired and actual states, and take actions that (they 
believe) will cause the real world to move towards the desired state” (Sterman, 2000: 15). 
However, information feedback about the real world is not the only input on which decision-
making is based, since decision-making is also the result of strategies and decision rules 
founded in the mental models of the decision makers. In double-loop learning, information 
feedback about the real world not only alters decisions within the context of existing 
strategies and decision rules, but also feeds back to alter mental models. As mental models 
change, strategies and decision rules become revised and therefore the same information 
processed and interpreted by a different decision rule now yields a different decision 
(Sterman, 2000). However, besides single- and double-loop learning, the literature also 
distinguishes between zero-learning (Romme et al., 1999) and deutero-learning (Argyris et 
al., 1978; Visser, 2003) or what Romme et al., (1999) calls triple-loop learning and Swieringa 
and Wierdsma (1992) refer to as learning at the level of “principles”. Zero-learning occurs 
when decision makers perceive discrepancies between desired and actual states of the world 
but fail to take corrective actions. Similarly, but at the organisational level, Romme (1999: 
439) states that zero-learning occurs in organisations when “fresh imperatives or problems 
arise, yet members fail to take corrective action”. Deutero-learning is the ability to learn 
about how to carry out single- and double-loop learning. It is “learning to learn” or “second-
order learning” (Argyris et al., 1978). This study examines only single- and double loop 
learning.  
 
Up to this point, learning has been discussed at the individual level in which the individual 
decision maker acts in complete isolation. However, in reality, this is never the case since the 
individual is influenced by the broader institutional/organisational environment in which he or 
she operates. One must then examine organisational learning theory and the link between 
individual learning and organisational learning. 
 
1.1.2 Organisational learning 
 
Organisational learning was introduced in the 1960s (e.g., Cangelosi et al., 1965) and is still a 
young research field. Research on organisational learning “gained momentum through the 
publication of The Fifth Discipline by Peter Senge (1990) from the Sloan School of 
Management (MIT), and the special edition on organizational learning in Organization 
Science (1991)” (Romme et al., 1997: 68). The concept of organisational learning has been 
taken from the psychological concept of individual learning (Weick, 1991). It follows that a 
substantial part of its theory is based primarily on observations of learning individuals (Huber, 
1991; Kim, 1993b; Sterman, 1989). Nevertheless, clear “distinctions must be made between 
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individual and organisational learning” (Fiol et al., 1985: 804). The topic of organisational 
learning has gained a lot of attention in recent years, but there is still little agreement on what 
is meant by organisational learning (Garvin, 2000; Kim, 1993b). The literature shows two 
current approaches in defining the concept of organisational learning, which Romme and 
Dillen (1997) refer to as normative versus descriptive definitions. The normative definition 
refers to certain requirements an organisation must satisfy in order to be known as a “learning 
organisation” (e.g., Bomers, 1989; Garvin, 1993; Hayes, 1988; Kline et al., 1993; Senge, 
1990) while the descriptive approach stresses that organisational learning is a process 
analogous to the individual learning process (Table 1.1). This thesis follows the descriptive 
approach to organisational learning.  
 
Table 1.1: An overview of descriptive definitions of organisational learning  
Reference  Descriptive definitions of organisational learning 
(Argyris, 1977)  Organisational learning is the process of detecting and correcting error. 
(Daft et al., 1984)  Organisational learning is defined as the process by which knowledge 
about action-outcome relationships between the organisation and the 
environment is developed. 
(Fiol et al., 1985)  Organisational learning means the process of improving actions 
through better knowledge and understanding. 
(Levitt et al., 1988)  Organisations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history 
into routines that guide behaviour. 
(Stata, 1989)  Organisational learning occurs through shared insights, knowledge, and 
mental models ... [and] builds on past knowledge and experience - that 
is, on memory. 
(Huber, 1991)  An entity learns if, through its processing of information, the range of 
potential behaviours is increased.  
(Kim, 1993b)  Organisational learning is defined as increasing an organisation‟s 
capacity to take effective action. 
(Source: Own compilation, adapted from Garvin, 2000: 10) 
 
The relationship between individual learning and organisational learning is paradoxical 
(Argyris, 1993; Argyris et al., 1978; Bomers, 1989; Huber, 1991; Kim, 1993a; Romme et al., 
1997; Senge, 1990), or as Kim (1993b: 37) puts it: “obvious and subtle”. Obvious because all 
organisations are composed of individuals and therefore individual learning is an important 
and necessary condition of organisational learning. Subtle, since the organisation is capable of 
learning independent of any single individual, but not independent of all individuals (Argyris 
et al., 1978; Kim, 1993b; Romme et al., 1997). Consequently, individual learning is important 
to organisations, but organisational learning is not simply the sum of each members‟ learning 
(Dodgson, 1993; Fiol et al., 1985; Kim, 1993b; Kline et al., 1993; Liebowitz, 2000) because 
organisations influence the learning of their members and store that which has been learned. 
Consequently, similar to individuals having a memory, organisations also have cognitive 
systems and memories through which certain modes of behaviour, mental models, norms and 
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values are acquired, retained and shared (Altman et al., 1998; Daft et al., 1984; Garvin, 2000; 
Hedberg, 1981; Liebowitz, 2000; Thompson, 1995; Weintraub, 1995). The aggregation of  
these cognitive systems and memories are often referred to as “organisational memory” 
(Walsh et al., 1991). Since organisational memory is analogous to individual memory, it also 
consists of “stored memory” and “active structures”, of which the latter affects a member‟s 
individual mental models and are therefore commonly referred to as shared mental models 
(Kim, 1993b). 
 
Shared mental models consist of (1) organisational routines including standard operating 
procedures, and (2) an organisation‟s world view in the form of shared frameworks or what 
Kim (1993b: 42) refers to as “weltanschauungen”. Organisational routines have a tremendous 
impact on individual learning since they are “commonly accepted practices and procedures 
that are uniform, unvarying, and performed without thinking” (Garvin, 2000: 19). Levitt and 
March (1988: 320) refer to them as “the experiential lessons of history” that improve the 
organisation‟s efficiency through standardisation, saving time and effort (Garvin, 2000: 20). 
They are in line with the organisations‟ shared frameworks or “weltanschauungen” and 
therefore “serve stability and preserve status quo instead of promoting change and reforms” 
(Ayas et al., 1996b: 55). As such, performing organisational routines can be defined as 
organisational single-loop learning (Kim, 1993a, 1993b). However, there is also a downside 
to performing organisational routines since they can lead to crises (Weintraub, 1995) 
frequently related to the notions of (1) “skilled incompetence” (Argyris, 1986, 1996), (2) 
“competency traps” (Levitt et al., 1988), (3) “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992), (4) 
“defensive routines” (Argyris, 1985), and (5) “paradigm paralysis” (Marshall et al., 1995). 
However, especially if such crises occur, there are opportunities for members of the 
organisation to get involved in individual double-loop learning (Argyris, 1977; Romme et al., 
1997). At that moment, there is an opportunity for the organisation to absorb individual 
learning into their shared mental models. This shifts the learning from the individual to the 
organisational level, commonly referred to as organisational double-loop learning (Kim, 
1993a, 1993b). However, the literature states that altering the shared mental models within an 
organisation is often not easy (Altman et al., 1998; Argyris et al., 1978; Romme et al., 1999; 
Romme et al., 1997; Senge, 1990) because it demands “inquisitiveness, openness and a 
willingness by managers to challenge assumptions and tackle conventional wisdom. 
Otherwise, behaviour will continue to be ruled by habit, and the status quo will remain 
undisturbed” (Garvin, 2000: 19). As such, organisational double-loop learning “violates a set 
of nested organisational norms” (Argyris et al., 1978: 3) or what Peter Drucker (1994) refers 
to as “the theory of the business” and what this thesis calls “shared mental models”. 
 
Argyris and Schön (1978: 28) formulated one of the key research question in organisational 
learning: “How can organisations learn to become better at double-loop learning?”. This 
research question has set scholars to work in finding ways of (1) enhancing individual double-
loop learning since altering shared mental models of an organisation starts by altering its 
member‟s individual mental models, and (2) sharing these altered individual mental models 
throughout the organisation. To accomplish these goals the literature proposes many tools, 
such as simulation, role plays, and dialogue and discussion (Bennett et al., 1995; Isaacs, 1993; 
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Romme et al., 1997; Schein, 2003; Warren et al., 1999). Although they are all admittedly of 
some value, this thesis focuses on the use of simulation models, specifically microworlds, in 
enhancing individual and organisational double-loop learning. 
 
1.1.3 Conceptual framework 
 
Figure 1.1 depicts the conceptual framework of this thesis. This framework translates the 
above-mentioned theory on individual and organisational learning into the world of fisheries 
management and illustrates where microworlds fit in. Additionally, it includes the broader 
environmental context in which organisations and their members work, as fisheries 
management is not made by one single organisation acting in complete isolation. However, 
this conceptual framework does not aim to include all relevant concepts to fisheries 
management, nor does it offer an exhaustive overview of current debates. It only represents 
challenging issues related to learning from microworlds in fisheries management. 
 
We conceptualise fisheries management as a policy development process that consists of 
single- and double-loop learning processes at both the individual and organisational level. At 
the heart of policy development is the process of discussing policy ideas amongst 
stakeholders (i.e., organisations) in an attempt to arrive at actual policy decisions that are in 
line with previously discussed policy goals and directions. These policy decisions are then 
implemented in the real world/system, leading to information feedback. In turn, this 
information feedback allows individuals to evaluate the implemented policy decisions based 
on their individual mental models about the desired state of the fisheries system. Eventually, 
this evaluation results in new or similar policy ideas that can be further tested throughout this 
individual single-loop learning process. In addition, information feedback from the real world 
can also result into individual double-loop learning when it not only alters policy ideas but 
also feeds back to alter the individual‟s mental models. If this happens, different policy ideas 
will emerge from the same information because this information is now processed and 
interpreted by these new mental models. 
 
Next, since decision makers are members of organisations, these organisations‟ shared mental 
models influence the decision maker‟s individual single- and double-loop learning processes 
through affecting their individual mental models. Hence, individuals from different 
organisations may perceive the same information feedback from the real world differently, 
resulting in different policy ideas. In turn, individual double-loop learning processes may also 
influence the shared mental models of the organisation through debating and discussing 
(Morecroft, 1984) the information feedback from the real world in the light of the altered 
individual mental models of its members. When these debates and discussions are successful, 
the altered individual mental models become absorbed in the organisation‟s shared mental 
models. Additionally, changed individual- and shared mental models in combination with 
information feedback can also result in setting new policy directions or goals for future 
fisheries management through debate and discussion. 
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Finally, this conceptual framework must take policy paradigms into account. A policy 
paradigm is “a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy 
and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the 
problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the 
very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is 
influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as 
a whole” (Hall, 1993: 279). Hence, such policy paradigms, like organisational shared mental 
models, also influence individual mental models. If this happens, individuals will align their 
policy ideas with the policy paradigm they have encountered and will try to implement these 
policy ideas into the real system through bringing them into debate and discussion when 
setting policy decisions. If such policy ideas get implemented, information feedback from the 
real world can be used at the individual level to (1) refine policy ideas or (2) (further) revise 
mental models. Additionally, information about the real system can also feed back at the 
organisational level to alter the organisations‟ shared mental models through debate and 
discussion. Finally, debate and discussion of this information feedback can also result in 
altered policy directions and goals and even (but probably more in the long run) in altering the 
policy paradigm itself; this is repeatedly referred to in the literature as a “paradigm shift” 
(Kuhn, 1962). 
 
Up to now, this conceptual framework has dealt with what is referred to as “real world 
feedback” (Kunc et al., 2006: 4) or “experimenting with reality” (De Geus, 1996: 32). 
However, real-world feedback of the kind outlined above cannot always be relied on to alter 
mental models or policy directions because information feedback from the real world is not 
available until implementation is well underway and therefore massively delayed. Hence, it is 
often already too late to alter policy directions or goals when real world information feeds 
back to the decision makers - possible damage to the system has often already been done. One 
way to overcome this learning deficiency is the use of simulation models or microworlds to 
test policy ideas. This enables the organisations to test the policy ideas for future impact 
before implementing them in the real world. This modelling capability introduces a new 
feedback path to the conceptual framework with identically the same feedback processes 
towards (1) individual policy ideas, (2) individual mental models, (3) shared mental models, 
(4) policy directions and goals, and (5) policy paradigms as in the real world feedback 
processes. However, the main difference is that the rehearsal capability of microworlds 
introduces fast-acting “virtual feedback” (Kunc et al., 2006), which policymakers can use to 
adjust policy ideas in order to anticipate and avoid meaningless policy discussions or, at 
worst, implementation of inferior policies in the real world. At the heart of this thesis are 
these virtual feedback learning processes, specifically the individual single- and double loop 
learning that occurs from using microworlds (both types of learning are indicated with a grey 
square in the conceptual framework). 
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Figure 1.1: The conceptual framework 
 
(Source: Own compilation, composed of Kim, 1993b; Kunc et al., 2006; Morecroft, 1984; Sterman, 
2000) 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
This thesis investigates to what extent learning takes place from microworlds. Many of the 
“virtual feedback”-links in the conceptual framework (Figure 1.1) lack conclusive proof 
because there is little well-structured evaluation research. These links thus present “axiomatic 
beliefs” about learning processes from microworlds and have given rise to the key research 
questions of this dissertation. This thesis also represents ILVO‟s first steps toward developing 
microworlds that could play a central role in formulating a long-term strategy for the Belgian 
fisheries system. The first two research questions serve to gain insights into the Belgian 
fisheries system itself (i.e., the real world) before simulating it. The third research question is 
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about playing in our microworld, which reveals the long-term effects policy instruments have 
on the Belgian fisheries system. The last research question evaluates whether stakeholders in 
the Belgian fisheries system learn from our microworld through a strictly controlled 
experimental design.  
 
The first two research questions, about gaining insight into the Belgian fisheries system map 
the various competitive strategies present in the Belgian fishing industry. 
 
1. Do firms in the Belgian fishing industry cluster around a limited array of 
competitive strategies (i.e., strategic groups) that result in performance differences? 
 
Fiegenbaum et al. (1988: 21) state that “identifying the strategic dimensions that define 
strategic groups is a key issue in understanding how competitors formulate their strategies” 
and that “strategic groups help us understand which firms compete strongly with each other”. 
Consequently, knowing these strategic differences between firms within the same industry is 
crucial when managing fisheries and implementing public policies (Oster, 1982: 376). Hence, 
identifying these strategic groups is essential for developing a long-term strategy for the 
Belgian fisheries system. Moreover, it will also help in developing the microworld since a 
decision will need to be made about how to include the fishing fleet in the microworld. Does 
it need to be included as a homogenous fleet consisting of homogenous agents, or do intra-
industry groupings (i.e., strategic groups) exist that must be taken into account in the 
microworld? 
See Chapter 2 below. 
 
2. Do firms in the Belgian fishing industry stick to their competitive strategy in the 
long-term? 
 
In line with the first research question, it is also valuable to investigate if the firms stick to 
their competitive strategy over the long run since this would allow us to omit “firm-
movement” (Fiegenbaum et al., 1993: 75) between groups in the microworld. This would 
drastically simplify the microworld. 
See Chapter 2 below. 
 
The next research question examines the long-term effects that policy instruments have on the 
Belgian fisheries system, as revealed by policymakers‟ play in the microworld. 
 
3. Do policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to align the real fisheries 
world with the desired world of their individual mental models? 
 
Single-loop learning in fisheries management is the learning process in which policymakers 
compare information about the state of the real fisheries system to various goals, perceive 
discrepancies between desired and actual states, and take actions in the form of policies, that 
(they believe) will cause the real world to move towards the desired state. However, the 
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question remains to what extent do policymakers in Belgian fisheries have the policy 
instruments at hand to take such corrective actions. 
See Chapter 4 below. 
 
The last question evaluates whether stakeholders in the Belgian fisheries system learn from 
the microworld, using a strictly controlled experimental design. 
 
4. Do stakeholders learn (differently) from playing with microworlds? 
 
This research question focuses on the individual single- and double loop virtual feedback 
learning processes from microworlds. It tests whether these virtual feedback learning 
processes actually exist or if they are only the creation of flimsily-based elaborate theorising.  
See Chapter 5 below. 
 
1.3 Research contributions 
 
The point of writing a doctoral thesis is, on the one hand, to conduct research that contributes 
knowledge to a scientific discipline, and on the other hand, to apply that knowledge to the 
practice of a profession (Schneberger et al., 2009; Van De Ven, 1989). The following 
questions thus arise: do the answers to this set of research questions contribute to science? 
Are these research questions and answers relevant to the practice of our profession? 
 
1.3.1 Scientific contribution 
 
Contributing to the advances of science equals contributing to theory (Whetten, 1989). 
However, not everyone agrees on what constitutes a theoretical contribution (e.g., Colquitt et 
al., 2007; Whetten, 1989). Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007) state that theoretical 
contributions are generally characterised as theory building or theory testing (or both). Hence, 
they combine these two types of contributions to create a two dimensional space in which the 
contribution of each empirical study can be mapped. They also identify five important areas 
in this space resulting in a taxonomy that can be used to categorise and “label” an empirical 
study‟s theoretical contribution as: (1) reporters, (2) testers, (3) qualifiers, (4) builders, and (5) 
expanders. This thesis uses both this space and taxonomy to visualise where the theoretical 
contribution of each of our research questions is situated (Figure 1.2). Since this thesis is in 
applied economics it is not surprising that most research questions aim to test existing theory 
instead of build theory. Therefore, the contribution of this thesis can be situated in the bottom 
right hand corner of Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan‟s (2007) scientific contribution space. 
 
To be more specific, the first two research questions aim to test if strategic group theory also 
holds true in the case of the Belgian fishing industry. Since strategic group theory is a “true 
theory” (Sutton et al., 1995) or what Schneberger et al. (2009: 54) would refer to as a “big T 
theory”, addressing research questions 1 and 2 need to be situated on the horizontal axis at the 
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level of “grounding predictions with existing theory”. On the vertical axis, they need to be 
situated at the lowest level of theory building, since they attempt only to replicate previously 
demonstrated effects, now within the Belgian fishing industry. These research questions will 
result in empirical research which can be classified as a “tester”. They investigate the 
generalisation of strategic group theory to a new industry. Therefore, they also investigate if 
the temporal and contextual factors (i.e., the “who”, “where” and “when” of a theory 
(Whetten, 1989)) that set the boundaries for the generalisation of a theory can be expanded. 
This is an important scientific contribution because generalisation is a core characteristic of 
any “big T theory”. Additionally, in addressing these research questions, this thesis also 
applies and tests the rigid methodological approach of Ketchen and Shook (1996) in 
identifying clusters in strategic management research. 
 
The research on the third research question is more of a “qualifier” as it contains moderate 
levels of both theory testing and theory building. Its aim is only to illustrate whether 
policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to align the real fisheries world with the 
desired world of their individual mental model. This question examines effects that have been 
previously theorised about in fisheries management science. This research is not conclusive in 
nature. Its purpose is exploratory as it grounds its predictions mainly on existing conceptual 
arguments. Nevertheless, its real scientific value lies in further introducing microworlds in 
fisheries management science – a tool that allows policymakers to visualise and rehearse 
fisheries policy strategies grounded in fisheries management theory. 
 
Last, the fourth research question tests to what extent different stakeholders learn from 
playing with microworlds. It tests the axiomatic belief of individual and organisational 
learning theory that decision makers do learn from using microworlds. Consequently, it 
grounds predications in existing theory and examines important effects that have been the 
subject of prior theorising. This study will be a „tester‟ but goes beyond simply replicating 
previous well-demonstrated effects. Hence, it contributes more to theory when compared to 
the research necessary to address the first two research questions. This research verifies if the 
connections between the concepts related to individual single- and double-loop learning from 
microworlds are correct. As such, it tests what Whetten (1989) refers to as the “how” of the 
theory. This is vital to future justification of using microworlds in learning processes. 
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Figure 1.2: Scientific contribution of this thesis (“RQ” = “Research Question”) 
 
 
(Source: Own compilation, adapted from Colquitt et al., 2007) 
 
1.3.2 Practical relevance 
 
This thesis is also relevant to the work of policymakers and practitioners, particularly in the 
fields of fisheries and fisheries management. 
 
The study on strategic groups in Belgian fisheries has practical relevance for both 
policymakers and ship owners. Introducing strategic group theory to fisheries management 
could simplify the current Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. Policymakers 
can use strategic group theory to simplify both fisheries management and regulation, as 
strategic group theory shows “which firms compete strongly with each other” (Fiegenbaum et 
al., 1988: 21). The knowledge of these strategic differences between firms is crucial to both 
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managing fisheries and implementing public policies (Oster, 1982: 376). As a result, strategic 
groups can form the basis for developing regulation instead of using either (1) tremendously 
detailed typologies of sub fleets solely based on technical characteristics (i.e., fishing 
methods, gear modifications and mesh sizes) (EC, 2002) or (2) overly specified classification 
systems based on métiers (EC, 2008) which probably need simplification (i.e., aggregation of 
métiers into fleet segments) if they want to be workable in practice. Moreover, this strategic 
group approach would result in a more strategic form of regulation. This means that the 
regulation would emphasise (1) affecting strategic groups‟ competitive advantages and (2) 
managing rivalry between strategic groups. In addition, this would also limit the range of 
policy instruments needed to regulate fisheries. Ship owners can use the results on the 
performance of these strategic groups to determine if they are still satisfied with their current 
strategic direction, and if so, they can compare their performance to the average performance 
of their group peers. It shows them the different performance potentials for the different 
competitive strategies in the current industry. This then allows them to reflect on current 
business and change strategic course if desired, based on performance indicators. 
 
The second aspect of this thesis is a microworld in which stakeholders of the Belgian fisheries 
system can “play” and gain long-term insight into the effect that policy instruments would 
have on the Belgian fisheries system. Consequently, this microworld is a learning laboratory 
for ex ante evaluation of possible policy strategies (De Geus, 1997; Keys et al., 1996) since it 
offers a risk free environment in which policy strategies can be evaluated much faster than in 
the real world (De Geus, 1997; Sterman, 2000). In addition, it can also be used as a 
transitional object in which strategies are rehearsed and visualised (Morecroft, 1999) bringing 
them into debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984) among stakeholder groups. This can lead 
to a better mutual understanding among the stakeholder groups of the fisheries management 
problems resulting in changing (1) knowledge, (2) attitudes, and (3) behaviour toward policy 
instruments and management systems as a whole. Additionally, developing and running this 
microworld can also introduce the value of simulation to practitioners within the Belgian 
fisheries system. 
 
1.4 Research design and structure of the thesis 
 
1.4.1 Research design 
 
The proposed research questions will be investigated through the research design represented 
in Figure 1.3. It presents an overview of the different steps in the research, their exploratory 
or conclusive objectives and the way they are linked with data sources and methods. A more 
detailed description of the different methodologies is described in the relevant chapters in 
addition to further analysis and the presentation of the results. 
 
The first step of this thesis is to examine the first two research questions related to strategic 
groups in the Belgian fishing fleet using secondary data in conclusive research. This data was 
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collected between 1997 and 2006 and is found in two databases: (1) “Belsamp”, a database 
hosted at the Section Fisheries Biology of ILVO-Fisheries, and (2) the database of the Belgian 
Sea Fishery Service of the Flemish government hosting accounting data. However, since most 
accounting data in the Belgian fisheries industry is currently still collected through surveys 
that are taken on a voluntary basis, sample sizes average only 50% of the total fleet. 
Additional data is collected at the fishing firms where necessary, which results in sufficiently 
large samples. The methodology used to determine valid strategic groups in the Belgian 
fishing industry is a combination of cluster- and discriminant analysis. Finally, non-
parametrical statistical tests are performed to determine performance differences between 
these groupings and the second research question on firm movements among these groupings 
is addressed based on comparing simple counts and percentages. 
 
The second step of this thesis is to develop a microworld about the Belgian fisheries system 
and the effect policy instruments have on it. The link between the previous study and this 
microworld is that the study helped us gain insight into the organisation of the fishing 
industry and use it to develop the microworld. The applied modelling methodology is system 
dynamics. The insights and information needed to develop the microworld were based on 
scientific expert group meetings of fisheries scientists from ILVO. These insights and 
information were then verified, where possible, through literature and simple data analyses. 
Finally, informal contacts with the fishing industry and policymakers made our 
conceptualisation of the fisheries system more accurate. To run this microworld, secondary 
data was collected between 1997 and 2006, mainly from the same two databases as the 
previous study, i.e., (1) “Belsamp” and (2) the database of the Belgian Sea Fishery Service of 
the Flemish government. We collected additional data from (1) official legislation documents 
and (2) yearly reports on the state of Belgian fisheries published by the Belgian Sea Fishery 
Service of the Flemish government. 
 
After having developed the microworld, the third step was to run the microworld and research 
if policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to align the real fisheries system with the 
desired one embedded in their individual mental model. The method used is running multiple 
scenarios through the microworld in an attempt to meet four predefined objective functions 
(or social welfare functions) in fisheries management. The latter serve the purpose of 
reflecting the different individual mental models policymakers can have about the desired 
state of the fisheries system. Hence, the nature of this study is explorative and based on 
secondary data.  
 
This thesis ends by formulating an answer to the research questions related to learning from 
microworlds. For this, an experiment was performed involving three stakeholder groups at 
both the national and European level of the Belgian fisheries system. They were (1) 
policymakers, (2) scientists and (3) ship owners and skippers. A total of 57 participants 
played with our microworld within the context of a “before-after with control group”-
experiment. This experimental design illustrates the causal effect a microworld has on 
individual learning processes. The research design is conclusive and is based on primary data 
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collected through the questionnaires administered both pre- and post-test. The analysis also 
applies different forms of analysis of variances.  
 
Figure 1.3: Research design, data source and methods 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
1.4.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters structured into two parts. Figure 1.4 provides a visual 
overview of how these six chapters are interrelated. 
 
The introductory chapter presents the research problems, questions, framework and design of 
the thesis. Part I (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) presents the framework in which the microworld was 
developed and tested. Chapter 2 illustrates the organisation of the fishing industry. It borrows 
the concept of strategic groups, together with its theory from the field of strategic 
management, and applies it to the case of the Belgian fishing fleet. This chapter investigates if 
strategic groups in the Belgian fishing fleet can be defined based on their differences in 
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competitive strategies. Additionally, it also looks at performance differences, firm movement 
and group loyalty between these groupings. Chapter 3 then presents the microworld about the 
Belgian fisheries system. This microworld (1) serves as a tool to learn about fisheries 
management and (2) investigates if stakeholders learn from microworlds. The link between 
this third chapter and the second is that the second helps to gain insights in the organisation of 
the fishing industry that can now be used in the process of developing the microworld. 
Finally, Chapter 4 then looks at fisheries management using the microworld developed in 
Chapter 3 and investigates whether policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to align 
the real fisheries system with the desired one embedded in their individual mental model. Part 
II (Chapter 5) investigates whether stakeholders learn (differently) from the microworld. This 
was based on experimental results where three stakeholder groups from both the national and 
European level of the Belgian fisheries system participated: (1) policymakers, (2) scientists 
and (3) ship owners and skippers. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the main results, 
research limitations, implications of our findings and directions for future research. 
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Figure 1.4: Structure of the thesis 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
1.5 Belgian fisheries: a brief overview of the empirical 
setting 
 
The Belgian fleet is currently the smallest fleet active in the Northeast Atlantic region of the 
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region is heavily fished, with roughly 60000 fishing vessels landing about 4.5 million tonnes 
of fish and employing almost 200000 fishermen (Polet et al., 2006). Because the Belgian fleet 
is small, its gross added value to the gross domestic product of Belgium is 0.04%, or 1.9% to 
the total value of agro- and horticulture (Anon., 2007). Nevertheless, since Belgium has a 
very small coast line, this industry is important at the regional level of the coastal area 
because it directly employs 900 persons at approximately 100 family-run shipping companies. 
Further, indirect employment in the fish processing industry is estimated at 1329 people and 
5000 people in fisheries related side industries (Anon., 2007). This industry also has an 
impact on the regional socio-economic structure: specific trades correlated with fisheries, 
distribution chains, fish processing companies, fish traders, catering industry and coastal 
tourism (Van den Eynde et al., 2009). However, future prospects are not good for the Belgian 
fisheries industry. The current crisis is bankrupting many shipping companies (Polet et al., 
2006; Polet et al., 2007; Stouten et al., 2007c; Van den Eynde et al., 2009). Fleet size has 
declined dramatically between 1950 and 2007; from 457 to 107 vessels, respectively (Figure 
1.5). One might expect that such dramatic decline in fleet size to be accompanied by a similar 
major decline in total fleet capacity in terms of gross tonnage and engine power. However, 
both gross tonnage and engine power have remained quite stable. The reason for this is that 
the average gross tonnage (GT) and engine power (kW) per vessel have multiplied over these 
years resulting in a small but powerful fleet; where in 1950 an average vessel only had 58 GT 
and 97 kW, one in 2006 had 187 GT and 563 kW. 
 
Figure 1.5: Key figures of the Belgian fishing fleet, 1950-2006 (“GT” = “Gross Tonnage”; 
“kW” = “Vessel power in kW”; the vertical dashed line separates 10 year linear interpolated 
data from yearly data) 
 
(Source: Own compilation, adapted from Tessens et al., 2006a) 
 
The main fishing method in Belgian fisheries is beam trawling, practised by almost 95% of 
the fleet. Beam trawling is an active fishing method in which nets are towed over the sea-bed 
(Figure 1.6). A horizontal beam keeps the net open (Gabriel et al., 2005; Van Craeynest, 
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2008). Beam trawling is a highly mixed fishery and contains a number of problems such as 
high fuel and material consumption (Depestele et al., 2006; Polet et al., 2007; Stouten et al., 
2007c; Van Craeynest, 2008), heavy seafloor impact (Anon., 2005; Hilborn, 2007b; 
Lindeboom et al., 1998; Polet et al., 2006; Polet et al., 2007) and low species- and size-
selectivity (Fonteyne et al., 2002; Lindeboom et al., 1998). The other 5% of the fishing is 
done using otter trawling and passive fishing methods like trammel and gill netting (Van 
Craeynest, 2008). Otter trawling is also an active fishing method but differs from beam 
trawling since the horizontal spread of the net is now ensured through the hydrodynamic force 
exerted to the otter doors (Figure 1.6) (Gabriel et al., 2005). Hence, its main advantage 
compared to beam trawling is reduced water resistance and less contact with the sea-bed 
resulting in reduced fuel costs and ecological damage (Van Craeynest, 2008; Vanderperren, 
2008). Finally, passive fishing methods is a collective name grouping the fishing methods 
where “the fish comes voluntarily to the gear” (Gabriel et al., 2005: 5). The main advantages 
of passive fishing is excellent fuel efficiency and low sea-bed impact (Depestele et al., 2008; 
Verhaeghe et al., 2008). These fishing methods are only marginally used in Belgium, but of 
them, trammel nets are most common. Trammel netting anchor nets at sea in an upright 
position, allowing fish to swim into it. In trammel nets, fish get entangled in the poorly visible 
netting (Figure 1.6) (Depestele et al., 2008; Gabriel et al., 2005; Verhaeghe et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 1.6: Main fishing methods in Belgium, from left to right: (1) beam trawling, (2)  otter 
trawling and (3) trammel netting 
   
(Source: www.greenpeace.org) 
 
The Belgian fleet is active in several ICES-areas (Figure 1.7), the most important of which are 
(1) Central North Sea (IVb), (2) Southern North Sea (IVc), (3) Irish Sea (VIIa), (4) Eastern 
Channel (VIId), (5) Bristol Channel (VIIf) and (6) South East Ireland (VIIg). The less 
important fishing grounds are (1) Skagerrak (IIIa), (2) Northern North Sea (IVa), (3) West 
Scotland (Via), (4) Western Channel (VIIe), (5) South East of Ireland (only VIIh and VIIj) 
and (6) the Gulf of Gascogne (only VIIIa). In 2006, the fleet landed 20264 tonne fish from 
these fishing grounds worth over 90M euro. Ninety percent of these landings were sold in 
Belgian auctions and supplied Belgian consumers with approximately 12% of their demand 
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for wild fish (Anon., 2007). When looking at the evolution of these landings over the last 
decades, it is clear that the Belgian fleet‟s total landings declined from roughly 54000 in 1950 
to 20000 tonnes in 2006 (Figure 1.8).  However, when expressed in monetary value, the total 
landed value of fish increased significantly over these decades. This is mainly due to the 
almost exponential growth in average fish prices.  
 
Figure 1.7: Fishing grounds were the Belgian fishing fleet is active (“Dark grey” = “Important 
fishing ground” and “Light grey” = “Less important fishing ground”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation, based on ICES areas) 
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Figure 1.8: Total landings of the Belgian fishing fleet (in tonne and current €), 1950-2006 (the 
vertical dashed line separates 5 year linear interpolated data from yearly data) 
 
(Source: Own compilation, adapted from Tessens et al., 2006a) 
 
As most Belgian vessels are beam trawlers, the total landings consist mainly of a mixture of 
demersal species. The top ten landed species in 2006 indicate that plaice (4885 tonne) and 
Dover sole (3818 tonne) are the most important species in landed weight, followed by ray 
(1777 tonne), cod (1326 tonne) and lemon sole (883 tonne) (Tessens et al., 2006a). Hence, 
plaice and Dover sole account for almost 50% of Belgian total landings. However, when 
looking at the landed value of these species, the rank order significantly changes. Dover sole 
is now by far the most important species, good for more than half the Belgian total landed 
value or 45M euro. Dover sole is followed far behind by plaice (9.74M euro), turbot (4.30M 
euro), lemon sole (4.18M euro) and anglerfish (4.15M euro). This clearly indicates a double 
overspecialisation in the Belgian fishing fleet: fishing method and target species. This makes 
the fleet vulnerable to sudden changes in the fishing environment, such as changes in fish 
consumption patterns, rising fuel prices and new policy directions, amongst others (Stouten et 
al., 2007b; Van den Eynde et al., 2009). 
 
This vulnerability of the double overspecialised Belgian fishing fleet to changes in the fishing 
environment brings us to a discussion of the Belgian‟s fisheries management system as it aims 
to regulate this fisheries environment. The Belgian fisheries management system is largely 
based on the European Union‟s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (EC, 2002), given that 
Belgium is a member state of the EU. Hence, these European regulations are adapted to the 
Belgian setting and complemented further by national rules (in the form of ministerial 
decisions). The CFP mainly contains biologically and economically restrictive policy 
instruments. The most important of these are: (1) Total Allowable Catches (TAC); often 
referred to as the “cornerstone of the CFP” (Karagiannakos, 1996), (2) maximum fishing days 
and (3) licences (Stouten et al., 2008). However, and despite evidence that they may 
exacerbate rather than reduce problems in fisheries (Mesnil, 2008; Sumaila et al., 2007), 
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public aid in the form of subsidies is also an important feature of the CFP. The Belgian 
fisheries management system contains seven important policy instruments, being: (1) total 
quota based on the TACs, (2) the allocation of these total quota over sub fleets, (3) maximum 
fishing days, (4) catch restrictions per fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, and 
(7) investment subsidies. 
 
When looking at the evolution of these policy instruments over time between 1986 and 2006, 
it is clear that the number of species under quota restrictions has increased from 11 to 24 
species. Despite more than doubling the number of species under quota restrictions, the total 
quota has declined significantly: from approximately 39000 to 29000 tonnes (approximately 
25% less). Additionally, the number of days fishermen were allowed to fish also declined 
from 285 to 260 days (a decline of around 10%). During this period, Belgium had also applied 
licencing and held several decommissioning rounds (e.g. 2004-2006) with increasing 
decommissioning fees per vessel in an attempt to reduce overcapacity by buying out 
unprofitable vessels and destroying their licences. Finally, during these two decades 
investment subsidies have also been widely granted to modernise older vessels and/or to 
experiment with other fishing methods. 
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Chapter 2: Strategic groups in the Belgian 
fishing fleet 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The field of strategic management research aims to explain the differences in performance of 
firms (Gonzalez-Fidalgo et al., 2002; Rumelt et al., 1994; Short et al., 2007). As a result, the 
determinants of performance have long been of central interest to strategic management 
researchers. Their research has emphasised determinants at four primary levels of analysis: (1) 
firm; (2) strategic group; (3) industry; and (4) nation (Gonzalez-Fidalgo et al., 2002; Porter, 
1998; Short et al., 2007). Research at the firm level focuses on how key within-organisation 
features shape outcomes. Perhaps the most popular perspective guiding this work is the 
resource-based view of the firm, which argues that a firm‟s bundle of resources and 
capabilities drive its performance (e.g., Barney, 1991, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995). 
Strategic groups researchers argue that firms cluster around a limited array of competitive 
strategies that result in performance differences (e.g., Cool et al., 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 
1990b; Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979). Research at the industry or nation level examines the extent 
to which the industries (e.g., Bain, 1972; Mason, 1939; Rumelt, 1991) or the nations (Porter, 
1998) where firms compete shape their performance. Although research has illustrated that 
each of these levels of analysis can explain a significant number of performance differences 
between firms (Gonzalez-Fidalgo et al., 2002; Porter, 1998; Short et al., 2007), this study 
examines the heterogeneity of the Belgian fishing fleet based on strategic group theory. 
 
Strategic group theory defines strategic groups as “clusters of firms within an industry that 
have common specific assets and thus follow common strategies in setting key decision 
variables” (Oster, 1990: 61). Strategic group theory adopts mostly “a post-strategy position, 
offering a taxonomy of strategies employed by firms, where individual firms are classified 
into strategic groups through comparison of past strategic investments” (Leask et al., 2005: 
458). As a result, strategic groups are an analytical tool to examine differences in firm 
performance primarily based on a firm‟s “realised strategy” (Mintzberg, 1978). Only a few 
studies  have defined strategic groups based on a firm‟s “intended strategy” (e.g., Dess et al., 
1984; Fombrun et al., 1987). Hence, strategic groups are “groupings” (Hatten et al., 1987) 
instead of “groups” since they are used as an analytical tool to define intra-industry 
taxonomies. 
 
In defining strategic groups, firms within an industry are clustered based on the homogeneity 
of their “past strategic investments”. These past strategic investments are primarily embodied 
in the state of the firm‟s “resource configuration” (Fiegenbaum et al., 1988: 8) because these 
strategic investments are a collection of past competitive strategic decisions that attempted to 
make sure that a firm‟s resource configurations could not readily be “imitated by firms 
outside the group without substantial costs, significant elapsed time, or uncertainty about the 
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outcome of those decisions” (McGee et al., 1986: 150). Hence, the essence of group 
membership is that the state of resource configurations represent “mobility barriers” (Caves et 
al., 1977) which deter or inhibit the movement of a firm from one strategic group to another. 
As a result, Hatten et al. (1987) define a high mobility barrier as a competitive advantage on 
strategic group level, while low mobility barriers may be competitive disadvantages. 
Therefore, the defining characteristics of strategic groups arise from the source of their 
mobility barriers, i.e., a firm‟s resource configuration. 
 
A distinct stream within empirical research has supported the notion of strategic groups. 
Central to these various studies have been one or more of the following research questions: 
(1) do strategic groups exist within industries; (2) does the existence of strategic groups affect 
overall industry performance; (3) does performance differ among strategic groups; and (4) do 
strategic group structures change over time? Viewed collectively, research has answered the 
first two questions positively (Cool et al., 1988; Hatten et al., 1977; Hatten et al., 1978; 
Hawes et al., 1984; Newman, 1978). However, research on the third question has produced 
conflicting evidence (Barney et al., 1990; Cool et al., 1988; Ketchen et al., 1997; Thomas et 
al., 1988). Linkages between strategic group and firm performance have been identified in the 
following industries: brewing (Hatten et al., 1977; Hatten et al., 1978), chemical processing 
(Newman, 1973, 1978), consumer goods (Porter, 1973), paints and allied products (Dess et 
al., 1984), industrial products (Hambrick, 1983), U.S. insurance (Fiegenbaum et al., 1990b), 
and retail mail-order (Parnell et al., 1993), among others. However, these linkages were often 
equivocal since some studies only used one performance indicator (e.g., Hatten et al., 1978) 
and others have used multiple indicators but fail to find rigorous linkages between strategic 
groups and all of these performance indicators (e.g., Cool et al., 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 
1990b; Katobe et al., 1993). Finally, research addressing the last research question mainly 
proved that strategic groups are “stable” over time (Cool et al., 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 
1990b; Oster, 1982). 
 
The objectives of this study are in line with these central questions in strategic group research. 
The objectives are: (1) to define strategic groups within the Belgian fishing fleet; (2) to 
examine the performance differences among these strategic groups; (3) to examine if firms 
(i.e., vessels) move between strategic groups over time; and (4) to examine if firm-movement 
(i.e., vessel-movement) differs across strategic groups. These objectives are then translated 
into the following four null hypotheses: 
 
H01: All vessels belong to the same strategic group. 
H02: All strategic groups perform the same. 
H03: Vessels do not move among strategic groups over time. 
H04: Each strategic group encounters equal firm movement. 
 
Testing these hypotheses begins with a brief description of already existing taxonomies and 
classifications in Belgain fisheries, illustrating their shortcomings and why they differ from 
the strategic group concept. Next, the methodology is described to define strategic groups 
within the Belgian fishing fleet. Central to this methodology is the use of a two-stage 
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clustering procedure. In addition, the methods used to enhance the external- and criterion-
related validity of the cluster solutions are explained. The section ends with a discussion on 
the statistic tests used to examine the performance differences across the strategic groups and 
the methods used to measure changes in group membership. Section 2 presents the results, 
starting with a determination of the key resources of vessels of the Belgian fishing fleet. It 
then defines five strategic groups within the Belgian fishing fleet, each having distinct 
strategies related to the earlier defined key resources of vessels of the Belgian fishing fleet. 
Last, the results about the performance differences and firm-movement across these strategic 
groups are given. Section 3 discusses the results in the light of strategic group research. It also 
discusses the limitations of the study and highlights the value of strategic groups in improving 
fisheries management. Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
 
2.2 Materials and methods 
 
2.2.1 Existing taxonomies and classifications  
 
Although the Belgian fishing fleet may seem homogenous at first glance, important 
distinctions between fishing methods and sub fleets are made using different taxonomies or 
classifications that serve as frameworks for data collection, regulation or reporting. Following 
the FAO‟s (1999) technical paper on “Definition and classification of fishing gear 
categories”, the Belgian fleet can be subdivided by fishing method. This classification of 
fishing methods is a commonly accepted and comprehensive classification of all fishing 
methods around the world. Next, the Belgian fleet can also be divided into sub fleets 
corresponding to European legislation (EC, 2002). EU regulation aggregates vessels in fleet 
segments mainly based on technological characteristics (i.e., fishing methods, gear 
characteristics and mesh size). The EU also reports yearly economic performance indicators 
per sub fleet. In these reports (e.g., EC, 2003, 2004), three sub fleets are identified: (1) beam 
trawlers over 24 metres, (2) beam trawlers under 24 metres, and (3) shrimp beam trawlers. 
Belgian policymakers also use a sub fleet classification in reporting yearly key figures of the 
state of Belgian fisheries over the last decade (e.g., Tessens et al., 2004a, 2005a, 2006a). They 
distinguish (1) coastal fishers, (2) eurocutters, (3) large beam trawlers, (4) other small fleet 
segment, and (5) other large fleet segment. Finally, at the European level, there is now the 
emergence of a new approach to fleet classification in fisheries. Instead of classifying vessels 
in fleet segments, they now start to classify fishing trips in métiers. These métiers should 
“reflect the fishing intention, e.g. the species targeted, the area visited, and the gear used, at 
the start of a fishing trip” (Marchal, 2008: 674). Following this métier approach, a vessel can 
now be assigned to more then one class (i.e., métier) during a certain time frame. However, 
each of these classifications has one or more problems, for instance: (1) the classification is 
overly complex; (2) the classification only uses one type of “clustering variable”; (3) the 
classification contains more than one leftover category (i.e., “others”); (4) the classification is 
not exhaustive; or (5) the classification is based on intention which can differ significantly 
from actual behaviour. As a result, despite the validity of all of these taxonomies, they have 
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not emerged from a strategic approach and thus do not satisfy the definition and conditions of 
strategic groups. 
 
2.2.2 Defining strategic groups in the Belgian fishing fleet 
 
Strategic groups‟ defining characteristics arise from the source of their mobility barriers. 
McGee and Thomas (1986) identify three sources of mobility barriers: (1) the state of market-
related resources, (2) the state of production and logistics resources, and (3) the state of 
infrastructure and corporate resources. However, the literature has still not agreed on how to 
start actually choosing the most relevant or dominant resources within these sources of 
mobility barriers. As a result, a variety of methods have been used to derive groupings in 
empirical research settings, resulting in a non-uniform approach and choice of resources 
(Fiegenbaum et al., 1988; Ketchen et al., 1996; McGee et al., 1986; Short et al., 2007; 
Thomas et al., 1988). Howard and Venkatraman (1988: 539) state that “some researchers 
specify the characteristics of the groups a priori, based on extant theoretical rationale, and 
subsequently employ data-analytic techniques to confirm or validate their theoretical 
groupings. In contrast, others derive the grouping structure a posteriori based on empirical 
results on a specific data set.” 
 
This study specifies the defining resources of the strategic groups a priori based on a 
triangulation of methods (Ketchen et al., 1996). First, a “cognitive approach” (Ketchen et al., 
1996) is used to generate a first list of relevant resources. This is done through four in-depth 
interviews with fisheries scientists of the Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research 
(ILVO), where the interviews continued as long as they contributed new resources to the list. 
Next, theoretical rationale (i.e., a “deductive approach” (Ketchen et al., 1996)) in combination 
with a meeting held with these fisheries scientists resulted in determining the key resources 
that are the source of the strategic groups‟ mobility barriers and therefore create the strategic 
groups‟ competitive advantages. As a result, these resources create the strategic dimensions 
(or axes) of the “strategic space” (Edgar et al., 1994; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990b; McGee et al., 
1990) in which vessels position themselves by means of the state of their resource 
configuration. 
 
Having defined the main resources, they will serve as the cluster variables in the cluster 
analysis to cluster vessels with the same state in resource configurations. However, before 
clustering, the cluster variables are tested for multicollinearity among the variables through 
Pearson‟s r correlation coefficient and Haitovsky‟s χ𝐻
2  (Haitovsky, 1969). In applying the 
clustering, the suggestions made by Ketchen et al. (1996) on the application of cluster 
analysis in strategic management research were taken into account. They believe that the key 
to surmounting the problems and critiques related to cluster analysis (i.e., cluster analysis‟ 
reliance on researcher judgement) is the vigorous pursuit of triangulation, both within-method 
and between-methods triangulation. As a result, this study starts with applying a two-stage 
clustering procedure where a hierarchical algorithm is used to define the number of strategic 
groups and cluster centroids. These results serve next as the starting point for subsequent non-
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hierarchical clustering (Hair et al., 1998; Ketchen et al., 1996). Research has shown that this 
two-stage procedure increases validity of solutions (Ketchen et al., 1996; Milligan, 1980; 
Punj et al., 1983). Afterwards, the obtained cluster solutions of the non-hierarchical clustering 
are tested for significant differences between the cluster means through Kruskal-Wallis tests 
and Mann-Whitney U post hoc tests both with Bonferroni adjustment (α‟= 0.005 since k=5 
where k equals the number of strategic groups). The outcome of these non-parametric tests 
will allow us to meet our first objective and hypothesis. 
 
The hierarchical clustering uses Ward‟s method (Ward, 1963) in combination with Euclidean 
distance on the standardised individual vessel data (i.e., z-scores) for each cluster variable 
from 1997 till 2006 (i.e. one clustering across the entire period studied) where each year is a 
census. Ward‟s method is best suited for this study since (1) it is the method which focuses 
the most on homogeneity within groups by minimising their within-cluster sum of squares 
(Hair et al., 1998), and (2) its main disadvantage, namely its sensitivity to outliers (Ketchen et 
al., 1996), is eliminated since our dataset – a census – has no outliers. In addition, Ward‟s 
method was also commonly used in earlier studies clustering strategic groups (e.g., Fombrun 
et al., 1987; Gonzalez-Fidalgo et al., 2002). To determine the optimal number of clusters, the 
first largest percentage change in the agglomeration coefficient will be used (Hair et al., 
1998). The rationale behind this “stopping rule” is to preserve the “tightness” (Fiegenbaum et 
al., 1990b; Harrigan, 1985) of the clusters as the algorithm progressively combines groups. 
Validation of the outcome of this rule occurs through visual inspection of the dendrogram and 
a priori theoretical rationale (i.e., the existing taxonomies of the Belgian fishing fleet). The 
non-hierarchical clustering is a k-means clustering based on the cluster results of the 
hierarchical clustering. It is again, as the hierarchical clustering, one clustering across the 
entire period studied. 
 
Further, this study needs to validate the obtained cluster solutions. Ketchen et al., (1996: 447) 
state “the goals of validation are to ensure that a cluster solution has external validity (i.e., is 
representative of the general population of interest) and criterion-related validity (i.e., is 
useful for the prediction of important outcomes)”. To prove the external validity of the cluster 
results, this study only needs to focus its effort on proving the reliability of the cluster 
solution (a necessary condition of validity) because the dataset is a census of the general 
population of interest. The reliability of the cluster solution is proven through triangulation. 
For the hierarchical clustering, the within-method triangulation consists of applying multiple 
clustering algorithms to confirm the results given by Ward‟s method. In addition, this study 
also used multiple methods to determine the optimal number of clusters within the use of 
Ward‟s method. For the non-hierarchical clustering, the within-method triangulation consists 
of running the k-means clustering multiple times with random clustering centroids instead of 
those given by the hierarchical clustering. In addition, the k-means clustering results were 
also compared with its non-parametric equivalent (i.e., k-mediods) which partitions around 
the mediods instead of the means. Finally, discriminant analysis is used to determine how 
well the vessels were classified into the right strategic groups, since the aim of this technique 
is to predict the membership of an individual (the vessel) to a qualitative group defined 
beforehand (strategic groups) (Rason et al., 2007). This is a form of between-method 
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triangulation. For this, discriminant analysis bases its “judgment” on the discriminant 
functions that discriminate most between these groups. 
 
Criterion-related validity can be accessed through significance tests on external variables 
which are theoretically related to the cluster but not used in defining the clusters (Ketchen et 
al., 1996). Given our second hypothesis (“all strategic groups perform the same”), 
performance indicators are the obvious choice for external variables. Since performance 
consists of many “dimensions”, this study will look at (1) operational and (2) financial 
measures, and (3) measures of overall effectiveness (Venkatraman et al., 1986). The 
operational dimension of performance is measured through (1) the average landings of a 
vessel (kg mixed fish), and (2) the average landings of a vessel per fishing hour (kg mixed 
fish/fishing hour). Here, financial performance measures (all expressed in nominal values) are 
mostly based on the average gross operating profit of a vessel, starting with its absolute value 
(i.e., GOP) followed by two relative measures: (1) the average gross operating profit of a 
vessel per fishing hour (GOP/fishing hour), and (2) the average gross operating profit of a 
vessel per kilogram of mixed fish landed (GOP/kg fish). Additionally, the absolute values of 
net operating profit are also given to illustrate the effect of the capital costs on the firm‟s 
financial performance. Finally, the measure of overall effectiveness is the average rate of 
return on investment, which indicates the profitability of the investment in relation to other 
alternative investments (Tietze et al., 2005). It is calculated by dividing the yearly net 
operating profit of a vessel (in nominal value) by its estimated capital investment. Significant 
differences among strategic groups on these performance measurements are tested through 
Kruskal-Wallis tests (Cool et al., 1988) in combination with Mann-Whitney U tests as post-
hoc test both with Bonferroni adjustment (α‟= 0.005 since k=5 where k equals the number of 
strategic groups). Consequently, the outcome of these tests will formulate an answer to the 
second hypothesis of this study. 
 
In order to test the third and fourth hypothesis on firm movement (vessel movement) across 
strategic groups, this study defines firm movement as “cluster analytic assignment of a firm to 
a different group than it had been in during the prior year” (Mascarenhas, 1989: 346). 
Consequently, in order to calculate firm movement rates between strategic groups, the yearly 
membership of each vessel was noted. Then, the number of vessels moving from one strategic 
group to another and the number of vessels remaining in the same strategic group in adjacent 
years are recorded. As a result, the firm movement rates are based on simple counts and 
percentages. 
 
2.2.3 Data 
 
Data on individual vessel characteristics and accounting data come from two databases. This 
study uses “Belsamp”, a database hosted at the Section Fisheries Biology of ILVO-Fisheries, 
which contains detailed data on individual vessel characteristics. Financial data on individual 
vessel level came from the Belgian Sea Fishery Service of the Flemish government. They 
collect accounting data for the Belgian sea fisheries fleet through annual surveys. These 
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surveys are taken on a voluntary basis and they sample on average 50 percent of the fleet (i.e., 
approximately 60 vessels) between 1997 and 2006. However, not all strategic groups are 
sufficiently present each year. Additional data was collected through the annual accounts of 
fishing firms, resulting in sufficiently high sample sizes for each strategic group per year. 
Finally, data related to investments and depreciation periods were confirmed by previous 
studies (e.g., Thøgersen et al., 2009; Tietze et al., 2005; Van Craeynest, 2008). 
 
2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 The key resources of the Belgian fishing fleet 
 
The outcome of the in-depth interviews with fisheries scientists at ILVO was a list of eight 
resources which were perceived as the sources of mobility barriers between strategic groups 
in the Belgian fishing fleet. These resources were thus seen as contributing to the competitive 
advantage of vessels, and are: (1) technology, (2) product range, (3) geographic reach, (4) 
fishermen‟s skill, (5) modernity level, (6) product quality, (7) markets, and (8) crew. 
“Technology” captures the difference in fishing methods a vessel uses to catch fish. Although 
the dominant fishing method in the Belgian fleet is beam trawling, they also use otter trawling 
and trammel netting. Technology is perceived as a very important discriminator between 
vessels since it reflects a fishermen‟s choice between active fishing (i.e., beam trawling and 
otter trawling) and passive fishing (i.e., trammel netting). The distinction between active and 
passive fishing methods is currently very important given the high fuel prices. “Product 
range” in fisheries is defined in this study as the landing compositions. It captures the 
difference between mixed fisheries and specialisation towards catching target species. 
“Geographic reach” captures how far offshore a vessel can go fishing. This is mainly 
determined by technical characteristics like engine power, tonnage and vessel length. 
“Fishermen‟s skill” captures the fishermen‟s knowledge of this “métier” and the fishing 
environment. “Modernity level” describes the state of the vessel: new versus old. “Product 
quality” captures the state of the landed fish, which is mainly a function of its treatment on 
board and the time between being caught and sold. “Markets” stands for the number of 
auctions a vessel uses to sell its fish. Finally, “crew” is the number of persons on board a 
vessel when fishing. 
 
During a meeting in which the four previously interviewed fisheries scientists gathered, a 
choice was made about which of these eight resources were the dominant sources of high 
mobility barriers between strategic groups in the Belgian fishing fleet. This choice was guided 
by (1) their combined knowledge about the Belgian fishing fleet, (2) lessons learned from the 
existing taxonomies in Belgian fisheries, (3) the measurability of the resources, (4) data 
availability through past monitoring of the resources, (5) the literature on strategic groups 
(e.g., McGee, 1985; McGee et al., 1990; McGee et al., 1986; Thomas et al., 1988); and (6) 
more specifically, the three sources of mobility barriers defined by McGee and Thomas 
(1986). Based on discussion, the decision was made to pick for each of the three sources of 
 36 
 
mobility barriers defined by McGee and Thomas (1986) the dominant one. A first step in this 
process was taken by looking at the measurability and the data availability of the eight 
resources. Table 2.1 illustrates the operational definitions and unit of measurement of these 
resources. “Fishermen‟s skill” is left out of the table because (1) it is an intangible and very 
complex resource to measure, and more importantly (2) it has hardly been monitored over the 
years. “Crew” is also left out because the number of crew members per vessel are nearly 
impossible to collect: they are not stored electronically and many media (often very volatile) 
have been used to inform authorities about the number of persons on board (e.g., fax, phone, 
e-mail and mobile phone text message). In addition, the average number of crew members per 
vessel is strictly regulated and is a function of (1) geographic reach, (2) vessel length, and (3) 
trip duration (KB, 1973: art 94) which are resources that are or (1) already taken into account 
(e.g., geographic reach and trip duration in the form of “product quality”) or (2) highly 
correlated with one or more of the resources that are already taken into account  (e.g., 
Pearson‟s r between vessel length and geographic reach (measured in engine power, kW) 
equals 0.92). Table 2.1 also illustrates that “Technology” is measured by two operational 
definitions reflecting the different dimensions of “Technology” (i.e. opposite choices). A 
second step was to decide source-by-source what the dominant resource is for each of the 
three theorized sources of mobility barriers by McGee and Thomas (1986). “Technology” was 
chosen as the dominant production resource since the fishing method a vessel operates was 
perceived as the most significant part of the production process. Additionally, it has also an 
effect on “Product quality” because the quality of the landed fish is also a function of the used 
method to catch the fish next to other processing variables like its treatment on board and the 
time between being caught, iced and sold. “Product range” was chosen as the dominant 
market-related resource since it captures the important strategic decisions and skills on 
targeting species. It is the result of being able to (1) target the species you want to catch 
(related to market conditions), and (2) choose which species to land and which to discard 
(related to market and regulatory conditions). Hence, it was perceived by the fisheries 
scientists that this resource of “product range” is therefore more important than the resource 
“Markets”. Especially given the fact that Belgian fishermen do not land on many different 
markets (i.e., 89% of the fish caught by Belgian vessels in 2006 was landed in the three 
Belgian fish auctions). Finally, “Geographic reach” was chosen as the dominant 
infrastructure-related resource instead of the resource “Modernity level”. The underlying 
reason is that the geographic reach of a vessel is very important within the Belgian context 
where different quota are allocate to different fishing ground. Additionally, modernity level is 
also a resource which differentiates more between vessels of the same strategic group instead 
of across strategic groups. In sum, this meeting concluded that the competitive advantage of 
sub fleets mainly lies within the configuration of the following three resources: (1) 
technology, (2) product range, and (3) geographic reach. These are: the dominant production 
resource, the dominant market-related resource and the dominant infrastructure-related 
resource, respectively.  
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Table 2.1: Operational definitions and unit of measurement of the resources perceived by 
fisheries scientists as being the sources of mobility barriers between strategic groups in the 
Belgian fishing fleet 
Resources Operational definition Unit of 
measurement 
Technology 1) Percentage of hours beam trawling (the 
dominant active fishing method in Belgian 
fisheries) in total number of fishing hours per year 
Percentage (%) 
 2) Percentage of hours trammel netting (the 
dominant passive fishing method in Belgian 
fisheries) in total number of fishing hours per year 
Percentage (%) 
Product range Number of species landed per trip # Species 
Geographic reach Engine power kW 
Modernisation level The age of the vessel Years 
Product Quality Trip duration in number of hours a vessel spent at 
sea per trip  
# Hours 
Markets  Number of auctions visited in a year # Auctions 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
2.3.2 The strategic groups of the Belgian fishing fleet 
 
These three main resources serve as the cluster variables in a two-stage clustering procedure. 
However, before clustering, the cluster variables are tested for multicollinearity among them 
through Pearson‟s r correlation coefficient. Significant coefficients above the commonly 
agreed 0.80 illustrate severe multicollinearity between variables (Field, 2009). However, 
Table 2.2 indicates that this is not the case since there is only some correlation between 
product range and geographic reach (r=.68, p<.01). Additionally, Haitovsky‟s χ𝐻
2  is highly 
significant (χ𝐻
2 (6)=631.66, p<.01) which confirms that these cluster variables do not suffer 
severly from multicollinearity (Haitovsky, 1969). 
 
Table 2.2: Testing the multicollinearity among the selected cluster variables (Pearson‟s r 
correlation coefficient), 1997-2006 
  Technology Product range Geographic reach 
  % beam trawling % trammel 
netting 
# Species/trip kW 
Technology % beam trawling 1.00 -0.45** 0.19** 0.26** 
% trammel netting -0.45** 1.00 -0.19** -0.05 
Product range # Species/trip 0.19** -0.19** 1.00 0.68** 
Geographic reach kW 0.26** -0.05 0.68** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
(Source: Own data) 
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Next, a hierarchical clustering (Ward‟s method – Euclidean distance) is performed to define 
the number of strategic groups and cluster centroids which will later be used as a starting 
point for subsequent non-hierarchical clustering. Determining the optimal number of clusters 
necessitates a trade-off between fewer clusters on the one hand versus less homogenous ones 
on the other. The most basic structure must be found that still achieves the necessary level of 
similarity within the clusters (Hair et al., 1998: 476). To make this trade-off, the first large 
percentage change in the agglomeration coefficient in the hierarchical clustering is examined. 
Table 2.3 illustrates the percentage change in agglomeration coefficient for the ten final 
aggregations between clusters. This table clearly shows that the aggregation step between five 
and four clusters is accompanied by a first sudden jump in percent change in aggregation 
coefficient (approximately 31%). In addition, visual inspection of the dendrogram (Appendix 
1) also confirms the choice of five clusters as a suitable number of clusters, although this 
method leaves more room for alternative interpretations (e.g., the use of only three clusters). 
Finally, the use of five clusters does not flatly oppose to a priori theoretical rationale since 
Belgian policymakers also use five sub fleets in reporting key figures of the Belgian fishing 
fleet. Consequently, the obtained cluster centroids for five clusters will serve as the initial 
cluster centroids for the subsequent non-hierarchical clustering (see Appendix 2 for the cluster 
centroids of the hierarchical clustering). 
 
Table 2.3: Agglomeration coefficient for the hierarchical cluster analysis, 1997-2006 
# clusters Agglomeration Coefficient  % change in coefficient to next level 
10 341.86 9.92 
9 379.52 10.01 
8 421.74 15.27 
7 497.75 14.13 
6 579.66 19.47 
5 719.79 30.93 
4 1042.12 40.99 
3 1766.07 46.07 
2 3275.04 38.35 
1 5312 / 
(Source: Own data) 
 
Finally, although the hierarchical clustering was based on Ward‟s method, other clustering 
algorithms were also used to increase the reliability of the cluster solution (i.e., within-method 
triangulation). Although some cluster methods suggested quite different results (e.g., single 
linkage method), others came fairly close to the suggested outcome of Ward‟s method (e.g., 
average linkage and centroid method). 
 
To determine the final cluster solution, a non-hierarchical clustering is performed with the 
cluster centroids of the hierarchical clustering as initial values. Table 2.4 presents the non-
standardised cluster means and the number of cases per cluster. In addition, it also 
summarises which cluster means are significantly different from each other through a 
Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U post hoc tests, both with Bonferroni adjustment. 
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Based on these results, this study labels the first cluster as the large beam trawler fleet. These 
vessels have high-powered engines (on average, 855.32 kW), which allow them to cover all 
of the Belgian fishing grounds. They usually operate the beam trawl (i.e., an active fishing 
method) as their only fishing method (98.51% of their fishing time) and they land the highest 
variety of species (average 19 species). A second cluster is the fleet of small beam trawlers. 
They mainly differ from the large beam trawlers due to lower engine power (on average, 
256.43 kW) and slightly less diverse landings (average 15 species). A third cluster is the 
shrimp beam trawler fleet. They differ from the small beam trawlers because their landing 
composition is quite specialised (average 5 species per trip; around 25% of the total landed 
weight is brown shrimp) and their engine is on average slightly less powerful (on average, 
201 kW). However, since some small beam trawlers seasonally target shrimps and therefore 
temporarily behave as shrimp trawlers, the distinction between the small beam trawler fleet 
and the shrimp trawler fleet is slightly sensitive. A fourth cluster is the otter trawler fleet. 
They are similar to the small beam trawler fleet but differ in fishing method. Where the small 
beam trawlers use the beam trawl, otter trawlers use the otter trawl. However, both are active 
fishing methods. Additionally, otter trawlers also have a slightly less diverse product range 
(an average of 12.43 species per trip). Finally, a fleet exists that uses passive fishing methods 
(on average, 93% of the fishing time is spent on trammel netting). This sub fleet is labelled as 
the trammel netters. These vessels have engine powers of 319 kW on average, which is higher 
than most small beam trawlers, shrimp beam trawlers and otter trawlers, but lower than the 
large beam trawlers. They are specialised in just a few species (an average of 4 species per 
trip), comparable with the shrimp beam trawlers. However, further inquiry into the data 
unveils that these vessels do not target shrimp. 
 
Table 2.4: Number of cases per cluster and the cluster means for the non-hierarchical k-means 
clustering (Mean), 1997-2006 
 Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 Sig. 
 Cluster labels Large beam 
trawlers 
Small beam 
trawlers 
Shrimp beam 
trawlers 
Otter trawlers Trammel netters  
 N 573 265 379 86 26  
Technology % beam trawling 98.51c 93.20b 92.15b 8.99a 4.10a .000 
% trammel netting 0.00a 0.00a 0.04a 0.26a 93.46b .000 
Product range # Species/trip 18.58d 15.29c 4.67a 12.43b 4.23a .000 
Geographic reach kW 855.32e 256.43b 200.72a 300.67c 380.96d .000 
Different superscripts (a–b–c–d–e) indicate significantly different average means using Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U as post hoc test 
both with Bonferroni adjustment (α‟= 0.005 since k=5). 
(Source: Own data) 
 
To validate this final cluster solution, the within-method triangulation consists of running the 
k-means clustering multiple times with random clustering centroids instead of those given by 
the hierarchical clustering. These runs gave mostly the same or similar cluster results. In 
addition, the k-means clustering results were also compared with its non-parametric 
equivalent which partitions around the mediods instead of the means (k-mediods). The results 
of this clustering are given in Appendix 3 and confirm the obtained results of the k-means 
clustering, which increases its reliability. 
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Finally, discriminant analysis is used to determine how well the vessels were classified into 
the right strategic groups since the aim of this technique is to predict the membership of an 
individual (vessel) to a qualitative group defined beforehand (strategic groups) (Rason et al., 
2007)). Hence, this is a form of between-methods triangulation. For this, discriminant analysis 
bases its “judgment” on the discriminant functions that discriminate most between these 
groups. Table 2.5 compares the results of the cluster analysis with the discriminant analysis 
and illustrates how many of the cases (in percentages) are similarly classified in both analyses 
for each strategic group. With 99.2% of original grouped cases and 99% of cross-validated 
grouped cases correctly classified (see “b” and “c” under need the table in bold), this 
discriminant analysis forms an additional sound proof of the reliability of the cluster solutions 
gained by the k-means clustering. 
 
Table 2.5: Cross table comparing the classification results of the k-means clustering with 
those of the discriminant analysis (%), 1997-2006 
    Discriminant analysis       
   Small beam 
trawlers 
Otter trawlers Large beam 
trawlers 
Trammel netters Shrimp beam 
trawlers 
Cluster analysis Small beam trawlers 99.2 0 0 0 0.8 
  Otter trawlers 0 98.8 1.2 0 0 
  Large beam trawlers 1 0 99 0 0 
  Trammel netters 0 0 0 100 0 
  Shrimp beam trawlers 0.5 0 0 0 99.5 
Cross-validated Small beam trawlers 99.2 0 0 0 0.8 
  Otter trawlers 0 97.7 1.2 0 1.2 
  Large beam trawlers 1.2 0 98.8 0 0 
  Trammel netters 0 0 0 100 0 
  Shrimp beam trawlers 0,5 0 0 0 99.5 
a  Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions 
derived from all cases other than that case. 
b  99.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
c  99.0% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified. 
(Source: Own data) 
 
2.3.3 Performance among the strategic groups of the Belgian fishing 
fleet 
 
Having defined five strategic groups in the Belgian fishing fleet, this study now examines 
whether the performance differs across these groups. Table 2.6 presents the averages of the 
different performance measures between the years 1997-2006 for each strategic group. In 
addition, it also summarises which averages are significantly different from each other 
through Kruskal-Wallis tests and Mann-Whitney U post hoc tests, all Bonferroni adjusted. As 
seen from the absolute values of landings and GOP, these results show that shrimp beam 
trawlers and trammel netters both have equally weak performance between 1997-2006. As a 
result, these two specialised fisheries have limited landings (mean yearly landings of 76244 
and 44558 kilograms mixed fish, respectively), resulting in low absolute financial profit 
(55642 euro and 61469 euro on average, respectively). Otter trawlers and small beam trawlers 
have equally high GOPs and perform in absolute terms better than shrimp beam trawlers and 
 41 
 
trammel netters. They have average yearly landings of approximately 150 tonnes mixed fish 
and GOP of roughly 100000 euro. Both are roughly twice as high as shrimp beam trawlers 
and trammel netters. Finally, large beam trawlers have the highest GOP of all strategic 
groups, on average: twice as high as small beam trawlers and otter trawlers, and almost four 
times that of shrimp beam trawlers and trammel netters. 
 
The relative landings per fishing hour approximate the same rank order, although the ratios 
between the strategic groups change. Shrimp beam trawlers land the lowest amount of mixed 
fish in a fishing hour (only 32.1 kg/fishing hour). Small beam trawlers, otter trawlers and 
trammel netters land slightly more (approximately 40 kg/fishing hour). Finally, large beam 
trawlers land the most fish per fishing hour namely (75.36 kg/fishing hour). In contrast, the 
relative measures of financial performance tell a different story in which trammel netters play 
an interesting role. Although trammel netters perform low in absolute values, their gross 
operating profit per fishing hour is as high as that of the large beam trawlers (around 50 euro 
per fishing hour), whereas their profit per landed kilogram mixed fish even outperforms every 
other strategic group (1.28 euro versus approximately 70 eurocent per kilogram mixed fish, 
respectively).  
 
An examination of NOP and ROI does not reveal a clear pattern, which makes the significant 
differences between these strategic groups harder to interpret. However, it is certain that when 
taking the capital costs into account in the form of depreciations, shrimp beam trawlers are 
not profitable on average, as they have a negative NOP (-19358 euro). Hence, this also results 
into a negative ROI (-1.29%), meaning that they are unable to even earn back their initially 
invested capital. Small beam trawlers and otter trawlers perform little better with average 
NOPs of 9782 and 1850 euro, respectively. As such, they are barely profitable and therefore 
their ROIs are marginally positive. Finally, the large beam trawlers and trammel netters 
perform best, with ROIs of roughly 1.5 percent and average NOPs of 58243 and 11469 euro, 
respectively. Nevertheless, their performance is still poor, as ROI is only considered to be 
good from ten percent onwards (Tietze et al., 2005: 3). 
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Table 2.6: Performance indicators among the strategic groups of the Belgian fishing fleet 
(Mean), 1997-2006 
  Large beam 
trawler 
Small beam 
trawler 
Shrimp beam 
trawler 
Otter trawler Trammel netter Sig. 
Operational Landings 
(kg mixed fish) 
329717c 143281b 76244a 158703b 44559a .000 
 Landings/fishing hour 
(kg mixed fish/h) 
75.36c 42.10b 32.10a 45.24b 40.04b .000 
Financial GOP 
(current €) 
218243c 109782b 55642a 101850b 61469a .000 
 GOP/fishing hour 
(current €/h) 
52.60d 30.65b 22.08a 29.63a,b,c 51.41c,d .000 
 GOP/kg fish 
(current €/kg mixed fish) 
0.69a 0.74a 0.67a 0.66a 1.28b .000 
 NOP 
(current €) 
58243c,d 9782b -19358a 1850a,b,d 11469b,c .000 
Overall 
effectiveness 
ROI 
(%) 
1.46c,d 0.49b -1.29a 0.09a,b,d 1.53a,b,c .000 
Different superscripts (a–b–c-d) indicate significantly different average means using Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U as post hoc test 
both with Bonferroni adjustment (α‟= 0.005 since k=5). 
(Source: Own data) 
 
2.3.4 Strategic group membership 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of the size of the strategic groups between 1997-2006. It 
shows that large beam trawlers are the largest strategic group, except in 1997. From 1997 to 
2000, the number of large beam trawlers increased from 52 to 65 vessels, an increase of 25%. 
After that time, it declined to 56 vessels in 2006 (a decrease of approximately 16%). The net 
change in fleet size between the years 1997-2006 is a slight net increase of four vessels or 
7.1%. The small beam trawler fleet consisted of 27 vessels in 1997 and reached their 
maximum in 2002 with 32 vessels (+18.5%). However, during the subsequent years, this 
strategic group fell back to 23 vessels in 2006 (-39.1%). Consequently, there was a net loss of 
five vessels or 18.5% between the years 1997-2006. The strategic group of the shrimp beam 
trawlers has encountered a constant decline, except for 1999 where it gained four new group 
members compared to the previous year. This strategic group had 59 members in 1997 and 
declined to 29 in 2006 (-50.8%). The size of the otter trawler fleet declined the most. This 
strategic group had 13 vessels in 1997 but declined to three vessels in 2006 (-92.3%). The size 
of the trammel netter fleet increased from one vessel in 1997 to three in 2006. 
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Figure 2.1: Size of the strategic groups (#vessels), 1997-2006 
 
(Source: Own data) 
 
These findings illustrate that the sizes of the strategic groups are not constant over time. In 
addition, it shows a recent trend of declining strategic group sizes, except for the strategic 
group of the trammel netters. Although the changes (especially the decline) in the size of 
strategic groups can be primarily explained by vessels exiting or entering the fishing industry 
(see infra, Table 2.7), they can also partly be explained by firm movements among strategic 
groups (i.e., shifts in group memberships or intra-industry shifts). However, Figure 2.2 
illustrates that more than 80% of the vessels did not shift strategic groups between the years 
1997-2006. It shows that once a vessel had decided on its strategic position in the fishing 
industry, it stayed in 80% of the cases in that position for a significant amount of time (in this 
case, 10 years). In addition, only 15.6% and 3.3% of the vessels shifted between two or three 
strategic groups, respectively. Consequently, vessel movement across strategic groups is not 
important in explaining changes in the size of strategic groups in the case of the Belgian 
fishing fleet. Strategic groups are therefore very stable over time in the Belgian fishing fleet. 
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Figure 2.2: Vessels with one or more strategic group memberships (%), 1997-2006 
 
(Source: Own data) 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates there are significant differences across the strategic groups when 
examining firm movement. The large beam trawler fleet is the strategic group whose group 
members shift the least of all strategic groups. Only 4% of all vessels who have been a large 
beam trawler during the years 1997-2006 have had other group memberships between 1997 
and 2006. Small beam trawlers had most firm movement, as only 35% of these vessels have 
never been a member of other strategic groups. As a result, 65% of all small beam trawlers 
have been a member of other strategic groups. However, the strategic group of the shrimp 
beam trawlers has more stable memberships (approximately 60%) compared to the small 
beam trawlers. Like the small beam trawlers, the otter trawlers also show major fluctuations 
in group membership. Only 42% of the otter trawlers have never been a group member of 
other strategic groups during 1997-2006. Finally, 60% of the trammel netters have never 
shifted group membership between the years 1997-2006. As a result, this group, together with 
the shrimp beam trawlers, is the second most stable group in terms of group membership. 
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Figure 2.3: Differences in the stability of group memberships across the strategic groups (%), 
1997-2006  
 
(Source: Own data) 
 
Finally, Table 2.7 illustrates the average yearly firm movement across strategic groups 
between pairs of adjacent years (i.e., 1997-1998, 1998-1999, …, 2005-2006). For the large 
beam trawler fleet, it is clear that they or (1) remain very loyal to their strategic group choice 
(on average, 92% of the cases), or (2) exit the fishing industry (on average, 8% of the cases). 
Consequently, there is no firm movement from large beam trawlers towards other strategic 
groups. When investigating firm movement from other strategic groups towards the large 
beam trawler fleet, one can observe that on average 91% of the total average firm movement 
towards large beam trawler fleet is from large beam trawlers from the previous year (so no 
actual firm movement), 8% is from outside the fishing industry, 1% is from small beam 
trawlers and 1% from otter trawlers. Small beam trawlers remain less loyal to their strategic 
choice (on average, 84% of the cases) when compared to the large beam trawler fleet (on 
average, 92% of the cases). They leave in on average 8% of the cases the fishing industry. In 
on average 1% and 7% of the cases they leave for the large beam trawler fleet or shrimp beam 
trawler fleet respectively. Firm movement towards the small beam trawler fleet is mainly 
from loyal small beam trawlers (86% of all cases). Shrimp beam trawlers and the otter 
trawlers move towards small beam trawlers in on average 7% and 5% of the cases 
respectively. Also interesting to notice is that on average only 2% of all firm movement 
towards the small beam trawler fleet is from new entrants to the fishing industry. Shrimp 
beam trawlers do in on average 80% of the cases not exit their strategic group. If they exit, 
they mainly opt to exit the fishing industry (on average, 9% of the cases) or move towards 
small beam trawlers (on average, 7%). However, there are also smaller migrations toward the 
otter trawler and trammel netter fleets (on average, 3% and 1% of the cases respectively). 
Firm movement towards the shrimp beam trawler fleet is on average for 88% accounted for 
by loyal shrimp beam trawler. The remaining movement towards this strategic group is made 
up by on average 5%, 3% and 4% from small beam trawlers, otter trawlers and new entrants 
from outside the fishing industry respectively. Next, otter trawlers are the least loyal among 
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adjacent years of all five strategic groups since on average 75% of all firm movement is 
accounted to otter trawlers being loyal. Otter trawlers leave their strategic group, mainly and 
equally, through exiting the fishing industry or through movement towards the shrimp beam 
trawler fleet (both on average, 10% of the cases). However, they also move to a lower extent 
toward large and small beam trawlers (on average, 1% and 5% of the cases respectively). 
Firm movement toward otter trawlers is in on average 85% of the cases from loyal otter 
trawlers. In on average 10% and 3% of all cases it is from shrimp beam trawlers or new 
entrants from outside the fishing industry respectively. There is no observed firm movement 
towards otter trawlers from the other three strategic groups. Lastly, trammel netters are like 
large beam trawlers very loyal since in on average 91% of the cases they stick to their 
strategic direction between pairs of adjacent years. If they do not remain loyal, they leave in 
on average 4% of the cases the fishing industry or they leave for the shrimp beam trawler 
fleet. Vessels entering the trammel netter fleet are in both 8% of the cases from the shrimp 
beam trawler fleet or from outside the industry. 84% of the total average firm movement 
towards trammel netters is explained by loyal trammel netters. 
 
Table 2.7: Yearly firm movement across strategic groups between adjacent years (#vessels, 
Mean), 1997-2006 (Cells containing no yearly firm movement are reported empty) 
 To Large beam 
trawlers 
Small beam 
trawlers 
Shrimp 
beam 
trawler 
Otter 
trawler 
Trammel 
netter 
Outside 
industry 
Total 
From 
 
Large beam 
trawlers 
52.89     4.56 57.44 
(Row %) (92%)     (8%) (100%) 
(Column %) (91%)       
Small beam 
trawlers 
0.33 22.67 1.78   2.11 26.89 
(Row %) (1%) (84%) (7%)   (8%) (100%) 
(Column %) (1%) (86%) (5%)     
Shrimp beam 
trawlers 
 2.78 31.22 1.00 0.22 3.67 38.89 
(Row %)  (7%) (80%) (3%) (1%) (9%) (100%) 
(Column %)  (11%) (88%) (12%) (8%)   
Otter trawlers 0.11 0.44 0.89 6.89 0.00 0.89 9.22 
(Row %) (1%) (5%) (10%) (75%) (0%) (10%) (100%) 
(Column %) (0%) (2%) (3%) (85%) (0%)   
Trammel 
netters 
  0.11  2.33 0.11 2.56 
(Row %)   (4%)  (91%) (4%) (100%) 
(Column %)   (0%)  (84%)   
Outside 
industry 
4.56 0.56 1.56 0.22 0.22   
(Column %) (8%) (2%) (4%) (3%) (8%)   
Total 57.89 26.44 35.56 8.11 2.78   
(Column %) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)   
(Source: Own data) 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
Empirical strategic group research has primarily focused on defining strategic groups within 
single industries to examine whether performance persistently differs across these groups and 
affects overall industry performance (e.g., Cool et al., 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 1993; 
Fombrun et al., 1987; Frazier et al., 1983; Harrigan, 1985; Hatten et al., 1977; Hawes et al., 
1984). Additionally, research has also habitually examined if strategic groups are subject to 
“changes” over time, such as whether group membership shifts, or if the number of strategic 
groups changes. The objectives of our study are in line with these central research questions 
in strategic group research. This study borrows the concept of strategic groups together with 
its theory from the field of strategic management and applies it to the case of the Belgian 
fishing fleet. Consequently, five strategic groups in the Belgian fishing fleet are defined based 
on their competitive advantages arising from the source of their mobility barriers (i.e., the 
state of their resource configuration). As a result, this finding rejects the first hypothesis, “all 
the vessels of the Belgian fishing fleet belong to the same strategic group”. In deriving these 
strategic groups cluster algorithms were used based on excessive within- and between-method 
triangulation (Ketchen et al., 1996). This resulted in highly valid cluster solutions. The 
within-method triangulation of a two-stage clustering procedure combining hierarchical- with 
non-hierarchical clustering (known in the literature for its increased validity of the cluster 
solution (Ketchen et al., 1996; Milligan, 1980; Punj et al., 1983)) has also increased the 
validity of the cluster solutions in this case. Furthermore, this study expands the between-
method triangulation with the use of discriminant analysis in addition to the commonly 
suggested analyses of variances on external variables (Ketchen et al., 1996). This idea of 
using discriminant analysis was borrowed from other fields like market research (Rason et al., 
2007) and geography (Power et al., 1992). 
 
Next, this study finds differences in the performance across most of the strategic groups, 
which rejects our second hypothesis, “all strategic groups perform the same”. This finding not 
only assesses the criterion validity of the obtained cluster solution, it also contributes to the 
discussion in the strategic group research on the existence of a “group membership-
performance link” (Barney et al., 1990). Although strategic group research is still unable to 
consistently find this link (Cool et al., 1988; Ketchen et al., 1997), this study proves that in 
the case of the Belgian fishing fleet the group memberships-performance link does persist. 
 
Related to the third and fourth hypotheses on group membership and group loyalty, the results 
unveil that most vessels remain a member of their strategic group for many years. Hence, 
vessels do not often shift between strategic groups. This finding is in line with the results of 
previous studies (Cool et al., 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990b, 1993; Oster, 1982) and the 
theory of the existence of mobility barriers between strategic groups that deter or inhibit the 
movement of a firm from one strategic group to another (Caves et al., 1977). As a result, the 
resources used to define the strategic groups (i.e., technology, product range and geographic 
reach) are important sources of mobility barriers and therefore quite valuable in unveiling the 
strategic groups‟ competitive advantages. However, not every strategic group enjoys the same 
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level of group loyalty since significant differences are observed across the strategic groups 
concerning firm movement. This results in the rejection of the fourth hypothesis. Although 
this is definitely a topic for further research, a possible interpretation for this phenomenon is 
the theory of asymmetric mobility barriers (Caves et al., 1977; Harrigan, 1985; Hatten et al., 
1987) in combination with a firm‟s “isolating mechanisms” (Rumelt, 1984). 
 
Asymmetric mobility barriers mean that not all mobility barriers seem to be equally high 
between strategic groups. Consequently, some shifts between strategic groups are more easily 
made than others because they require an accumulation of one or more resources which is not 
too costly or risky. The results on the average yearly firm movement across strategic groups 
between pairs of adjacent years illustrated that small beam trawlers and shrimp beam trawlers 
often shift between these strategic groups. These shifts only require the purchase of a new 
fishing net and successful targeting of other species. Further inquiry also illustrated that there 
is often a “back-and-forth”-move between these strategic groups. This can be mainly 
explained by the fact that in some years small beam trawlers may have had caught a lot of 
shrimp during the shrimp season and therefore kept targeting them longer than usual. 
Consequently, cluster analysis allocated them in that year to the strategic group of shrimp 
beam trawlers instead of small beam trawlers. The inverse pattern exists in the strategic 
groups of the shrimp beam trawlers. Next, the results on the average yearly firm movement 
across strategic groups also showed that there is significant firm movement from otter 
trawlers to both the small beam trawler fleet and shrimp beam trawler fleet. In the first case 
this requires only the purchase of new fishing gear and being able to use it successfully. In the 
second case this requires the purchase of new fishing gear and being able to successfully 
target shrimp. The fact that otter trawler move towards two strategic groups prove that they 
did not have a second best choice like the “small beam trawlers-shrimp beam trawler”-trade 
off. Additionally, “back-and-forth”-movement is not observed for the otter trawler fleet since 
small beam trawlers and shrimp beam trawlers do not or at least not that frequently move 
back to the otter trawler fleet. Hence, it seems that vessels which have made the shift towards 
the otter trawler fleet are satisfied with their new strategic direction. Finally, the results of 
average yearly firm movement across strategic groups illustrates that there are also marginal 
or absent potential firm movements. This can illustrate that certain shifts are (too) costly or 
risky. For instance: small beam trawlers whose ambition is to become a member of the large 
beam trawler group have to invest in a larger and more powerful engine. In addition, the 
engines will consume more fuel, which will result in higher operational costs. As a result, 
these small beam trawlers encounter much higher mobility barriers compared to the small 
beam trawlers who shift to operate as shrimp beam trawlers. 
 
Isolating mechanisms is a second phenomenon that can block firm movement. It means that 
“individual firms are also constrained by their resource base and the legacy of past 
investments. These isolating mechanisms represent firm-specific commitments (i.e., 
resources) that restrict the individual firm‟s degrees of strategic freedom and thus may 
prevent a firm from switching from one strategy to another” (Leask et al., 2005: 459). This is 
for instance the case for the current trammel netting fleet in Belgium. These vessels are often 
catamarans that have not the capability to tow fishing gear over the sea-bed. Hence, their past 
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strategic decisions have isolated them from any form of beam- or otter trawling. This clearly 
limits their strategic freedom. 
 
Despite careful attention to reliability and validity in this study, important limitations remain. 
First of all, the validity of this study outside the Belgian fishing fleet is limited because it is an 
empirical “single industry/single country”-study. In future research on strategic groups in EU 
fisheries, researchers could include more than one country in their analysis. Furthermore, 
future research on strategic groups should also primarily focus on defining strategic groups 
across multiple countries and/or perhaps multiple (similar) industries. However, such studies 
would only become possible given a uniform methodology for defining strategic groups 
across (similar) industries and/or countries. A second limitation of this study may lie in its 
time horizon. Although ten years is a reasonable timeframe, the authors believe that setting 
the timeframe at several decades would have identified more different strategic groups (e.g., 
large otter trawlers) and more group member shifts across strategic groups, as a vessel 
remains operational for much longer than ten years. This expanded timeframe could perhaps 
even lead to identifying different resources as the sources of competitive advantages. 
However, expanding the time frame to decades may be impossible due to data limitations. A 
third limitation is the absence of the use of “stable strategic time periods” (Fiegenbaum et al., 
1990a; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990b, 1993) in our analysis in combination with the use of a fixed 
number of strategic groups over time. However, these two limitations are permitted since (1) 
the time horizon of this study is medium term; and (2) group structure has been found to be 
fairly stable and predictable over modest periods of time (Cool et al., 1987; Fiegenbaum et 
al., 1990b; Oster, 1982).  A fourth limitation is the study‟s static analysis. Although strategic 
group research has primarily used different kinds of static analyses (e.g., regression models 
(Hatten et al., 1977; Hatten et al., 1978; Newman, 1978; Porter, 1979), MANOVA‟s (Hawes 
et al., 1984), MANOVA‟s and regression models (Frazier et al., 1983), or ANOVA‟s and 
MANOVA‟s (Fiegenbaum et al., 1993)), future studies should apply dynamic models in 
analysing group dynamics (e.g., agent-based models (Gilbert et al., 1999) or system dynamics 
(Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000)). A final limitation of this study may be the labelling of the 
strategic groups. Labelling each strategic group is a subjective process. This study opted to 
use the terminology and labels of existing sub fleet classifications where possible. This has 
the advantage that policymakers will recognize some of the strategic groups. However, it also 
led to the slightly forced labelling of one strategic group: “the shrimp beam trawlers”. In this 
group, some vessels land only small amounts of shrimp but are very specialised toward some 
other target species. The label “specialised small beam trawlers” may have been more 
appropriate here. In addition, this inadequate label also resulted in a slightly counterintuitive 
outcome: the disappointing performance of shrimp beam trawlers compared to other strategic 
groups. 
 
This study contributes directly to the fishing industry because it shows ship owners the 
different performance potentials for the different competitive strategies in the current 
industry. This allows them to reflect on current business and change strategic course if 
desired, based on performance indicators. If they are satisfied with their current strategic 
direction, ship owners can still compare their performance to the average performance of their 
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group peers allowing them to evaluate how they are performing within their strategic group. 
However, the main contribution of this study lies in its value for fisheries management. The 
authors believe that strategic group theory could be used to simplify fisheries management 
and its regulation. Fiegenbaum et al. (1988: 21) state that “identifying the strategic 
dimensions that define strategic groups is a key issue in understanding how competitors 
formulate their strategies” and that “strategic groups help us understand which firms compete 
strongly with each other”. Consequently, knowing these strategic differences between firms 
within the same industry is crucial when managing fisheries and implementing public policies 
(Oster, 1982: 376). As a result, policymakers should start defining strategic groups within 
fisheries and use them as the basis for regulation instead of using (1) tremendously detailed 
taxonomies of sub fleets solely based on technical characteristics (i.e. fishing methods, gear 
modifications and mesh sizes) (EC, 2002) or (2) overly specified classification systems based 
on métiers (EC, 2008) which probably need simplification (i.e., aggregation of métiers in fleet 
segments) if they want to be workable in practice. Moreover, this strategic group approach 
shall result in a more strategic form of regulation: the regulation will be more focused on (1) 
affecting strategic groups‟ competitive advantages (i.e., mobility barriers), (2) affecting 
“isolating mechanisms” of firms, and (3) managing rivalry between strategic groups. In 
addition, the range of policy instruments should be limited to those affecting efficiently the 
sources of the mobility barriers between strategic groups, altering individual vessels or a 
strategic group‟s position within its strategic space. In conclusion, the authors believe that the 
use of strategic groups can be a way towards simplifying the current Common Fisheries 
Policy of the European Union. But this study should only be seen as a first introduction of the 
concept of strategic groups to fisheries management science and fisheries science in general. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This study borrows the concept of strategic groups, along with its theory from the field of 
strategic management, and applies it to the case of the Belgian fishing fleet. As a result, it 
defines five strategic groups in the Belgian fishing fleet based on their competitive advantages 
arising from the source of their mobility barriers (i.e., the state of their resource 
configuration). In addition, it shows that these strategic groups have significant differences in 
performance. As a result, this study proves that for the case of the Belgian fishing fleet the 
“group memberships-performance” link persists. Furthermore, in terms of firm movement and 
group loyalty, this study finds that most vessels remain a member of their strategic group for 
many years. Strategic groups are therefore very stable over time in the Belgian fishing fleet, 
but not every strategic group has this high level of “group loyalty”. Although this is definitely 
a topic for further research, a possible interpretation for this phenomenon is the theory of 
asymmetric mobility barriers (Caves et al., 1977; Harrigan, 1985; Hatten et al., 1987) in 
combination with a firm‟s “isolating mechanisms” (Rumelt, 1984). 
 
The value of our study lies in its contribution to fisheries management. The authors believe 
that strategic group theory could be used to improve fisheries management together with its 
regulation. Strategic group theory offers fisheries management a strategically grounded theory 
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for developing fishing fleet taxonomies. These taxonomies divided the fleet in strategic 
groups, each with a unique state in resource configuration and competitive strategy. Such a 
strategic exercise, along with the way in which strategic groups are defined, will help us 
better understand competition and rivalry in fisheries. As a result, fisheries management 
should focus on regulating the competition between these strategic groups. However, further 
research will be vital in convincing policymakers of the value of strategic groups to manage 
fishing fleets. For EU fisheries policy, a crucial step will be to shift the focus from a single 
country study to one incorporating many EU countries.  In addition, research should also 
focus on the origin of the shifts between strategic groups. Future questions could be, “What 
are the internal or external causes driving vessels to move between strategic groups? And to 
what extent are such moves motivated by performance differences?” Finally, future strategic 
group research in fisheries should also apply dynamic models in analysing strategic group 
dynamics. Two potentially interesting modelling approaches are (1) agent based modelling 
(Gilbert et al., 1999), or (2) system dynamics (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000) . 
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2.6 Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Dendrogram of the hierarchical clustering using Ward’s method and 
Euclidean distance, 1997-2006 
 
(Source: Own data) 
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Appendix 2: The cluster solution of the hierarchical clustering using Ward’s method 
and Euclidean distance (Mean), 1997-2006 
 
 Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 
 N 605 237 393 68 26 
Technology % beam trawling 0.39 0.18 0.06 -3.25 -3.14 
% trammel 
netting 
-0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 7.00 
Product range # Species/trip 0.77 0.23 -1.24 0.00 -1.33 
Geographic reach kW 1.03 -0.87 -0.94 -0.59 -0.38 
(Source: Own data) 
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Appendix 3: The cluster solution of the k-mediods clustering (Median), 1997-2006 
  
 Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 Sig. 
 Clusters labels Large beam 
trawlers 
Small beam 
trawlers 
Shrimp beam 
trawlers 
Otter trawlers Trammel netters  
 N 574 277 367 85 26  
Technology % beam trawling 100c 100b 100b 0a 0a .000 
% trammel 
netting 
0a 0a 0a 0a 100b .000 
Product range # Species/trip 19.11d 15.28c 3.90a 13.08b 4.20a .000 
Geographic reach kW 882e 221b 218a 221c 382d .000 
Different superscripts (a–b–c–d–e) indicate significantly different average means using Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U as post hoc test 
both with Bonferroni adjustment (α‟= 0.005 since k=5). 
(Source: Own data) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo: One of the many scientific expert group meetings held in developing my microworld 
(©Kevin Vanhalst - ILVO) 
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Chapter 3: Simulating the fisheries system with 
its management system 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the 20
th
 century, fisheries worldwide have been the subject of many 
modelling exercises (Arnason, 2007). The overall aim of these models is to assist in solving 
the problem of inefficient use of fish (aquatic) resources. Over the decades, an evolutionary 
pattern can be observed throughout modelling fisheries. In the 1930s, when fisheries 
modelling was primarily the domain of fisheries biologists, the focus was on the fish stocks, 
their total size and cohort structure, and how they changed over time (e.g., Graham, 1935; 
Russell, 1931). These models were thus called biological models. In the (late) 1950s, 
biological models were expanded toward bioeconomic models, which included the 
interactions between the fish stocks and the industry (e.g., Crutchfield, 1956, 1959; Gordon, 
1953, 1954; Scott, 1955). Such models combined biological and profit function models but 
still considered fisheries regulation to be a set of exogenous variables. Further, bioeconomic 
models also dealt with little intra-industry and/or human behaviour. In the 1980s, these two 
shortcomings were addressed with the emergence of the political bioregunomics approach to 
fisheries management (e.g., Anderson, 1987; Walters, 1980) and research on fleet dynamics, 
respectively. The political bioregunomics approach to fisheries management (e.g., Anderson, 
1987; Walters, 1980) resulted in three types of models. All three include parts of the 
“fisheries management regime” (Arnason, 2007) as endogenous variables: (1) management 
models assisted in selecting or designing the “best” fisheries management system; (2) 
fisheries enforcement models extended these management models by including enforcement 
of management rules; and (3) comprehensive fisheries models extended fisheries enforcement 
models by including penalty structures. Research on fleet dynamics resulted in an increased 
understanding of the role intra-industry and human behaviour plays in the exploitation of 
aquatic resources (e.g., Gillis, 2003; Helu et al., 1999). Its four main research areas are: (1) 
investment and disinvestment decisions, (2) effort allocation, (3) harvesting efficiency, and 
(4) discarding and fish mortality (Hilborn, 1985). As a result, fleet dynamic models became 
very important for fisheries management science. They have become important to all involved 
with strategic issues related to the future potential of fisheries and fishing fleets in particular. 
 
As in many research fields, these fisheries models can be divided into theoretical and 
empirical models. The difference between these two types of models is that theoretical models 
do not have any particular empirical content. They do not contain a description of any 
particular fishery, only fisheries in general (e.g., Clark et al., 1979; Clark et al., 1982; 
Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Smith, 1968, 1969; Turvey, 1964).  Empirical models, on the 
other hand, contain a specific empirical description of the features of one or more particular 
fisheries. A third category of fisheries models exists that partly overlaps the previous two: 
numerical models. These models contain numerical descriptions of the subject and, as a result, 
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are capable of producing numerical outcomes. While most empirical models are numerical, 
theoretical models are usually not, but this is not always necessary (for an overview of 
empirical and numerical models also see: Le Roch, (no date); Rodrigues, 1990). 
 
Fisheries models can also be broadly classified into four types based on their intended 
purposes: (1) optimisation models; (2) short-term impact assessment models; (3) dynamic 
simulation models; and (4) microworlds. Optimisation models determine the “optimal” level 
of key variables depending on a range of assumptions. They are configured to answer 
“What‟s best?” questions (Tingley, 2005). Optimisation models frequently attempt to 
maximise factors such as profit, employment, crew share or fleet size for the entire industry 
subject to a range of constraints like pre-specified fishing grounds and target species, total 
allowable catches, minimum profit margins, and days at sea (e.g., Arnason et al., 1997; 2000 
and the EMMFID model). Short-term impact assessment models are mainly used to determine 
the impact of a change in key variables from one time period to the next. As a result, they 
answer questions such as: “What‟s the impact of….?” (Tingley, 2005). Short-term impact 
assessment models are used to assess the economic impact for fishing industries when 
changes occur such as alteration in total allowable catches (TAC‟s) (e.g., the EIAA model 
explained in Salz et al., 2000) or reductions in fleet capacity (e.g., the USA West Coast 
groundfish fishery model explained in Scholz, 2003). Dynamic simulation models are 
developed to provide a dynamic simulation framework for considering interactions between 
key variables over the longer term (i.e., 5-15 years) and to answer questions such as “What 
happens if…?” (Tingley, 2005). Dynamic simulation models have been developed by the 
FAO, for instance. These models are applied to a variety of fisheries to predict fleet 
performance as a function of fishery management measures (e.g., BEAM4 explained in FAO, 
2009a; Le Roch, (no date); Tingley, 2005). Similar studies have been performed for the (1) 
English Channel and Celtic Sea fisheries (e.g., the Invest in Fish South West model, explained 
in CEMARE et al., 2005), (2) the Mediterranean fisheries (e.g., MEFISTO and BEMMFISH 
explained in Anon., 2001, 2004; Guillen et al., 2004; Tingley, 2005), (3) the Barents Sea 
fisheries (e.g., ECONMULT explained in Anon., 1992; Eide et al., 1994), (4) Danish fisheries 
(e.g., TEMAS explained in Sparre et al., 2007), and (5) fisheries around the Italian coastline 
(e.g., MOSES explained in Arnason et al., 1997), among others. Finally, microworlds allow 
decision makers to “refresh decision-making skills, conduct experiments, and play” (Sterman, 
2000: 34). They are learning laboratories for ex ante evaluation of strategies (De Geus, 1997; 
Keys et al., 1996). Such microworlds are often based on simple dynamics simulation models 
equipped with a user-friendly interface. In fact, they lock a dynamic simulation model giving 
the player of the microworld only a limited amount of input and output objects. In addition, 
microworlds can be run “step-wise” (i.e., “gaming” or the dynamic decision making mode) or 
“continuous”  (i.e., “simulation” or the policy development mode) (Langley et al., 1996; 
McCormack et al., 1998; Wolfe, 1975a). Running the microworld “step-wise” allows decision 
makers to adjust decisions in the microworld after each time step, which is not the case in the 
policy development mode since this runs the microworld in one time. Examples of the 
application of microworlds in fisheries are scarce. However, there is one well known 
microworld, called Fish Banks, Ltd (Meadows et al., 2001), which aims to teach principles of 
sustainable management of renewable natural resources through the rivalry of competing 
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fisheries. Other lesser-known examples include (1) Moxnes‟ (1998a; 1998b) microworld on 
the exploitation of a single cod population in an isolated Norwegian fjord, which proved that 
not only tragedy of the commons but also misperception of feedback contribute to 
overexploitation; and (2) Morecroft‟s (2008; 2007) microworld called “Fish and Ships” which 
deals with the puzzling dynamics of fisheries when managing fishing effort. 
 
This brief overview of fisheries modelling helps to positions this study since its objective is to 
develop a microworld where stakeholders can “play” and gain long-term insights in the effect 
policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. The approach is a game that is run in 
a dynamic decision making mode where the players of the microworld are invited to alter 
policy instruments annually through switches and sliders. The story behind the game is that 
the player is the only policymaker in Belgian fisheries and needs to maximise votes for the 
upcoming elections. The way to do this is to demonstrate the policy strategy proposed for that 
fisheries system for the next 20 years to the various stakeholder groups. This collective group 
of stakeholders will then give their votes in function of how well the player paid attention to 
their needs. The needs are captured by (1) total industry value, (2) industry value per vessel, 
(3) fleet size, (4) industry employment, (5) average wages, (6) government expenses, and (7) 
estimated fish stock. How well the policymaker scores on each of these objectives is indicated 
on the interface of the microworld by “status lamps”; a green light indicates excellent 
performance, so the policymaker gains 20000 votes, yellow light means “can do better” but 
the policymaker still gains 10000 votes and red means “severe neglect of this objective” and 
the policymaker then loses 30000 votes. The total amount of votes a player has acquired is 
then simply the sum of the votes for each of these seven objectives. Finally, the more votes 
the player has obtained, the better the score and so the higher the chance of becoming re-
elected. 
 
The basis for this microworld is a simple dynamic simulation model, equipped with a user-
friendly interface (i.e., “flight simulator”), representing the Belgian fisheries system. Hence, it 
provides a dynamic representation of the changing and interlinked relationships between 
biological, fishing and economic components extended to incorporate a range of other 
features like behavioural intra-industry responses to policy instruments and vessel entry/exit 
decisions (i.e., fleet dynamics). As such, it allows for key variables in the simulation model to 
be determined endogenously (i.e., it allows for multiple dynamic interactions) (Tingley, 
2005). Finally, it is a theoretical simulation model however grounded in empirical research 
and findings of the Belgian fisheries. As a result, it contributes to strategic management of the 
Belgian fishing industry where the microworld on top of the simulation model serves as a 
learning laboratory for ex ante evaluation of possible policy strategies (De Geus, 1997; Keys 
et al., 1996). 
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a microworld based on a dynamic simulation 
model of the Belgian fisheries system. It contains four sections. Section 1, Materials and 
Methods, starts by defining the concept of “microworld”. A justification of the choice of 
system dynamics as the modelling methodology then follows. Then comes a discussion of the 
modelling process, and the section ends with an overview of the information and data needed 
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to develop the microworld. Section 2, Results, describes the development of the dynamic 
simulation model underlying the microworld throughout the different stages of the modelling 
process. It ends with locking the simulation model up in a microworld based on the gaming 
setup. Section 3 discusses the simulation model‟s value, scope, underlying assumptions and 
limitations. Section 4 then presents the conclusions. 
 
3.2 Materials and methods 
 
3.2.1 Defining the concept of microworld 
 
Papert (1980) used the term “microworld” for the first time, but microworlds are also known 
under various other names, including “virtual worlds” (Schön, 1983), “synthetic task 
environments”, “high fidelity simulations”, “interactive learning environments”, “virtual 
environments”, “scaled worlds” (Gonzalez et al., 2005), and “simuworlds” (Keys et al., 
1996). This thesis follows Sterman‟s (2000) definition of microworlds. He defines 
microworlds as “formal models in which decision makers can refresh decision-making skills, 
conduct experiments, and play” (Sterman, 2000: 34). As a result, microworlds are based on 
formal models which  Harrison et al. (2007: 1232) define as “a precise formulation of the 
relationships among variables, including the formulation of the processes through which the 
values of variables change over time, based on theoretical reasoning”. In other words, 
developing a microworld starts with a model of the behaviour of some system the researcher 
wishes to investigate, in our case the behaviour of the Belgian fisheries system. The next step 
is to decide between the nature of the microworld being a physical model, a role play, or a 
computer simulation (Sterman, 2000: 34). The microworld developed in this study is a 
simulation model. Therefore, the next step is to convert the formal model into a set of 
equations and/or transformation rules for the processes by which the variables in the system 
change over time. These equations and/or transformation rules are then translated into 
computer code that allows it to run the resulting program on the computer for multiple time 
periods and produce the outcomes of interest (Harrison et al., 2007). Finally, this simulation 
model is equipped with a user user-friendly interface which locks the model, allowing the 
prayers to vary only a limited amount of variables over a limited range. This interfact makes 
interaction with the model easiers for non-modellers. 
 
3.2.2 Choice of simulation methodology 
 
To construct a microworld like this based on a computer simulation model, a broad range of 
simulation methods exist, which can be classified according to several criteria including: (1) 
theoretical versus empirical; (2) static versus dynamic; (3) stochastic versus deterministic; (4) 
continuous versus discrete; and (5) local versus distributed.  The choice on the first two 
criteria has already been made since the microworld is based on a theoretical dynamic 
simulation model grounded in empirical research of the Belgian fisheries system. The next 
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choice is now related to the third and fourth criteria above. In this case, this roughly equals 
choosing between (1) discrete-event simulation (e.g., Robinson, 2004) (2) agent-based 
modelling (e.g., Axelrod, 1997; Epstein et al., 1996; Gilbert et al., 1999) and (3) system 
dynamics (e.g., Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000). 
 
Discrete-event simulation models are stochastic and discrete. These models are not found in 
fisheries management science because they are more suited to simulating operation systems as 
they progresses through time for the purpose of better understanding and/or improving those 
systems (Robinson, 2004). Discrete-event simulation conceptualises such systems as queuing 
systems. Technically, these simulation models maintain a queue of events sorted by the 
simulated time in which they should occur. The simulator reads the queue and triggers new 
events as each event is processed. Events result in entities (e.g., people, tasks, messages, etc.) 
travelling through “the blocks of a flowchart where they stay in queues, are delayed, 
processed, seize and release resources, split, combined, etc.” (Borshchev et al., 2004: 6). 
 
Agent-based modelling is stochastic and continuous. It is regularly used in fisheries 
management science as a dynamic simulation method to evaluate policy strategies (e.g., 
Elliston et al., 2006; Little et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2008; Soulie et al., 2006). Agent-
based modelling simulates the interactions between adaptive autonomous agents with their  
“personal” attributes on the one hand, and their environment and other agents on the other 
hand (Macy et al., 2002; Van Dyke Parunak et al.). As a result, agent-based models are 
essentially “decentralised”, meaning that the global system behaviour is not modelled directly 
(Harrison et al., 2007) but emerges “as a result of many individuals, each following its own 
behaviour rules, living together in some environment and communicating with each other and 
with the environment” (Borshchev et al., 2004: 6). Consequently, the main advantage of these 
models is that they are able to capture complex structures and dynamics in the absence of full 
knowledge about the global interdependencies in the system (Borshchev et al., 2004). Finally, 
the outcomes from such models can be obtained on individual- or aggregated levels. 
 
System dynamics modelling is a deterministic and continuous modelling approach based on a 
system of differential equations (Forrester, 1961). It was developed by electrical engineer Jay 
W. Forrester in the 1950s and draw upon its foundations in engineering control theory 
(Keating, 1998). The purpose of a system dynamics model is “to improve understandings of 
the relationships between feedback structure and dynamic behaviour of a system, so that 
policies for improving problematic behaviour may be developed” (Richardson et al., 1999: 
38). As a result, its focus is on dynamic problems in complex feedback systems (Richardson 
et al., 1999) where it takes the important generic principle that the structure of a system 
determines its dynamic behaviour and therefore its performance over time (Morecroft, 2008; 
Richardson et al., 1999). Consequently, this approach looks within a system for the sources of 
its problem behaviour instead of blaming externalities. In practice, this axiomatic internal 
point of view results in models of feedback systems that “bring external agents inside the 
system” (Richardson et al., 1999: 16). 
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To create such simulation models, system dynamics starts mostly by diagramming the 
feedback system responsible for causing the dynamic problem. Two kinds of diagrams are 
common in system dynamics literature: (1) causal-loop diagrams (CLDs), and (2) stock and 
flow diagrams (SFDs). CLDs map the interconnections and delays between causes and effects 
underlying the dynamic problem in a combination of balancing and reinforcing loops. These 
CLDs are most often used in early stages of model conceptualisation and in later intuitive 
descriptions of model structure for nontechnical presentations. SFDs drill deeper into the 
CLDs to match “more closely a complete quantitative description of a model” (Richardson et 
al., 1999: 25). Feedback loops are now formed when “stock and flow networks interact 
through causal links, in other words when the inflows and outflows of one asset stock 
depends, directly or indirectly, on the state and size of other asset stocks” (Morecroft, 2008: 
66). As a result, system dynamics abstracts from single events and aggregates “agents or 
entities” in homogenous asset stocks. Finally, these SFDs are in a later step translated toward 
“friendly algebra” (Morecroft, 2008: 111) which allows simulation. 
 
This study opts to use system dynamics. Several reasons underpin this choice. First, the 
interactions between policy instruments and the fisheries system contain multiple interlocking 
feedback loops which can be clearly and visually presented by using CLDs and SFDs. 
Second, this visual way of model conceptualisation and building in combination with the 
“friendly algebra” helps stakeholders to become involved in the modelling process. It allows 
stakeholders to discuss a complex and non-linear microworld. Consequently, the simulation 
model is no longer a mathematical black box, but is designed as a tool to enhance learning, 
which is the aim of this study. Finally, system dynamics software packages also offer plenty 
of options for graphical interfaces. These make the microworld on top of the simulation 
model more attractive and much easier to handle. 
 
System dynamics is not new to the field of fisheries management science, nor to strategic 
management (for an overview of system dynamics and strategy see Gary et al., 2008). 
Although much scarcer in the field of fisheries management science, examples are (1) 
Meadow‟s (2001) Fish Banks, Ltd; (2) Morecroft‟s (2008; 2007) microworld on “Fish and 
Ships”; and (3) Moxnes‟ (1998a; 1998b) study on the contribution of  misperception of 
feedback to the overexploitation of fish resources. In addition, the latter also applied system 
dynamics to evaluate harvesting strategies (Moxnes, 1999) and used it for policy sensitivity 
analysis in simple and cohort fishery models (Moxnes, 2005). Dudley (2008) applied system 
dynamics as a methodological basis for understanding fishery management dynamics. Lastly, 
Maes et al., (2007) used system dynamics to model the relation between shrimp fisheries and 
the sand and gravel extraction activity in a perspective of sustainable development. 
 
Last, a choice needs to be made between a local versus distributed approach in modelling 
method, building a model for a single computer versus one which can or should be run on a 
network of interconnected computers (possibly through the internet). This study will use the 
local approach, as there is no need to run it through a network of interconnected computers as 
there is no form of interaction through the microworld amongst players. 
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3.2.3 The modelling process 
 
As a result of choosing system dynamics, this study needs to follow its modelling process. 
The purpose of the modelling process is eventually to “produce a model highly consistent 
with the real system, well suited for its purposes, and well understood” (Richardson et al., 
1999: 293). In system dynamics, the modelling process is iterative but five distinct steps can 
be identified: (1) problem articulation, (2) defining the dynamic hypothesis, (3) formulation, 
(4) testing, and (5) policy formulation and evaluation (Morecroft, 2008; Sterman, 2000) 
(Figure 3.1). Since this study follows these steps, each step except for the last is discussed 
briefly below, because policy formulation and evaluation is not part of this chapter. 
 
Figure 3.1: Iterative modelling process in system dynamics 
 
(Source: Sterman, 2000: 87) 
 
The first step in the modelling process is “problem articulation”. Since system dynamics 
focuses on tackling specific problems in systems rather than just capturing those systems, it is 
the most important step because it shapes the entire study. All problems addressed in system 
dynamics have at least two features in common. First, they are dynamic: “they involve 
quantities which change over time” (Richardson et al., 1999: 1). As a result, they can be 
explained in term of graphs of variables over time. Second, these dynamic problems arise in 
feedback systems (Richardson et al., 1999). Therefore, specifying the time horizon over 
which the dynamic problem unfolds is an important step since it will (1) influence the 
simulation model‟s scope and (2) serve as the length of simulated time over which the 
simulation model will eventually run (Morecroft, 2008). 
 
After the dynamic problem has been defined with its proper time frame, the system which 
causes the dynamics problem needs consideration (Morecroft, 2008). Crucial in this is to 
define the boundary of the system being the imaginary line separating what is considered to 
be inside the system and what is considered to be outside. Within the system, all concepts and 
quantities regarded by the study to relate significantly to the dynamics of the problem at hand 
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can be found (Richardson et al., 1999). In drawing the system boundary, special attention is 
paid to system dynamics‟ most important criteria for correctly drawing system boundaries: 
“the closing of feedback loops in the system” (Richardson et al., 1999: 42). However, where 
exactly to draw the boundary still remains mostly “a matter of judgement and experience” 
(Morecroft, 2008: 36). To aid in this process, this study uses sector mapping to define the 
sectors with their interactions that are needed to explain the dynamics of the problem 
(Morecroft, 2008). 
 
The second step in the modelling process is the formulation of a dynamic hypothesis, being “a 
working theory of how the problem arose” (Sterman, 2000: 95). It is “a preliminary sketch by 
the modeller of the main interactions and feedback loops that could explain observed or 
anticipated performance” (Morecroft, 2008: 106), or “a statement of system structure that 
appears to have the potential to generate the problem behavior” (Richardson et al., 1999: 55-
56). Dynamic hypotheses can be given verbally or in terms of CLDs. Such CLDs are 
qualitative models, all constructed from the same basic elements: “words, phrases, links and 
loops – with special conventions for naming variables and for depicting the polarity of links 
and loops” (Morecroft, 2008: 39) (For more details on how to construct CLDs see chapter 5 
of Sterman, 2000). This study states the dynamic hypothesis of this study in a CLD which will 
also be verbally explained. 
 
Step three is “formulation” which is “the transformation of a dynamic hypothesis into a 
reasonably detailed diagram of feedback processes and corresponding algebraic equations” 
(Morecroft, 2008: 106). As a result, this step transforms the informal, conceptual, qualitative 
view of CLDs into a formal, quantitative representation of SFDs, enabling the simulation 
model to be simulated (Richardson et al., 1999). Central to the formulation of these SFDs is 
the identification of “asset stock accumulations” (Morecroft, 2008: 59) which are a kind of 
memory, “a storage device for material, energy, or information” (Richardson et al., 1999: 
176) (e.g., workforce, savings, products and knowledge). Such asset stocks accumulations 
change according to their inflows and outflows in the same way that “water accumulates in a 
bathtub” (Morecroft, 2008: 60). Next, the feedback loops between these asset stock 
accumulations are determined by the “coordinating network” (Morecroft, 2008: 66) consisting 
of (1) physical flows (similar like in causal linkages in CLDs) (solid arrows), (2) information 
flows (dotted arrows), (3) convertors (or auxiliaries) and (4) constants (Morecroft, 2008). In 
building such quantitative models, it is important to incorporate within its structure (1) 
decision rules which are realistic and “bounded rational” (Morecroft, 1983a, 1983b; Simon, 
1976) and (2) criteria for evaluating policies that are used in the real system (Richardson et 
al., 1999). Finally, there remain two last choices in this step of formulation: (1) the need to 
disaggregate stocks (i.e., to represent a given asset stock accumulation as a single stock or to 
disaggregate it into a series of stocks, for instance: the single stock of “fishing vessels” versus 
the two stocks of “fishing vessels still under depreciation” and “depreciated fishing vessels”) 
and (2) the choice of the right computation interval (i.e., ∆t or dt) which is the model time 
elapsing between computations in the simulation. Disaggregating stocks is tempting and 
should be avoided simply to make the simulation model look more like the real system. In 
system dynamics, there are only two cases where disaggregation of stocks is appropriate: (1) 
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when the disaggregation is required in order for the simulation model to be able to address 
particular management issues, and (2) when the disaggregation of a stock has the potential to 
change significantly the behaviour of the simulation model (Richardson et al., 1999). Finally, 
choosing the right computation interval for the simulation model is a judgmental process. 
However, a simple rule of thumb sets it between one-half and one-tenth of the smallest time 
constant occurring in the simulation model (Forrester, 1961; Richardson et al., 1999). 
 
The fourth step is “testing”, in which the simulation model is simulated and tested to see 
whether or not its behaviour over time is plausible and consistent with its assumptions and 
available evidence from the real world (Keating, 1998; Morecroft, 2008). In this step, errors 
are fixed and confidence in the model integrity is built. System dynamics adopts a broad and 
pragmatic view on model validation as a process of confidence building (Forrester et al., 
1980). Confidence building involves a variety of different tests to assess the quality of both 
the model and the modelling process (Barlas, 1996; Forrester, 1973; Forrester et al., 1980; 
Sterman, 2000). However, three categories of tests have been proven particularly useful in 
practice: (1) tests of model structure, (2) tests of model behaviour and (3) tests of learning 
(Morecroft, 2008). Tests of model structure are intended to assess whether the feedback 
structure and equation formulations of the simulation model are consistent with the available 
facts and descriptive knowledge of the real system (Morecroft, 2008). These tests apply to 
both the conceptual model and the algebraic model and are very important in system 
dynamics practice because structure is central to understanding dynamic behaviour. This 
study applies the five main tests of model structure: (1) boundary adequacy, (2) structure 
verification, (3) dimensional consistency, (4) parameter verification and (5) extreme condition 
test (Morecroft, 2008; Sterman, 2000). The tests of model behaviour are intended to assess 
how well a model reproduces the dynamic behaviour of interest.  The proper use of such tests 
is to uncover flaws in the structure or parameters of the model and to determine whether they 
matter relative to the model purpose. Normally, a useful starting point is to ask whether model 
simulations fit observed historical behaviour. One way to assess goodness-of-fit is to devise 
formal metrics like (1) mean absolute error (MAE), (2) mean square error (MSE) or (3) 
Theil‟s inequality statistics (Theil, 1966). However, since this study is about a simulation 
model based on Belgian fisheries that is transformed into a microworld containing a gaming 
setup, these formal metrics lose their value. As a result, qualitative tests of fit are used instead 
of quantitative tests. Qualitative tests of fit are widely used in practice and consist of 
“eyeballing the magnitude, shape, periodicity and phasing of simulated trajectories and 
comparing to past behaviour”(Morecroft, 2008: 400). As a result, it is still possible to “build 
confidence in model fit by ensuring that simulated trajectories are correctly scaled, pass 
through recognised data points, have the appropriate periodicity and relative phasing and are 
consistent with reliable anecdotal information about past behaviour” (Morecroft, 2008: 400). 
Tests of learning are intended to assess whether model users (in this case gamers) have gained 
new insights about system structure or learned something new about real system behaviour. 
Whenever a simulation model provides useful new insights to the stakeholders then it passes 
the test of learning (Morecroft, 2008). These tests of learning will be the subject of Chapter 5. 
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3.2.4 Information and data collection 
 
In each of these stages, insights and information were mainly gained from scientific expert 
group meetings involving fisheries scientists from the Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries 
Research (ILVO) and myself. These scientific expert group meetings took place on a regular 
ad hoc basis (roughly bi-monthly) during one year and consisted of three to four experts per 
meeting. These insights were then verified, when possible, through literature and simple data 
analyses. Finally, informal contacts with the fishing industry and policymakers have further 
improved conceptualising the fishing environment more accurately. 
 
To perform the simple data analyses and run the simulation model, data was collected 
between 1997-2006 concerning (1) the Belgian policy instruments, (2) the fishing 
environment, and (3) individual vessel characteristics and accounting data. Data on Belgian 
policy instruments are found in European and national regulations. The latter contains the 
translation of the European regulations to the Belgian setting, extended with complementary 
national rules. As a result, only national regulations need to be sought and can be found in the 
Belgian state papers (often in the form of ministerial decisions). Data on the remaining fishing 
environment are mainly gathered from two yearly reports published by the Belgian Sea 
Fisheries Office of the Flemish government: (1) “Belgian marine fisheries: landings and 
totals” (e.g., Tessens et al., 2004a, 2005a, 2006a), and (2) “Results of Belgian marine 
fisheries”(e.g., Tessens et al., 2004b, 2005b, 2006b). These reports contain key figures about 
the condition of the Belgian fisheries (e.g., fish prices and fuel prices) and its fleet. Finally, 
data on individual vessel characteristics and accounting data were collected from two 
databases. There is a very useful database called “Belsamp” hosted at the Section Fisheries 
Biology of ILVO-Fisheries which contains detailed data per individual vessel on catch 
composition and fishing effort allocation. Financial data on individual vessels came from the 
Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish government. They collect accounting data for the 
Belgian sea fisheries fleet through annual surveys. These surveys are taken on a voluntary 
basis and they sample on average 50 percent of the fleet (approximately 60 vessels) between 
1997 and 2006. However, not all sub fleets of the Belgian fleet are sufficiently present each 
year. Consequently, additional data was collected through consulting the annual accounts of 
fishing firms. This resulted in sufficiently high sample sizes for each sub fleet per year.  
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Problem articulation 
 
The objective of developing a microworld that allows decision makers to “play” and gain 
long-term insights in the effect policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system 
emerged from the broader observation of a lasting “profitability crisis” in the Belgian fishing 
industry. As a result, the modelling process started with discussing this current crisis (as of 
 69 
 
2006) in the scientific expert group meetings based on graphs of key variables of the Belgian 
fisheries system over time. When looking at the evolution of the technical characteristics of 
the Belgian fleet over the last decades, the scientific expert group agreed that, up to the 1980s, 
the Belgian fishing fleet has gone through a vast conversion. First of all, there was a dramatic 
decline in fleet size from 457 to 208 vessels between 1950 and 1980. Second, the fleet was 
converted towards a small but powerful beam trawler fleet operating a highly efficient fishing 
method for targeting flatfish like sole and plaice. As a result, the Belgian fishing fleet became 
doubly (over)specialised in both fishing method and target species (Polet et al., 2007). 
However, this vast conversion together with its sacrifices seemed to have resulted in a fishing 
fleet which was not longer declining between the eighties and nineties. Hence, this 
specialisation seemed to have saved the Belgian fleet from depletion. Nevertheless, after more 
than ten years of having a stable (even a slightly increasing) fleet size, a second decline was 
setting in around 1992 and still persists (Figure 3.2). This second decline in fleet size, and the 
role management played or could have played in this crisis, became the focus of our study. As 
a result, the information in Figure 3.2 served as the starting point for defining the dynamic 
problem under research. 
 
Figure 3.2: Belgian fleet size (#vessels), 1986-2006 
 
(Source: Own compilation, adjusted from Tessens et al., 2006a) 
 
Although financial data over these two decades (i.e., 1986-2006) are limited, further inquiry 
into the dynamic problem led the experts to look at the performance of the fleet over time. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the revenues and landings for an average vessel of the Belgian fleet per 
day at sea. It shows a declining trend in average landings between 1986 and 1992 with 
exceptions in 1990 and 1991. However, from 1993 onward, landings increased again, 
exceeding the 1986 level by almost 10%. In addition, revenues gained from these landings 
show quite a similar pattern but it is even more promising. First, the slight downfall in 
landings between 1986 and 1992 has partly been compensated by the increase in prices for 
Dover sole. Second, the increase in landings from 1993 onward has been reinforced by almost 
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exponentially growing average fish prices (Figure 3.4). As a result, the problem of declining 
fleet size in Belgian fisheries seems at first glance not to be situated on the revenue side. 
 
Figure 3.3: Revenues (current €) and landings 
(kg) per day at sea for an average vessel of 
the Belgian fleet, 1986-2006 
Figure 3.4: Average Belgian fish price 
(current €/kg), 1986-2006 
  
(Source: Own compilation, based on data from 
the Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish 
government) 
(Source: Own compilation, adjusted from Tessens 
et al., 2006a) 
 
Investigating the cost side is problematic, as data dates only back to the year 1997. 
Nevertheless, since labour costs are a fixed fraction (usually 33%) of the revenues, it is clear 
that labour costs increase directly proportional to the observed increased revenues between 
1986 and 2006. Another important cost component is fuel. Cost research on Belgian fleet 
performance (Polet et al. (2006)) states that over 45% of all costs are fuel costs. Additionally, 
the Belgian Sea Fisheries Office states that in the year 2006 34% and 25% of the revenues of 
large and small vessels, respectively, were required to cover fuel costs alone (Tessens et al., 
2006b)). By combining data on fishing effort with fuel prices, light could be shed on the 
trajectory of fuel costs between 1986 and 2006. During these two decades, the fishing effort 
per average vessel tends to decline (Figure 3.5). However, this decline in fishing effort in 
combination with exponentially increasing fuel prices (Figure 3.5) almost certainly resulted in 
increased total fuel costs. This reasoning is backed when investigating the figures on fuel 
costs for the period 1997-2006. As a result, increased costs between 1986 and 2006 could 
have played an important role in this crisis since they limit opportunities to make profit. 
 
Having observed the trajectories related to revenues and costs of an average vessel of the 
Belgian fleet, the scientific expert group agreed that fisheries management and regulation 
played a huge role in the shape of these trajectories because fisheries management is able to 
alter the fishing environment which results in changes to fleet performance (e.g., Stouten et 
al., 2008). This fishing environment can be managed by fisheries management systems which 
Arnason (2009) broadly classifies into two classes: (1) biological fisheries management and 
(2) economic fisheries management. Biological fisheries management (such as gear 
restrictions, total allowable catches, area closures, nursery ground protection, etc.) is focused 
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on conserving the fish stocks. Economic fisheries management is further divided into (1) 
direct restrictions and (2) indirect economic management. The difference between these two 
categories is that direct restrictions (e.g., the effort restriction of limiting the days at sea, 
fishing time, holding capacity of vessels, engine size, etc.) impose explicit constraints on the 
activity of the fishermen, while indirect management merely changes the incentives facing the 
fishermen. Finally, indirect economic management may be divided into two categories; (1) 
subsidies and taxes, and (2) property rights (e.g., fishing licences, sole ownership, territorial 
use rights, individual quota, and community rights). 
 
The scientific expert group looked at the main policies Belgium had undertaken between 1986 
and 2006. Since fisheries management in Belgium is still mainly based on biologically and 
directly economically restrictive policy instruments (often imposed by the European Union 
since Belgium is a member state (EC, 2002)) (Stouten et al., 2008), the scientific expert group 
first investigated the evolution of the total Belgian fishing quota (i.e., cumulative quota across 
species and fishing grounds) and the number of species under quota restrictions (i.e., a small 
computation error is made by counting a small rest fraction as one species) over the last two 
decades (Figure 3.6). Between 1986 and 2006, there is a clear increase in the number of 
species under quota restrictions, from 11 to 24 species. Even though the number of species 
under quota restrictions has more than doubled, total quota has declined significantly from 
approximately 39000 to 29000 tonnes (a decline of approximately 25%). In addition, Belgian 
decision makers have also decreased the total amount of fishing days fishermen are allowed to 
fish. Between 1997 and 2006, the total amount of fishing days decreased from 285 to 260 
days (a decline of around 10%) whereas for the North Sea, a very important fishing ground 
for the Belgian fishing fleet, the total amount of fishing days even decreased by more than 
30% - from 235 to only 160 days. Hence, many of the biological and direct economic 
restrictive policy instruments have all been intensified during the last two decades. 
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Figure 3.5: Fishing effort (days at sea) of an 
average Belgian vessel and average fuel 
prices (current €/l) in the Belgian fishing 
industry, 1986-2006 
Figure 3.6: Total quota (tonne) and species 
under quota restrictions (#species) in Belgian 
fisheries, 1986-2006 
  
(Source: Own compilation based on data from the 
Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish 
government) 
(Source: Own compilation based on data from the 
Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish 
government) 
 
Belgium had also applied licencing between 1986 and 2006. Licencing is an indirect 
economic policy instrument (Arnason, 2009). The licencing, in combination with several 
decommissioning rounds (2004-2006, with increasing decommissioning fees over the years) 
aimed to reduce overcapacity by buying out unprofitable vessels and destroying their licences. 
These decommissioning rounds have definitely accelerated the decline in total fleet size. 
Furthermore, during those two decades, investment subsidies were also widely granted to 
modernise older vessels and/or to experiment with other fishing methods. However, the 
scientific expert group agreed that all these financial stimuli have only resulted in a declining 
fishing fleet; no significant fleet conversions away from unprofitable fisheries have yet taken 
place. This insight led us to this study, which focuses on developing a tool to help decision 
makers gain insight into the effects of policy instruments on the Belgian fisheries system. As 
a result, “learning” instead of “predicting” became central to this study. 
 
We then consolidated these findings and determined (1) the desired length of simulation time 
and (2) a sector map. This map defines the scope in the simulation model that will explain the 
observed behaviour of the previous trajectories and provide long-term insight into the effect 
of policy instruments on the Belgian fisheries system. First, the desired length of simulation 
time was set to 20 years. This was based on the information presented in the previous figures; 
the dynamic problem unfolds over approximately a 20 year time horizon. Second, armed with 
insights gained from the same information, the experts in the group meetings agreed on the 
sector map given in  
Figure 3.7. It contains nine sectors, with its interactions being: (1) “stock dynamics and quota 
recommendation”, (2) “regulation”, (3) “fishing tactics”, (4) “fleet performance”, (5) 
“investment decision”, (6) “bank”, (7) “fleet”, (8) “employment”, and (9) “government 
expenses”. “Stock dynamics and quota recommendation” captures the puzzling dynamics of 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0
50
100
150
200
250
Fu
le
 p
ri
ce
 (
eu
ro
/l
)
D
ay
s 
at
 s
ea
Average Fishing Effort Fuel Price
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
#S
p
ec
ie
s
To
n
n
e
Total quota Species under quota restrictions
 73 
 
the fish stocks that Belgian fishermen target and the process of making scientific 
recommendations for total quotas to the policymakers, who in turn set the quotas for the 
Belgian fishing industry. Hence, this sector interacts with the sector of “regulation” through 
quota recommendations, but also with the sector of “fleet performance” since dynamics of the 
fish stock affect catch rates. “Regulation” is the sector that aggregates all Belgian fishing 
regulation. It contains: (1) quota setting based on the quota recommendations, (2) the 
allocation of the total quota over Belgium‟s five sub fleets (3) maximum fishing days, (4) 
catch restrictions per fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) investment 
subsidies, and (8) fuel subsidies and taxes. These eight forms of regulation affect both 
fishermen‟s fishing tactics and investment decisions. They also affect the sector “fleet 
performance” through fuel subsidies or taxes and catch restrictions per fishing day, for 
example. Third, regulations also have an impact on the sector “bank” since investment 
subsidies can alter the loans fishermen need when buying new vessels. Finally, some 
regulations like subsidies and decommissioning fees may also result in government expenses 
illustrated by the connection between both sectors, the sector of “regulation” and the sector of 
“government expenses”. “Fishing tactics” captures the decision rules on capacity utilisation of 
the fleet given the regulatory environment, shaped by the sector “regulations”, and the 
estimated Contribution Margin Ratios per sub fleet (Marshall et al., 2003; Milling, 2003) (see 
below, Equation 16). The effect this sector has on fleet performance and government expenses 
is through its chosen level of capacity utilisation of the fleet. “Fleet performance” refers to the 
financial performance of the fleet. It gives insight in: (1) catches (which in this study are set 
equal to landings), (2) revenues, (3) costs, (4) net profit/losses, (5) savings (i.e., the 
accumulation of net profit; saved money), (6) debts, (7) value of the vessels of the Belgian 
fleet, (8) average wages in the industry, and (9) industry value (being industry savings minus 
industry debts plus the value of the vessels of the Belgian fleet). This sector affects many 
other sectors. First, it affects “stock dynamics and quota recommendation” through catch rates 
since catches reduce the fish stock. Secondly, it affects the estimated Contribution Margin 
Ratios used in “fishing tactics” since these estimates are based on past realised fleet 
performance. Third, it affects “regulation” since the value of the vessels (which decreases 
through aging) determines the decommissioning fees. Fourth, it affects “investment decision” 
since healthy fleet performance may result in investments and unhealthy performance in 
disinvestment or decommissioning. Finally, it also has an impact on “government expenses” 
since fishermen may choose to benefit from the given fuel subsidies, for example. 
“Investment decision” captures the decision rules on buying, selling or decommissioning of 
vessels. This sector obviously affects the fleet size (i.e., the sector “fleet”). It also affects 
“regulations” through altering the amount of remaining available licences. Last, it also affects 
“government expenses” since changes in investment decisions can result in changes in the 
uptake of decommissioning fees and/or investment subsidies. “Bank” captures the dynamics 
of the loans the banks are willing to provide; this is mainly a function of estimated future fleet 
performance. These loans are crucial since buying vessels is almost impossible without such a 
loan. Hence, they affect the fishermen‟s investment decisions. Next, loans also affect “fleet 
performance” since borrowing money results in new debt and interest that both need to be 
repaid. “Fleet” captures the dynamics in fleet size over time. First, it affects the investment or 
disinvestment decisions since the state of the fleet size may or may not be the desired one. 
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Second, it affects “regulations” since it affects the amount of available licences. Third, it 
affects the performance of the fleet (i.e., the “fleet performance” sector). Fourth, it affects the 
sector of “fishing tactics” since changes in fleet size may affect capacity utilisation of the 
fleet. Fifth, it affects industry employment. Finally, it also affects government expenses 
through the effect a change in fleet size has on the amount of government money that drains 
away to fuel subsidies. “Employment” is the sector which aggregates all crew members of the 
vessels. This sector has only an impact on the average wages in the sector (i.e., sector “Fleet 
performance”). Finally, “Government expenses” aggregates all expenses the government 
makes through the implementation of (1) decommissioning fees, (2) investment subsidies, and 
(3) fuel subsidies and taxes. 
 
Figure 3.7: The sector map of the simulation model 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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3.3.2 Dynamic hypothesis 
 
Once the scientific expert group had defined the scope of the simulation model, they then 
developed a dynamic hypothesis capturing a deeper understanding of how these sectors 
interact with each other. The experts agreed on the dynamic hypothesis (the causal loop 
diagram (CLD) in Figure 3.8). To explain this diagram, it is best to start from R1 and R2, two 
reinforcing loops that represent growth through investments in an open access fishery with 
unlimited fish available for harvest. Under these conditions, deploying a larger fishing fleet 
results in more net profits, which leads to increased savings. Increased savings in combination 
with higher net profits results in more investments, boosting the fleet size. In addition, 
increased net profits also drive further fleet utilisation (i.e., R3). However, the costs of fishing 
are not yet taken into account. B1 (where “B” stands for balancing loop) illustrates the 
negative effect costs have on net profits and therefore on the reinforcing behaviour of R1, R2 
and R3. Next, B2 represents the balancing effect that investments have on savings. However, 
in reality, investments are not paid in full. Hence, loans (with interest) from financial 
institutions like banks are necessary to finance these investments. R4 then represents the 
effect of profitability on getting a loan from the bank. In our simplified case, profitability is 
taken as a simplified form of a firm‟s “debt repayment capacity”, which normally equals net 
profit augmented with depreciations minus repayment of debts, but we assume that 
depreciation equals debt repayment and can therefore be omitted from the formula. Increased 
profitability leads to being able to get larger loans that will eventually have a positive effect 
on investments. However, investments also result in increased debt (with interest) that need to 
be repaid, which in turn decreases net profits (B3). In addition, these debts even increase 
when profitability increases, because larger bank loans can be obtained (B4). Finally, the 
effect of debt repayment (including interest) on a regular basis on the amount of debt is given 
by B5. 
 
Up to this point, the CLD is still based on an open access fishery with unlimited fish to 
harvest. However, in reality Belgian fisheries are operating in a highly regulated fishing 
environment. Following the sector map, the selection of policy instruments must be included 
in the CLD. First, it includes quotas and their effect on fleet utilisation in balancing loop B6. 
Deployment of a larger fishing fleet results in higher catches, depleting the fish stock. 
Consequently, a depleted fish stock will lead to recommendations for a lower quota. Lower 
recommended quotas leads to lower quotas given the same “fraction change on quota 
recommendation”, or the political judgmental factor in the quota setting process. Second, 
fishing days also affect fleet utilisation through limiting the number of days the fleet can 
spend at sea. Although this choice is definitely bound by feedback mechanisms, the scientific 
expert group chose to “open the loops” (Sterman, 2000) related to fishing days. Third, 
maximum catch per fishing day also affects fleet utilisation since the higher these limits are, 
the smaller the fleet needs to be to catch the quota given the fishing day restrictions. Fourth, 
the limiting effect licences have on investment, and therefore on fleet size, is given by 
balancing loop B7. As a result, the fleet size can only increase if there are licences available, 
which is a function of (1) changes in fleet size and (2) the applied licence policy. Fifth, 
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policies concerning decommissioning fees and investment subsidies affect investment 
decisions by stimulating exit and entry behaviour, respectively. Decommissioning fees are 
determined endogenously in the simulation model as a fraction (i.e., the policy choice) of the 
remaining value of an old vessel (not given in the CLD). Finally, policymakers can also grant 
fuel subsidies or levy fuel taxes. Although this is not (yet) the case in Belgium, fishermen see 
this as a solution for the Belgian fuel-intensive fishing fleet. Hence, the scientific expert group 
meeting agreed to include this policy instrument in the CLD as well as in the simulation 
model. 
 
Figure 3.8: Causal loop diagram of the simulation model (“R” = “Reinforcing loop”; “B” = 
“Balancing loop”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
3.3.3 Formulation 
 
The translation of the CLD to the stock and flow diagram (SFD) with its equations is done 
sector by sector, following the order by which the sectors in the sector map were discussed. 
But before doing so, two decisions need to be explained and justified. The first decision is 
related to the need for developing a realistic but simple and transparent simulation model, 
since complexity can blur or block learning. As a result, only one array is introduced in the 
simulation model, i.e., the array of sub fleets. The scientific expert group believed that this 
disaggregation of stocks was required in order for the simulation model to be able to address 
particular very relevant management issues (related to the diversification of the fleet versus 
(re)focusing the fleet toward a sub fleet). Hence, the simulation model contains five 
homogeneous sub fleets as its key agents. The second and more technical decision concerns 
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the choice of time unit and computation interval. The time unit of this simulation model is 
“years” since most of the policy decisions happen yearly. Its computation interval is set at ¼ 
of a year, following the abovementioned simple rule of thumb for setting the computation 
interval (Forrester, 1961; Richardson et al., 1999). 
 
SECTOR 1: STOCK DYNAMICS AND QUOTA RECOMMENDATION 
 
Figure 3.9 is the SFD for the sector on fish stock dynamics and scientific quota 
recommendation. The scientific expert group meetings pointed out that the dynamic 
behaviour of a fish stock is still puzzling, subject to extensive research and enormously 
complex modelling exercises. There are three principal forms of uncertainty in understanding 
and capturing stock dynamics: (1) fundamental structural uncertainties, (2) parameter 
uncertainty, and (3) random fluctuations (i.e., “noise”) (Charles, 1998). Scientists encounter 
fundamental structural uncertainties, which reflects a basic lack of knowledge about the 
nature of stock dynamics. Parameter uncertainty reflects the fact that parameter estimates 
related to the state of the fish stock are often imprecise and/or delayed. Finally, random 
fluctuations hamper the process of further inquiry into stock dynamics. This results in a lack 
of accurate knowledge about the behaviour of the fish stock, although it can be roughly 
estimated from (1) stock assessment data and (2) quota (ICES, 2008). Consequently, the 
scientific expert group agreed that the simulation model should reflect these inaccuracies and 
estimations. 
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Figure 3.9: Stock and flow diagram capturing stock dynamics and quota recommendation 
with its in-flows from and out-flows to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
In the simulation model, as in reality, the fish stock is thus not known accurately but its value 
can be roughly estimated. In addition, the scientific expert group made some additional 
simplifications and assumptions. This simulation model assumes that the Belgian fleet 
operates in complete isolation. As a result, it is based on a fractional stock dynamics model, 
equal to Belgium‟s fraction of all European fleets fishing the same stocks on the same fishing 
grounds. The scientific expert group opted to include a single species in the simulation model 
that captures the properties of the different species in Belgian fisheries. Finally, this single 
species approach is represented in a single asset stock accumulation instead of a more 
complex cohort structure. The underlying reason for this single stock representation is that the 
scientific expert group believed that a cohort structure only adds needless complexity to the 
simulation model. This would not have supported its objective, namely learning about 
fisheries management. As a result, this study sets the initial value of the total Belgian fish 
stock 𝐵0 at 40000 tonne fish (see Equation 1 below). Next, 𝐵(𝑡) is the fish stock at time t 
which increases through 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) and depletes through 𝐶(𝑡), being net generation rate of new 
fish and total catch of the Belgian fleet, respectively, both in time t. 
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 𝐵 𝑡 = 𝐵 𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑁𝐹 −  𝐶 𝑑𝑡     𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒        
𝐵 0 = 𝐵0 = 40000     𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒   
(1)  
 
Where 𝐶(𝑡) equals the sum of all the catches of the Belgian sub fleets at time t. 𝑁𝐹 is in 
reality not yet fully understood because it is related to 𝐵(𝑡) which is unknown and this 
relationship is complex and involves many other variables (i.e., a fundamental structural 
uncertainty). As a result, the scientific expert group agreed to conceptualise 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) as a 
graphical function based on theory. Hence, 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) is a combination of a Ricker‟s density-
dependent stock-recruitment relationship and a density-dependent S-shaped natural mortality 
rate (Cooper, 2006; Nikolskii, 1969) as given in Figure 3.10. Although this is a very 
theoretical conceptualisation, similar conceptualisation of 𝑁𝐹 can be found in other system 
dynamics studies (e.g., Dudley, 2008; Meadows et al., 2001; Morecroft, 2008) and results in 
the desired smooth S-shaped growth for a natural fish population, commonly known as “limits 
to growth” (Randers et al., 1972).  
 
Figure 3.10: Net generation of new fish as a combination of a Ricker‟s density-dependent 
stock-recruitment relationship and a density-dependent S-shaped natural mortality rate 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
These stock dynamics then form the basis for quota, which scientists must recommend to 
Belgian policymakers. The scientific expert group conceptualised quota as to limit total catch 
steering 𝐵(𝑡) toward 𝐵𝑚𝑠𝑦 (𝑡), being its maximum sustainable biomass at time t. Although 
fisheries management has multiple objectives, maximum sustainable yield is a commonly 
agreed objective for the fish stock found in legislation and international agreements, e.g., Rio 
Declaration 1992 and Johannesburg Declaration 2002. In this simulation model, 𝐵𝑚𝑠𝑦 (𝑡) is 
reached when 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) is at its maximum which happens when 𝑑(𝑡), being the fish density at 
time t, reaches the value of 0.6 (Figure 3.10) with: 
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𝑑 𝑡 =
𝐵 𝑡 
𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥
      𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠  
 
𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 80000     𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒  
(2)  
 
Where 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑡) is the maximum value for 𝐵(𝑡) also known in fisheries as the carrying 
capacity. In this simulation model, 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑡) is set as a constant with a value of 80000 tonne 
fish assuming that the carrying capacity does not change over time (through ecological effects 
of fishing and/or policy strategies, for instance). 
 
To allow steering 𝐵(𝑡) toward 𝐵𝑚𝑠𝑦(𝑡) or to recommend quota, scientists need to estimate (1) 
the gap between 𝐵(𝑡) and 𝐵𝑚𝑠𝑦 (𝑡) and (2) 𝑁𝐹(𝑡), respectively ∆𝐵 (𝑡) and 𝑁𝐹 (𝑡). 𝑁𝐹 (𝑡) 
equals 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) smoothed over the assumed time scientists need to estimate 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) through 
surveys (set in this case at one year). To calculate ∆𝐵 (𝑡), the scientific expert group assumed 
scientists have an accurate idea of the value of 𝐵𝑚𝑠𝑦 (𝑡) (i.e., 𝐵𝑚𝑠𝑦 (𝑡)  equals 𝐵 𝑚𝑠𝑦 (𝑡) and is 
set constant at 48000 tonne fish) but need to estimate the fish stock (𝐵 (𝑡)) through estimating 
the fish density (𝑑 (𝑡)) with 𝑑 (𝑡) being 𝑑(𝑡) smoothed over the assumed time scientists need 
to estimate 𝑑(𝑡) (in this case one year). Next, ∆𝐵 (𝑡) is then simply calculated as: 
 
  ∆𝐵  𝑡 =  𝐵 𝑚𝑠𝑦 − 𝐵  𝑡      𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒  (3)  
 
Hence, the scientific quota recommendation at time t is then obtained by: 
 
 
 𝑄𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑚𝑡𝑕1 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁𝐹  𝑡 +  ∆𝐵  𝑡 , 0 , 𝑡𝑄𝑟     
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(4)  
 
Where “smth1” is a first-order smoothing function and 𝑡𝑄𝑟  is a constant and reflects the time 
scientists need to adjust their quota recommendations, capturing the time scientists need to 
believe that ∆𝐵 (𝑡) and 𝑁𝐹 (𝑡) have structurally changed. In this case, 𝑡𝑄𝑟  is set at one year. 
Finally, it is 𝑄𝑟(𝑡) which scientists report to the policymakers who actually set the quota. 
 
SECTOR 2: REGULATIONS 
 
This sector contains the SFD of all the fishing regulations in the simulation model (Figure 
3.11). This SFD contains four major parts: (1) “Part A” captures the conceptualisation of 
quota setting and the setting of maximum fishing days, (2) “Part B” captures the catch 
restrictions per fishing day, (3) “Part C” captures the dynamics in available licences, and (6) 
“Part D” captures the conceptualisation of decommission fees, investment subsidies and fuel 
taxes or subsidies, respectively. 
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Figure 3.11: Stock and flow diagram capturing the sector on regulations with its in-flows 
from and out-flows to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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In the simulation model, quota at time t 𝑄(𝑡) are set based on 𝑄𝑟(𝑡) (see part A of Figure 
3.11). However, policymakers who set 𝑄(𝑡) enjoy a certain freedom to agree or disagree with 
𝑄𝑟(𝑡). This process of political judgement is captured in a single variable being the desired 
fraction change in total quota at time t (𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡)). Hence, 𝑄(𝑡) is then given by: 
 
 
𝑄 𝑡 = 𝑄𝑟 𝑡  1 + 𝑝𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡       
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
    
(5)  
 
The value for 𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) is initially set at zero resulting in 𝑄𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑄(𝑡) meaning that 
policymakers fully agree with 𝑄𝑟(𝑡) and are not sensitive to lobbying from different 
stakeholder groups. 
 
Next, 𝑄(𝑡) is allocated over the five Belgian sub fleets. As a result, the quota per sub fleet at 
time t 𝑄𝑠(𝑡) is conceptualised as: 
 
 
𝑄𝑠 𝑡 =
𝑄 𝑡 
max  𝑝𝑞𝑠(𝑡)𝑠 , 1 
 𝑝𝑞𝑠 𝑡     
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(6)  
 
Where 𝑝𝑞𝑠 𝑡  represents the relative proportion of total quota allocated to sub fleet s at time t 
which equals in this case the desired relative proportion of total quota allocated to sub fleet s 
at time t 𝑝𝑞𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡). 𝑝𝑞𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) initial values are all set to five. Since these values 
represent relative proportions of the total quota allocated to each sub fleet, altering one of 
them affects all others. 
 
Hence, 𝑄𝑠(𝑡) is a limiting factor of the effective capacity utilisation of sub fleet s at time t 
𝑈𝑠(𝑡) (which is obtained in the sector on fishing tactics). A second factor is 𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡) being 
the amount of fishing days sub fleet s gets from policymakers at time t which equals in this 
case the desired amount of fishing days for sub fleet s. In this simulation model, this desired 
number of fishing days for the different sub fleets can be set between zero and 365 days but 
their initial values are all set to 200. 
 
When 𝑄𝑠(𝑡) and 𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡) are obtained, 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡) being the possible capacity utilisation due 
to regulation for sub fleet s at time t can be calculated as: 
 
  𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡 = min 𝑈𝑞 ,𝑠 𝑡 ,𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡)      𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠  (7)  
 
Where 𝑈𝑞 ,𝑠(𝑡) and 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠 𝑡  are both the possible capacity utilisation for sub fleet s at time t 
due to respectively quota and fishing days. As a result, 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡) limits 𝑈𝑠(𝑡). Hence, 
𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡) is an output of this sector on regulations and will serve as an important input in the 
sector on fishing tactics where it has its limiting effect on 𝑈𝑠(𝑡). 
 
In Equation 7, the possible capacity utilisation due to quota for sub fleet s at time t is 
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 𝑈𝑞 ,𝑠 𝑡 =
𝑄𝑠 𝑡 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝐶𝑠 𝑡 
     𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠  
(8)  
 
Where 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the number of vessels for sub fleet s at time t and 𝐶𝑠(𝑡) the catch of the 
sub fleet s at time t. 
 
In Equation 7, the possible capacity utilisation due to fishing days for sub fleet s at time t is 
 
 
 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠 𝑡 =
𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡)
𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥      𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠  
(9)  
 
Where, 𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is a constant and set at 365 days (i.e., all days of a regular year) being the 
maximum number of fishing days a policymaker can give to a vessel of sub fleet s at time t. 
 
After having limited capacity utilisation of the fleet through regulation, policymakers can also 
restrict the amount of fish sub fleets are allowed to catch per fishing day (see part B of Figure 
3.11). As in reality, the main objective of restricting the catch per fishing day is to spread the 
quota over the sub fleets and their fishing days. However, since the conceptualisation of this 
simulation model already spreads the quota over the sub fleets and their fishing days through 
adjusted utilisation of the sub fleets capacity, the scientific expert group agreed to 
conceptualise the catch restrictions per fishing day at the “cost-side of the fleet”. The logic 
behind this is that catch restrictions per fishing day force sub fleets to spend more time fishing 
since catches are restricted. As a result, the variable costs increase since more time is spent on 
fishing (see the sectors “fishing tactics” and “fleet performance”). The decision on 
implementing catch restrictions per fishing day is included in this simulation model as a 
boolean 𝑍(𝑡) taking the value one at time t when catch restrictions are active and zero when 
inactive for all sub fleets. 
 
Next, policymakers use licences to limit the amount of vessels in the total fleet as illustrated 
in the SFD of part C in Figure 3.11. The number of available licences at time t 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐(𝑡) is 
represented as an asset stock accumulation which value changes through two bi-flows. The 
first bi-flow captures the change in licences through the chosen licence policy at time t 
𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔 (𝑡). A negative value for 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔 (𝑡) (only) decreases the number of available licences 
that are not yet used by fishermen. Consequently, a negative value will not force vessels to 
leave the fleet. The second bi-flow captures the change in licences as a result of the 
investment decisions of the different sub fleets at time t 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝐼(𝑡). As a result, the number of 
available licences at time t is then given by: 
 
 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑡 = 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐  𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔 −  𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝐼 𝑑𝑡     𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  
𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐  0 = 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐
0 = 0     𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒   
(10)  
 
Where 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐
0  is the initial value for available licences which is a constant set to zero. 
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In Equation 10, 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝐼(𝑡) at time t is 
 
  𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝐼 𝑡 =  𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡 −  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑌𝑠 𝑡   
𝑠
   𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  (11)  
 
Where, 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 is the number of licences per vessel for sub fleet s at time t which is set 
constant at one for each vessel independent of the sub fleet, 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the number of 
vessels sub fleet s buys at time t, 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the number of vessel sub fleet s sells at 
time t, and 𝑌𝑠(𝑡) is a boolean taking value one if sub fleets s sells its vessels through the 
market instead of through decommissioning. 𝑌𝑠(𝑡) is zero in all other cases. 
 
Next, part D of Figure 3.11 illustrates the SFD on how policymakers affect the investment 
behaviour of fishermen through direct economic stimuli like decommissioning fees, 
investment subsidies and fuel taxes or subsidies. When policymakers grant decommissioning 
fees, it is to stimulate fishermen to leave the industry and reduce overcapacity in the fleet. 
These decommissioning fees are, theoretically speaking, the price government is willing to 
pay for old vessels given their target of reducing overcapacity. In the simulation model as in 
reality, the decommissioning fee for an average vessel of sub fleet s at time t 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠(𝑡) is 
a fraction of its remaining value at time t. As a result, 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠(𝑡) at time t is: 
 
 
 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑑𝑓𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡 
𝑉𝑠 𝑡 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 
     
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
  
(12)  
 
Where 𝑑𝑓𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) is the desired fraction of the average value of a vessel of sub fleet s at 
time t which policymakers are willing to pay for an old vessel of sub fleet s at time t. 
𝑑𝑓𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) is initially set at zero, but can be varied between zero and one. 𝑉𝑠(𝑡) is the total 
value of the vessels in sub fleet s at time t.  
 
When policymakers give investment subsidies in this simulation model, it is to stimulate 
fishermen to buy new vessels. These subsidies lower the price of a new vessel for sub fleet s 
at time t 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,𝑠 𝑡  toward the price of a new vessel for sub fleet s at time t after 
investment subsidies 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡  which is given by: 
 
  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,𝑠 −  𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,𝑠 𝑡      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
  (13)  
 
Where 𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  is the desired fraction of the price for a new vessel of sub fleet s at time t 
which will be subsidised. 𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  is initially set at zero, but can be varied between zero 
and one. 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,𝑠 are constants: they are 2000000, 5000000, 2000000, 1000000, and 
1500000 euro for a small beam trawler, a large beam trawler, an otter trawler, a trammel 
netter and a shrimp beam trawler, respectively. 
 
Finally, although not (currently) the case in Belgium, policymakers can also implement fuel 
taxes or subsidies (see part D of Figure 3.11). This would mean that policymakers alter the 
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price fishermen need to pay per litre fuel. As a result, the fuel price after subsidies or taxes at 
time t 𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔 (𝑡) is then given by: 
 
  𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔  𝑡 = 𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙   1 + 𝑓 𝑡      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒
  (14)  
 
Where 𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  is the normal fuel price at time t which is a constant and set at 0.28 euro per litre. 
𝑓 𝑡  is the desired fraction of change in normal fuel price at time t which equals the fuel 
subsidies or taxes. Initially, 𝑓 𝑡  is set at zero. 
 
SECTOR 3: FISHING TACTICS 
 
The SFD of this sector on fishing tactics is given in Figure 3.12 and determines the value of 
𝑈𝑠(𝑡) based on 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡) and the estimated financial performance when fishing at 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡). 
 
Figure 3.12: Stock and flow diagram capturing the sector of fishing tactics with its in-flows 
from, and out-flow to, the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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 𝑈𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔,𝑠 𝑡  𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠 𝑡      𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠   (15)  
 
Where 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the nonlinear effect the estimated Contribution Margin Ratio (Marshall et 
al., 2003; Milling, 2003) for sub fleet s at time t (𝐶𝑀𝑅 𝑠(𝑡)) has on 𝑈𝑠(𝑡). 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡) is a 
graphical function and illustrates that when 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑠(𝑡) lies beneath 0.1 fishermen decide not to 
fish at 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡) but at a fraction of 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠(𝑡) as given in Figure 3.13. As a result, the 
conceptualisation of 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡) reflects the fact that 𝑈𝑠 𝑡  is based on estimates of variables 
resulting in a decision for 𝑈𝑠 𝑡  which is not “black or white”-decisions as “to fish or not to 
fish”. 
 
Figure 3.13: Effect of Contribution Margin Ratio (CRM) on capacity utilisation 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
To calculate 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡), the estimated CMR for sub fleet s at time t is 
 
 
𝐶𝑀𝑅 𝑠 𝑡 =
𝑅 𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑉𝐶 𝑠 𝑡 
𝑅 𝑠 𝑡 
    𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠  
(16)  
 
Where 𝑅 𝑠(𝑡) are the estimated revenues for sub fleet s at time t and 𝑉𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) are the estimated 
variable costs for sub fleet s at time t. This equation as a part of 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡) assumes that 
fishermen go fishing as long as they expect that the revenues cover their variable costs. If not, 
then 𝑈𝑠(𝑡) will be equal to 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡  multiplied by 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡). 
 
In Equation 16 and also to calculate 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑅 ,𝑠(𝑡), the estimated revenues for sub fleet s at time t 
is 
 
 𝑅 𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠  𝑐 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑃 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑠 𝑡    𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  (17)  
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Where 𝑐 𝑠(𝑡)  is the estimated catch for a vessel of sub fleet s at time t and 𝑃 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the 
estimated fish price for sub fleet s at time t. 
 
Also in Equation 16, the estimated variable costs for sub fleet s at time t is 
 
 𝑉𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) =  𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 0  𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛 0 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑍 𝑡  𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡),𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡   𝑣𝑐 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 + 𝐿𝐶 𝑠(𝑡)   
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
   
(18)  
 
Where 𝑣𝑐 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡)  are the estimated variable costs (i.e., fuel costs and all other variable 
costs excluding labour costs) for a vessel of sub fleet s at time t smoothed over the time 
needed to estimate these variable costs (in this case one year) and 𝐿𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) is the estimated 
labour costs for sub fleet s at time t. Table 3.1 illustrates the different outcomes of this 
equation. 
 
Table 3.1: Overview of the different outcomes of the estimated variable costs for sub fleet s at 
time t (𝑉𝐶 𝑠(𝑡)) depending on the possible capacity utilisation due to regulation for sub fleet s 
at time t (𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡 ) and the catch restrictions per fishing day (𝑍 𝑡 ) 
𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑍 𝑡  𝑉𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) 
≠ 0 𝑈𝑞 ,𝑠(𝑡) < 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡) 0 𝑈𝑞 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑣𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) 
  1 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑣𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) 
 𝑈𝑞 ,𝑠 𝑡 > 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡) 0 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑣𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) 
  1 𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑣𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐶 𝑠(𝑡) 
= 0 All cases All cases 0 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
SECTOR 4: FLEET PERFORMANCE 
 
Figure 3.14 illustrates the SFD of the sector on the financial performance of the fleet and sub 
fleets. 
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Figure 3.14: Stock and flow diagram capturing the sector of fleet performance with its in-
flows from and out-flows to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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Crucial in this financial status of the fleet is (1) the total value of the industry at time t 
 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑡 , and (2) the total value of the industry per vessel which simply divides 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑡  by 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 (𝑡) being the number of vessels in the fleet at time t. As a result, a good starting point 
for explaining the SFD of this sector is to start with the total value of the industry at time t as 
conceptualised by the scientific expert group as: 
 
  𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑡 =  𝑆𝑠
𝑠
 𝑡 − 𝐷𝑠 𝑡 
𝑠
+  𝑉𝑠(𝑡)
𝑠
    𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  (19)  
 
Where 𝑆𝑠 𝑡  are the savings, 𝐷𝑠 𝑡  the debts, and 𝑉𝑠 𝑡  the total value for the vessels of sub 
fleet s at time t. 
 
In Equation 19, the savings for sub fleet s at time t is an asset stock accumulation which value 
changes due to two bi-flows. The first bi-flow 𝑁𝑃𝑠(𝑡) represents the net profit for sub fleet s 
at time t. Since 𝑁𝑃𝑠(𝑡) can be either negative or positive reflecting net profit or net losses, 
respectively, 𝑁𝑃𝑠(𝑡) can either deplete or increase the amount of savings for sub fleet s at 
time t. The second bi-flow 𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑛 ,𝑠(𝑡) captures the financial result of the investment decision for 
sub fleet s at time t. Consequently, 𝑆𝑠 𝑡  at time t is given by: 
 
 𝑆𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑆𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑁𝑃𝑠 −  𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑛 ,𝑠 𝑑𝑡     𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝑆𝑠𝑏𝑡  0 = 𝑆𝑠𝑏𝑡
0 = 10    𝑆𝑙𝑏𝑡  0 = 𝑆𝑙𝑏𝑡
0 = 25    𝑆𝑜𝑡𝑡  0 = 𝑆𝑜𝑡𝑡
0 = 10       𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎  0 = 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎
0 = 5    𝑆𝑠𝑕𝑟 0 = 𝑆𝑠𝑕𝑟
0 = 7.5     𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
(20)  
 
Where 𝑆𝑠𝑏𝑡
0 , 𝑆𝑙𝑏𝑡
0 , 𝑆𝑜𝑡𝑡
0 , 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎
0 , and 𝑆𝑠𝑕𝑟
0  are the initial values of the savings for respectively small 
beam trawlers, large beam trawlers, otter trawlers, trammel netters and shrimp beam trawlers. 
 
In Equation 20, the first bi-flow 𝑁𝑃𝑠(𝑡) depends on the outcome of the fishing tactical 
decision rules for sub fleet s at time t and is given by: 
 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑅𝑠 𝑡 −  𝐹𝐶𝑠 𝑡 + 𝑉𝐶𝑠 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐶𝑠 𝑡 + 𝑁𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ,𝑠 𝑡       
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(21)  
 
Where 𝑅𝑠 𝑡  are the revenues of sub fleet s at time t, 𝐹𝐶𝑠 𝑡  the fixed costs of sub fleet s at 
time t calculated by multiplying 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) by normal fixed costs per vessel of sub fleet s at 
time t, 𝑉𝐶𝑠(𝑡) the variable costs of sub fleet s at time t, 𝐿𝐶𝑠 𝑡  the labour costs for sub fleet s 
at time t which is as in reality a fraction (i.e., mostly 0.33) of 𝑅𝑠 𝑡 , and 𝑁𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ,𝑠(𝑡) the 
normal repayment of debts for sub fleet s at time t which is given by dividing 𝐷𝑠 𝑡  by the 
average debt repayment period, in this case 20 years. 
 
In Equation 21, the variable costs of sub fleet s at time t are: 
 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑠 𝑡 =  𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑠 𝑡 = 0  𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛 0 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑍 𝑡  𝑈𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ,𝑠(𝑡),𝑈𝑠 𝑡   𝑣𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡    
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(22)  
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Where 𝑣𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  are the variable costs for a vessel of sub fleet s at time t being the fuel and 
all other variable costs excluding labour costs. Fuel costs of sub fleet s at time t are given by 
multiplying 𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔  𝑡  by the constants of fuel consumption for sub fleet s (𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠), 
being 720362, 1672732, 456192, 155772 and 320776 liters per year for a small beam trawler, 
a large beam trawler, an otter trawler, a trammel netter and a shrimp beam trawler, 
respectively. The sum of all the other variable costs excluding labour costs are 150867, 
300406, 122283, 115810 and 69808 euro per year for a small beam trawler, a large beam 
trawler, an otter trawler, a trammel netter and a shrimp beam trawler, respectively. Finally, 
Equation 22 is similar to Equation 18 with its possible outcomes given in Table 3.1. The only 
difference is that (1) 𝑈𝑟𝑒𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡  is now 𝑈𝑠 𝑡 , (2) the estimated values are now actual values, 
and (3) labour costs are omitted from the equation. 
 
In Equation 21, the revenues for a sub fleet s at time t is given by: 
 
 𝑅𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑈𝑠(𝑡) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑠      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  (23)  
 
Where, 𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  is the catch per vessel of sub fleet s at time t and 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑠 is the fish price for 
sub fleet s at time t meaning that the fish price differs among the sub fleets reflecting 
differences in “quality” of their landed fish (i.e., catch composition, size of the fish, freshness, 
injuries, etc.). Unlike reality, 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑠 are constants in this simulation model with 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑒𝑢𝑟  = 
3787 euro per tonne, 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑙𝑏𝑡  = 3818 euro per tonne, 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑜𝑡𝑡  = 3009 euro per tonne, 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑡𝑟𝑎  
= 6268 euro per tonne, and 𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑕 ,𝑠𝑕𝑟  = 3431 euro per tonne. Next, 𝑐𝑠 𝑡  is the product of the 
normal catch per vessel of a sub fleet (these are conceptualised as constants being 376, 681, 
365, 162, and 244 tonne mixed fish for a small beam trawler, a large beam trawler, an otter 
trawler, a trammel netter and a shrimp beam trawler, respectively) multiplied by the effect the 
fish density has on the catch of a vessel. This effect represents a vital part of the dynamic 
complexity in fisheries following the “law of diminishing returns” as illustrated in Figure 
3.15. As a result, and not surprisingly, the lower the fish density, the more difficult it becomes 
for fishermen to locate fish resulting in catches below the normal levels (Morecroft, 2008). 
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Figure 3.15: Effect of fish density on catch per vessel 
 
 (Source: Own compilation) 
 
In Equation 20, the second bi-flow 𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑛 ,𝑠(𝑡) depends on the outcome of the investment 
decision for sub fleet s at time t. In the simulation model, this investment decision contains 
three options: (1) investment in new vessels for sub fleet s at time t 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡 , (2) selling 
vessels of sub fleet s at time t to agents “outside the scope of the simulation model” (a 
scrapping company, among others), or (3) decommissioning of vessels of sub fleet s at time t. 
However, both last selling options are captured with 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 . As a result, 𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑛 ,𝑠(𝑡) can 
be written as: 
 
 
𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑛 ,𝑠 𝑡 =  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡   𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡 − 𝐿𝑠 𝑡   −  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑 ,𝑠 𝑡 −
𝐷𝑠(𝑡)
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡)
   
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(24)  
 
Where 𝐿𝑠(𝑡) is the bank loan sub fleet s has at time t and 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the price for an old 
vessel of sub fleet s at time t which is an output of the sector “investment decision”. 
 
Returning to Equation 19, the debts for sub fleet s at time t is also an asset stock accumulation 
which accumulates through 𝑁𝐷𝑠(𝑡) being the amount of new debt sub fleet s makes at time t 
and drains through 𝑅𝑃𝑠(𝑡) representing the amount of debt which sub fleet s repays at time t. 
As a result, 𝐷𝑠(𝑡) at time t can now be written as: 
 
 𝐷𝑠 𝑡 =  𝐷𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑁𝐷𝑠 −  𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ,𝑠 𝑑𝑡     𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝐷𝑠𝑏𝑡  0 = 𝐷𝑠𝑏𝑡
0 = 10    𝐷𝑙𝑏𝑡  0 = 𝐷𝑙𝑏𝑡
0 = 25    𝐷𝑜𝑡𝑡  0 = 𝐷𝑜𝑡𝑡
0 = 10    𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎  0 = 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎
0 = 5    𝐷𝑠𝑕𝑟 0 = 𝐷𝑠𝑕𝑟
0 = 7.5     𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
(25)  
 
Where 𝐷𝑠𝑏𝑡
0 , 𝐷𝑙𝑏𝑡
0 , 𝐷𝑜𝑡𝑡
0 , 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎
0 , and 𝐷𝑠𝑕𝑟
0  are the initial values of the debt for small beam 
trawlers, large beam trawlers, otter trawlers, trammel netters and shrimp beam trawlers, 
respectively. These initial values for the debts of the different sub fleets are set equal to the 
initial values of the savings (see Equation 20). Hence, in the initial phase of the game, this 
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sets the industry value equal to the value of all vessels in the fleet. The designer of the 
simulation model and the scientific expert group agreed that this is a good initial starting point 
for playing the game since it allows easy comparison among the different sub fleets. 
 
In Equation 24, the amount of new debts sub fleet s makes at time t is given by: 
 
 
𝑁𝐷𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝐿𝑠 𝑡   1 + 𝑖      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(26)  
 
Where 𝑖 equals the interest of the bank loan which is a constant set at five percent. 
 
Also in Equation 24, the amount of debts sub fleet s repays at time t is given by: 
 
 
𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ,𝑠 𝑡 =  𝑁𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ,𝑠 𝑡 + 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠
𝐷𝑠(𝑡)
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡)
     
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(27)  
 
Returning one last time to Equation 19, the total value of the vessels in sub fleet s at time t is 
conceptualised as a “resource attribute” (Sterman, 2000; Warren, 2008) of the number of 
vessels in the fleet. As a result, 𝑉𝑠 𝑡  is an asset stock accumulation which increases when 
new value is gained through buying new vessels for sub fleet s at time t 𝑁𝑉𝑠 𝑡  and decreases 
through 𝐿𝑉𝑠 𝑡  capturing the loss of value for sub fleet s at time t through both (1) the aging 
of the vessels and/or (2) the selling of old vessels. Consequently, 𝑉𝑠 𝑡  at time t can be written 
as: 
 
 𝑉𝑠 𝑡 =  𝑉𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑁𝑉𝑠 −  𝐿𝑉𝑠 𝑑𝑡     𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝑉𝑠𝑏𝑡 0 = 𝑉𝑠𝑏𝑡
0 = 20    𝑉𝑙𝑏𝑡  0 = 𝑉𝑙𝑏𝑡
0 = 50    𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑡  0 = 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑡
0 = 20     𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝑉𝑡𝑟𝑎  0 = 𝑉𝑡𝑟𝑎
0 = 10    𝑉𝑠𝑕𝑟 0 = 𝑉𝑠𝑕𝑟
0 = 15     𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
(28)  
 
Where 𝑉𝑠𝑏𝑡
0 , 𝑉𝑙𝑏𝑡
0 , 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑡
0 , 𝑉𝑡𝑟𝑎
0 , and 𝑉𝑠𝑕𝑟
0  are the initial values of the debts for small beam 
trawlers, large beam trawlers, otter trawlers, trammel netters and shrimp beam trawlers, 
respectively, which the scientific expert group set to be double the value of 𝑆𝑠 𝑡  and 𝐷𝑠 𝑡 . 
 
In Equation 28, 𝑁𝑉𝑠 𝑡  at time t is: 
 
 
 𝑁𝑉𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,𝑠 𝑡     
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(29)  
 
And also in Equation 28, 𝐿𝑉𝑠 𝑡  at time t is given by: 
 
 
𝐿𝑉𝑠 𝑡 =  𝐿𝑉𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡 +  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  
𝑉𝑠 𝑡 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 
      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(30)  
 
Where 𝐿𝑉𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 ,𝑠 𝑡  is the value lost through aging conceptualised as 𝑉𝑠 𝑡  divided by the 
average life span of a vessel. In order to simplify the model, this simulation model sets the life 
span of a vessel equal to the debt repayment period of the debts originally made when buying 
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the vessel. Hence, the lifespan of the vessels equals the debt repayment period, which are both 
set constant at 20 years. 
 
SECTOR 5: INVESTMENT DECISION 
 
The SFD of this sector on investment decision is given in Figure 3.16. 
 
Figure 3.16: Stock and flow diagram capturing the sector of investment decision with its in-
flows from and out-flows to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
As stated earlier, the investment decision contains three options: (1) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡 , (2) 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  to agents “outside the scope of the simulation model” (e.g., scrapping 
company among others), or (3) 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  through decommissioning. The investment in 
new vessels for sub fleet s at time t is given by: 
 
 
 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑚𝑖 𝑛  𝑚𝑖 𝑛  
𝑠𝑎𝑠  𝑆𝑠 𝑡 
𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡 − 𝐿𝑠 𝑡 
,𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) ,
𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 (𝑡)
𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
 , 0 
𝑡𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦
     
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟   
(31)  
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Where 𝑠𝑎𝑠 is the fraction of the savings sub fleet s uses for investments at time t which is set 
constant at 80%, 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  is the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to buy at time 
t, and 𝑡𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦  is the time needed to buy the vessels at time t which is a constant set at one 
year. 
 
In Equation 30, the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to buy at time t is 
 
 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡 − 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 , 0     𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙   (32)  
 
Where 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  is the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to have at time t. This 
equation determines if there is a positive gap between 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  and 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  and defines 
it as the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to buy at time t. Defining such gaps 
between desired and actual states of the system are very important in system dynamic models 
since they drive important actions in these simulation models. 
 
To obtain the positive gap between 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  and 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  in Equation 32, the desired 
number of vessels for sub fleet s at time t needs to be determined. Since the desired value of a 
variable is always based on the current state, 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  can be written as: 
 
  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡   1 + 𝐺𝑟𝑠 𝑡       𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  (33)  
 
Where 𝐺𝑟𝑠 𝑡  is called “the propensity for growth” for sub fleet s at time t. This concept is 
borrowed from Morecroft‟s (2008; 2007) “Fish and Ships”-microworld and is conceptualised 
as a graphical function (Figure 3.17). 
 
Figure 3.17: Propensity for growth given the estimated ratio of net profit versus the price for a 
new vessel after investment subsidies 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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In this figure, the estimated ratio of net profits versus the price of a new vessel after 
investment subsidies is calculated as the estimated average future net profits for a vessel of 
sub fleet s at time t 𝑛𝑝    𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) divided by 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡 . Finally, 𝑛𝑝    𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the result 
of 𝑁𝑃𝑠(𝑡) divided by 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) subject to a first-order smoothing over the time needed to 
estimate and adjust the future net profits for each new t (which is set at one year). 
 
A second option for each sub fleet in the investment decision is to sell their vessels. This 
decision 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  at time t can be written as: 
 
 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  𝐸𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑉 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
,𝑠
 𝑡     
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
   
(34)  
 
Where 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  is the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to sell at time t and 
𝐸𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑉 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
,𝑠
(𝑡) is the nonlinear effect the ratio of 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑 ,𝑠(𝑡) over the maximum between 
𝑣 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡), being the average value of an old vessel of sub fleet s at time t, and one has on 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 . This effect is conceptualised in this simulation model as the graphical 
function given in Figure 3.18. 
 
Figure 3.18: Effect of ratio price versus value of an old vessel on selling vessels 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
Next, the price for an old vessel of sub fleet s at time t is 
 
  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠 𝑡 ,𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡       
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
  (35)  
 
Where 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  is the price for an old vessel of sub fleet s at time t when selling it to 
agents “outside the scope of the simulation model”. The obvious underlying idea of this 
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equation is that fishermen will choose between decommissioning and selling based which 
option results in the highest price for their old vessels. 
Recalling Equation 12, where 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠 𝑡  was conceptualised as a fraction of the average 
value of an old vessel of sub fleet s at time t which policymakers are willing to pay for given 
their target of reducing overcapacity, 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  is conceptualised similarly. As a result, 
𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  at time t is 
 
 
 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑚
𝑉𝑠 𝑡 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 
    
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
  
(36)  
 
Where 𝑚 is the fraction of the average value of a vessel of sub fleet s at time t at which the 
market is willing to buy old vessels of the Belgian fleet. 𝑚 is set constant at 0.25. 
 
In Equation 33, the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to sell at time t is obtained 
similarly as 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (t) (see Equation 32) and can be written as 
 
 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡 = −𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡 − 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 , 0     𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  (37)  
 
This equation determines if there is a negative gap between 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  and 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  and 
defines it as the desired number of vessels sub fleet s wants to sell at time t. 
 
SECTOR 6: BANK SECTOR 
 
Figure 3.19 is the SFD containing the basic mechanism of how financial institutions (i.e., 
banks) determine the level of 𝐿𝑠 𝑡  at time t. Bank loans are common in fisheries given the 
high price of new vessels. As a result, the role of banks cannot be omitted from the simulation 
model since growth or decline of a fishing industry often depends on their so-called 
generosity. 
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Figure 3.19: Stock and flow diagram capturing the bank sector with its in-flows from and out-
flow to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
The scientific expert group agreed that banks grant loans based on the estimated financial 
performance (as a simplification of a firm‟s debt repayment capacity; see above) of the firm 
(i.e., vessel) requesting the loan. Consequently, 𝐿𝑠 𝑡  for sub fleet s at time t can be written 
as: 
 
 𝐿𝑠 𝑡 =  𝑙 𝑡  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙
  (38)  
 
Where 𝑙 𝑡  is the fraction of the price of a new vessel after investment subsidies the bank is 
willing to lend at time t. This simulation model uses a graph function to conceptualise 𝑙 𝑡  
(Figure 3.20). 
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Figure 3.20: Fraction of price new vessel after investment subsidies through bank loan 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
SECTOR 7: FLEET 
 
Figure 3.21 illustrates the SFD for the sector capturing the fleet dynamics. 
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Figure 3.21: Stock and flow diagram capturing the fleet with its in-flows from and out-flows 
to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
Consequently, the number of vessels in the fleet at time t is given by 
 
  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  𝑡 =  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡      𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝑠
 
(39)  
 
In Equation 39, 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) are represented by asset stock accumulations used to track the 
behaviour of the fleet sizes of the five sub fleets through time. These stocks increase through 
the inflow of purchased new vessels and decrease through the outflow of selling old vessels. 
Consequently, both flow rates are a result of the endogenous defined investment decisions of 
the ship owners (see sector “investment decision”). Therefore, 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) at time t can be 
written as: 
 
 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 − 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑑𝑡    𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 0 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠
0 = 25     𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙   
(40)  
 
This equation illustrates that the initial values of the number of vessels for each of the sub 
fleets is set at 25. Although this does not reflect the real situation in Belgian fisheries, the 
scientific expert group agreed that the initial condition for playing the microworld base on this 
simulation model should be one where all sub fleets start with the same number of vessels. 
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Twenty-five was chosen to create a total fleet of 125 vessels, roughly the average total fleet 
size of the Belgian fleet between 1997-2006. 
 
SECTOR 8: EMPLOYMENT 
 
Figure 3.22 illustrates the SFD for this sector on employment. 
 
Figure 3.22: Stock and flow diagram capturing employment with its in-flow from and out-
flow to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
Hence, total employment of the fleet at time t  𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  𝑡  is given by: 
 
  𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  𝑡 =  𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ,𝑠(𝑡)
𝑠
     𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  (41)  
 
Where 𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the total employment for sub fleet s at time t which is 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  times 
the average crew per vessel for sub fleet s at time t. In this simulation model, the average crew 
per vessel for the different sub fleets are constants, with their values set to the average of the 
strictly regulated (KB, 1973: art 94) minimum number of required crew members. This 
number differs among sub fleets. This option was chosen because data on the number of crew 
members are nearly impossible to collect; they are not stored electronically and many media 
(often volatile) have been used to inform authorities about the number of persons on board 
(e.g., fax, phone, email and mobile text message). As a result, average number of crew 
members per vessel are set to three persons for small beam trawlers, otter trawlers and 
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trammel netters; five persons for large beam trawlers; and two persons for shrimp beam 
trawlers (KB, 1973: art 94).  
 
SECTOR 9: GOVERNMENT EXPENSES 
 
Implementing (1) fuel taxes or subsidies, (2) investment subsidies, and/or (3) decommission 
fees result in the government making or spending money. As a result, tracking these expenses 
is also important in the simulation model since these expenses are paid for by the Belgian 
taxpayers.  
Figure 3.23 illustrates the SFD on how this sector is conceptualised. 
 
Figure 3.23: Stock and flow diagram capturing the government expenses with its in-flows 
from and out-flow to the other sectors (“SF” = “Sub Fleet”) 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
In this SFD, the total government expenses at time t 𝐺 𝑡  is conceptualised as an asset stock 
accumulation which accumulates or drains through its only bi-flow 𝑁𝐺(𝑡) being net 
government expenses at time t. As a result, 𝐺 𝑡  at time t can be written as: 
 
  𝐺 𝑡 = 𝐺 𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑁𝐺 𝑑𝑡     𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
𝐺 0 = 𝐺0 = 0    𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜  
(42)  
 
Obviously, the initial value for the total government expenses is set to zero. 
 
In Equation 42, net government expenses at time t is given by: 
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 𝑁𝐺 𝑡 =  𝐺𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡)
𝑠
+  𝐺𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠(𝑡)
𝑠
+  𝐺𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠(𝑡)
𝑠
      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  (43)  
 
Where 𝐺𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠(𝑡) is the financial result for the government for its chosen fuel policy at time t 
whereas 𝐺𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠(𝑡) and 𝐺𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠(𝑡) are the government expenses made at time t by granting 
investment subsidies and decommission fees, respectively. 
 
In Equation 43, the financial result for the government on the chosen fuel policy at time t is 
 
 
𝐺𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑈𝑠 𝑡  𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  𝑡 − 𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔  𝑡      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(44)  
In Equation 43, the government expenses on investment subsidies at time t are 
 
 
𝐺𝐼𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑏𝑢𝑦 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑛𝑒𝑤 ,𝑠 −  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑢𝑏 ,𝑠 𝑡      
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(45)  
 
Also in Equation 43, the government expenses on decommission fees at time t are 
 
 
𝐺𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑐 ,𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑠 𝑡 = 1  𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛 0  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 ,𝑠 𝑡  𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 ,𝑜𝑙𝑑 ,𝑠 𝑡     
𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
  
(46)  
 
3.3.4 Testing 
 
After the simulation model is developed, the next step in the modelling process is testing. In 
this study, many of the tests were undertaken in the different scientific expert group meetings. 
In addition, the final microworld was also presented and discussed in a scientific expert group 
meeting fully dedicated to testing the microworld. In these meetings, the microworld passed 
on (1) boundary adequacy tests, (2) structure verification tests, (3) parameter verification 
tests, and (4) qualitative tests of fit (see Appendix 1 for the main qualitative tests of fit). Next, 
the dimensional consistency test was performed and no errors occurred. Finally, many 
extreme condition scenarios were launched into the microworld all resulting in plausible and 
satisfying outcomes. 
 
3.3.5 The microworld: the game and user friendly interface 
 
This microworld that locks the dynamic simulation model is based on a game run in a 
dynamic decision making mode in which players of the game are invited to alter policy 
instruments annually through switches and sliders in an attempt to maximise their votes for 
the upcoming elections (see Appendix 2 for the interface of this microworld). Hence, through 
yearly alteration of sliders, players of the game demonstrate their policy strategy for that 
fisheries system to the different stakeholder groups involved. This collective group of 
stakeholders will then vote in function of how well the player paid attention to their needs as 
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captured by (1) total industry value 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑡 , (2) industry value per vessel 
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑡 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  𝑡 
, (3) fleet 
size 𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  𝑡 , (4) industry employment 𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  𝑡 , (5) average wages 
𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  𝑡 
𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  𝑡 
, (6) 
government expenses 𝐺 𝑡 , and (7) estimated fish stock 𝐵 (𝑡). This voting system is 
effectively a weighting on the importance of these objectives. The player‟s score on each of 
these objectives is indicated on the interface by “status lamps”; where a green light means 
“doing very well” so the player gains 20000 votes, yellow light means “can do better”, but the 
players still gains 10000 votes and red means “highly neglecting this objective” and the player 
loses 30000 votes (weights are made up for the purpose of the excercise). Table 3.2 illustrates 
the range for the colour codes of the status lamps for all of the seven objectives. As a result, 
the change in colours occurs when thresholds are crossed. The total amount of votes a player 
has acquired is then simply the sum of the votes for each of these seven objectives. Finally, 
the more votes the player has obtained, the better the score and so the higher the chance of 
becoming re-elected. 
 
Table 3.2: Range for the colour codes of the status lamps for all of the seven management 
objectives included in the microworld 
 Status lamps colour range 
 Red Yellow Green 
Total industry value 0 - 3e08 3e08 - 5e08 5e08 - ∞ 
Industry value per vessel 0 - 2e06 2e06 - 4e06 4e06 - ∞ 
Fleet size 0 - 100 100 - 150 150 - ∞ 
Industry employment 0 - 300 300 - 500 500 - ∞ 
Average wages 0 - 40000 40000 - 70000 70000 - ∞ 
Government expenses 6e07 - ∞ 3e07 - 6e07 0 - 3e07 
Estimated fish stock 0 - 36000 36000 - 60000 60000 - 80000 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
Next, the player can use a variety of policy options to formulate a policy strategy (see stock 
and flow diagram “regulation” above). First, 𝑄(𝑡) can be set by varying 𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) between 
-0.5 and 0.5 by means of a slider. As a result, the player is in the microworld free to decrease 
or increase 𝑄𝑟(𝑡) by 50 percent. Second, the player can decide which proportion of 𝑄(𝑡) is 
allocated to each sub fleet by altering 𝑝𝑞𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) for each sub fleet through the use of five 
sliders. The player is free to vary 𝑝𝑞𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) between zero and ten, keeping in mind that 
altering one of them affects all others. Third, the player can choose to set the desired number 
of fishing days for each of the sub fleets (0-365 days). Obviously, this is done through five 
independent sliders. Fourth, a switch can be handled by the gamer to implement catch 
restrictions per fishing day or not (i.e., the boolean 𝑍(𝑡)). Fifth, the player can control the 
number of available licences through 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔 (𝑡) which is a slider able to vary between minus 
ten and ten. However, when choosing a negative value for 𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑐 ,𝑟𝑒𝑔 (𝑡), this only decreases the 
available licences not yet used by fishermen. Consequently, a negative value will not force 
vessels to leave the fleet. Sixth, the player can alter, though a slider, 𝑑𝑓𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑡) between 
zero and one to set the amount of the decommissioning fee for the different sub fleets as a 
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desired proportion of the average value of a vessel of these sub fleets. Seventh, the player can 
also decide to vary 𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑡  by means of a slider, altering the amount of investment 
subsidies given (in the form of a fraction of the price of a new vessel) when ship owners buy 
new vessels. Finally, the player‟s last option is to alter through a slider 𝑓 𝑡  between -0.5 and 
0.5 resulting in fuel subsidies and taxes, respectively. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
This study has developed a microworld (i.e. (simple) dynamic simulation model with user-
friendly gaming interface) in which stakeholders can “play” and gain long-term insights into 
the effect policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. Such a tool is helpful since 
managing fisheries systems is difficult and often results in unsustainable fisheries where fish 
stocks collapse, industry profits evaporate and dissatisfaction with the management system 
grows. This microworld can answer these problems however, it is necessary to be clear about 
what to expect when using it. Clearly, it can be used as a learning laboratory for ex ante 
evaluation of possible policy strategies (De Geus, 1997; Keys et al., 1996). However, it is no 
fortune teller. Its purpose is not forecasting, prediction or optimisation (Morecroft, 1999). 
What it does offer is a risk-free environment in which policy strategies can be evaluated much 
faster than in the real world because delays in the learning process are drastically reduced (De 
Geus, 1997; Sterman, 2000). In addition, a microworld not only enhances the speed, but also 
improves the quality of that learning process since such a risk-free environment allows more 
room for creativity, imagination, adventure and fantasy (Stouten et al., 2007a). Finally, this 
microworld can also be used as a transitional object in which strategies are rehearsed and 
visualised (Morecroft, 1999) bringing them into debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984) 
among stakeholder groups. As a result, policymakers will be able to better illustrate and 
discuss the implications of different policy strategies among themselves and other stakeholder 
groups. Hence, these other stakeholder groups will see more clearly the difficulties 
encountered when managing fisheries systems. This can lead to a better mutual understanding 
among the stakeholder groups of the fisheries management problems resulting in changing (1) 
knowledge, (2) attitudes, and (3) behaviour toward policy instruments and management 
systems. 
 
However, these benefits rely on the stakeholders‟ confidence in the microworld. They need to 
believe that the dynamic simulation model underlying the microworld resembles the real 
world situation. Nevertheless, they often start to criticise the simulation model and start 
questioning its scope and underlying assumptions. This problem of face-validity is almost 
impossible to rule out completely since “all models are wrong” (Sterman, 2002) and their 
limitations depend mainly on the mental model (i.e., a person‟s “deeply held internal images 
of how the world works” (Senge, 1990: 174)) through which one is looking at the simulation 
model. Therefore, developing a simulation model unavoidably results in discussions and 
uncertainties related to its scope and underlying assumptions. A first and important discussion 
in the development of our simulation model was related to the inclusion of arrays in the 
simulation model (e.g., sub fleets, fishing grounds and species). It was clearly tempting for 
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the scientific expert group to disaggregate stocks simply because it made the simulation 
model look more like the real system. The scientific expert group, being scientists striving for 
accuracy, found it difficult to abandon this form of “detailed complexity” (Senge, 1990). The 
scientific expert group was only willing to reduce the number of arrays to one (the five sub 
fleets) once they were shown that detailed complexity can blur or block our understanding of 
“dynamic complexity” (Senge, 1990) and explained the two rules for disaggregation of stocks 
(Richardson et al., 1999). As a result, the scientific expert group agreed that this array was 
required in order for the simulation model to be able to address relevant management issues 
such as choosing between a diverse or (re)focused fleet. The added complexity given by 
including other arrays (e.g., fishing grounds or species) could not be justified and were thus 
left out of the simulation model. 
 
A second point of discussion was the absence of market dynamics in the simulation model, 
especially for setting fish prices. Fish prices are in this case conceptualised as constants 
varying among the sub fleets reflecting differences in “quality” (i.e., catch composition, size 
of the fish, freshness, injuries, etc.) of their landed fish. Some experts initially saw the 
absence of a market mechanism influencing the fish price as an important shortcoming and 
commented that including such a mechanism is not too demanding and would better reflect 
reality. However, this was rebutted since Belgium is a small player on the fish market (i.e., 
Belgium market is only 0.48% of European market in 2010 (EC, 2010)), meaning that 
Belgian demand and supply has no strong effect on fish prices, and results in Belgium being a 
price taker. In addition, including a realistic market mechanism for fish prices should have to 
incorporate the effect of import and export, and aquaculture, especially  since the latter 
strongly affects fish prices (Anderson, 2007). Such a market mechanism would have 
significantly expanded the scope of the simulation model. The scientific expert group decided 
that the market dynamics were not necessary given that the focus of this study is on learning 
about the effect policy instruments have on Belgian fisheries. 
 
A third discussion was related the omission of the ecological aspect of fisheries and its 
indirect economic effects. First of all, this study sets catch equal to landings and thus excludes 
the whole discard problem (e.g., Davies et al., 2009; Kelleher, 2005) together with its 
economic impact. Discards are a waste of natural resources affecting the marine ecosystem 
(Hall, 1994; Kelleher, 2005) resulting in the loss of potential income (and human food 
sources) (Catchpole et al., 2005). In addition to discards, fishing also impacts the bottom 
habitat (e.g., Chuenpagdee et al., 2003; Kaiser et al., 2006; Rice, 2006; Watling et al., 1998) 
which decreases carrying capacity (Dudley, 2008). Therefore, in reality, damage to carrying 
capacity is cumulative and is proportional to the amount of fishing taking place (Dudley, 
2008). However, this disruptive effect of fishing on carrying capacity is not taken into account 
in the simulation model since the carrying capacity (𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑡)) is set as a constant. This could 
become an interesting topic for improving the simulation model and further research. 
Inspiration on how to conceptualise this can be found in Dudley (2008). 
 
A fourth discussion point is related to the “catchability” of the vessels in the simulation 
model. Where in the simulation model the catch per vessel of the different sub fleet only 
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depends on the fish density of the fish stock, another important aspect is the evolution of the 
efficiency of fishing gear. Obviously, when catch per unit of effort (in this simulation model: 
catch per time step) drops significantly, the fishers who remain will attempt to improve the 
efficiency of their fishing gear through maintenance or innovations (Dudley, 2008). This 
limitation was perceived by some experts in the scientific expert group as an important 
limitation to the simulation model. However, after having further discussed this topic in the 
group, these experts came to realise that this simulation model implicitly assumes that a 
constant yearly maintenance cost (a component of the fixed costs) in combination with yearly 
fishing gear costs (a component of the variable costs) keeps “catchability” constant. The 
scientific expert group agreed that this simple assumption contains a satisfying degree of 
reality. In addition, these experts also know that innovative technical improvement of fishing 
gear is a very slow process. Hence, this is an example where “a quantity is modelled as a 
constant not because it never changes, but because in the timeframe of the model it essentially 
does not change” (Richardson et al., 1999: 186). 
 
In addition to these discussions on the scope, conceptualisation and underlying assumptions 
of the simulation model, two other important discussions were held. The first one relates to 
the way in which the scientific expert group meetings were used to develop the simulation 
model. Since this study had limited resources, these scientific expert group meetings where 
not held according to rigid guidelines (i.e., scripts) in group model building (Andersen et al., 
1997). For instance, this study did not follow the guideline on having a team of (1) 
facilitator/elicitor, (2) modeller/reflector, (3)  process coach, (4) recorder, and (5) gatekeeper 
(Andersen et al., 1997) in addition to the experts in the scientific expert group meetings. The 
reason for this is simply the lack of human capital. Consequently, this study does not classify 
as a group model building exercise “pur sang” but rather an iterative process in which the 
modeller repeatedly called together a group of experts to help (1) conceptualise the simulation 
model and (2) validate his modelling efforts. Second, there was discussion of some of the 
roughly estimated parameter values used to run the simulation model, such as the initial value 
of the total Belgian fish stock (𝐵0), which was roughly set at 40000 tonne fish. Hence, al lot 
of time went in discussing the value of such a simulation model based on many rough 
parameter value estimations. This discussion was solved through illustrating (i.e. running the 
simulation model under different parameter values) system dynamics‟ initially rather 
disturbing fundamental assertion that “the behavior of a system dynamics model is much 
more a consequence of its structure than its parameter values” (Richardson et al., 1999: 230). 
In other words, feedback models are relatively insensitive to (small) parameter changes. 
Therefore, parameters need not be estimated with statistical confidence intervals in order to 
have confidence in the policy implications of the simulation model. Consequently, a modeller 
should estimate parameter values only to the degree of accuracy required (Richardson et al., 
1999: 230); in this case, this means that it needs to enable learning about the effect policy 
instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. However, whatever the parameter type, the 
system dynamics approach insists that any parameter in the simulation model should have a 
clear correspondence to a real quantity or concept. In some sense, the quantity should be 
observable although there are situations in which the term “intuitable” is more appropriate 
(Richardson et al., 1999). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This study has developed a microworld (i.e. (simple) dynamic simulation model with user-
friendly gaming interface) in which stakeholders can “play” and gain long-term insight into 
the effect policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. The microworld is a game 
run in a dynamic decision making mode in which the players are invited to alter policy 
instruments annually through switches and sliders. Their objective is to maximise their votes 
for the upcoming elections by gaining the votes of the stakeholders involved in the Belgian 
fisheries system through demonstrating their policy strategy for that fishing system for the 
upcoming 20 years. This collective group of stakeholders will then give their votes in function 
of how well the player paid attention to their needs which are captured by (1) total industry 
value, (2) industry value per vessel, (3) fleet size, (4) industry employment, (5) average 
wages, (6) government expenses, and (7) estimated fish stock. The more votes the player 
obtains, the higher the score and the higher the chance of being re-elected. 
 
The basis for this microworld is a (simple) dynamic simulation model, equipped with a user-
friendly interface, that represents the Belgian fisheries system. The chosen modelling 
methodology is system dynamics because the interactions between policy instruments and the 
fisheries system contain multiple interlocking feedback loops which can be clearly visually 
presented by using causal loop diagrams and stock and flow diagrams. As a result, the 
simulation model is no mathematical black box and can be used as a learning laboratory for 
ex ante evaluation of possible policy strategies (De Geus, 1997; Keys et al., 1996) since it 
offers a risk free environment in which policy strategies can be evaluated much faster than in 
the real world (De Geus, 1997; Sterman, 2000). In addition, it can also be used as a 
transitional object in which strategies are rehearsed and visualised (Morecroft, 1999) bringing 
them into debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984) among stakeholder groups. This can lead 
to a better mutual understanding among the stakeholder groups of the fisheries management 
problems resulting in changing (1) knowledge, (2) attitudes, and (3) behaviour toward policy 
instruments and management systems. 
 
However, for all these benefits to happen, stakeholders playing with the microworld need to 
have confidence in it. Nevertheless, this problem of face-validity is almost impossible to rule 
out completely since “all models are wrong” (Sterman, 2002). In this study, four main 
discussion points where identified related to the conceptualisation of the simulation model 
underlying the microworld: (1) the limited inclusion of arrays, (2) the absence of any market 
dynamics, (3) the absence of the ecological aspect of fisheries with its indirect economic 
effects, and (4) the evolution in fishing gear efficiency. These discussion points form 
interesting stepping stones for future research. 
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3.6 Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Main qualitative tests of fit performed on the dynamic simulation model 
 
This dynamic simulation model originated from the observation that, after having had a stable 
fleet for almost a decade, a decline in fleet size was setting in around 1992 (see Figure 3.2). 
As a result, our simulation model should be able to produce this behaviour to a satisfying 
degree. To investigate if this is the case, this study uses qualitative tests of fit instead of 
quantitative tests because these formal metrics lose their value when applied to theoretical 
simulation models which aim at learning. Figure 3.24 shows the fit between the historical data 
about the fleet size between 1986 and 2006 (as also given in Figure 3.2) and the data 
generated by our simulation model when run with real trends observed in the Belgian fishing 
system related to its input variables (e.g., increasing fuel prices, increasing variable and fixed 
costs, increasing fish prices, decreasing fishing days, slightly decreasing quota, decreasing 
market value of the vessels, decreasing investment subsidies, catch restrictions per fishing 
day, two decommissioning rounds and decreasing available licences). It is clear from this 
figure that the simulation model is able to generate the historical behaviour of the fleet quite 
successfully. For a start, the stability and slight increase before 1992 is mimicked by the 
simulated trajectory. Next, the dominant trend of the simulated data after 1992 is a concave 
decline in fleet size in which periods of decline alternate with periods of stability; just like the 
real fleet size behaved in this period. 
 
Figure 3.24: Fit between the historical data and the data generated by the simulation model for 
the total Belgian fleet size (#vessels), 1986 and 2006 
 
(Source: Own compilation, based on data from the Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish 
government) 
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Figure 3.26) per day at sea for an average vessel of the Belgian fleet. Although the fit between 
the historical data and the data generated by the simulation model for revenues per fishing day 
is not as good as the fit observed in Figure 3.24, the general trend of steady increase in 
revenues are similar in both slope and magnitude. The booms and busts in the trajectories also 
follow roughly similar patterns except for the time period 2000-2004. When looking at the 
trajectories of landings per fishing day, it is clear that our simulation model is more sensitive 
to changes in the external environment when compared to the actual behaviour of the 
historical data. Nevertheless, similar patterns, although amplified, can still be observed 
between both trajectories. Again with the only exception for the time between 2000-2004 
which also partly explains the anomaly observed in Figure 3.25.  
 
Figure 3.25: Fit between the historical data and the data generated by the simulation model for 
revenues per day at sea of an average vessel of the Belgian fishing fleet (€), 1986 and 2006 
 
(Source: Own compilation, based on data from the Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish 
government) 
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Figure 3.26: Fit between the historical data and the data generated by the simulation model for 
landings per day at sea of an average vessel of the Belgian fishing fleet (Kg), 1986 and 2006 
 
(Source: Own compilation, based on data from the Belgian Sea Fishery Office of the Flemish 
government) 
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Appendix 2: Interface of the “Belgian Fisheries Microworld” 
 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo: Policymakers in Belgian  fisheries paying attention 
at a press conference held by ILVO 
(©Misjel Decleer) 
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Chapter 4: Policy instruments to meet fisheries 
management objectives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s, between 25 and 30 percent of world fisheries have become seriously 
overexploited (FAO, 2009b), including those in countries or regions with well-developed 
fisheries management systems (Dudley, 2008). Overfished species include (1) tuna and other 
top predator species in international waters (Myers et al., 2003; Sibert et al., 2006; Ward et 
al., 2005), (2) Canadian cod fisheries (Mason, 2002; Schrank, 2005), and (3) North Sea cod 
fisheries (Malakoff et al., 2002). Many fisheries worldwide are subject to mismanagement of 
varying proportions (Arnason, 2009). Fisheries management is very complex (Bjørndal et al., 
2004; Pascoe et al., 2009) and fishery managers (i.e., policymakers) must make decisions 
daily that affect the future of aquatic resources. These decisions are mostly based on the data 
and information available at that time (Bredehoeft et al., 1993) in combination with some 
kind of model (Johnson, 1995). This model may be a simple mental model or “rule of thumb”, 
but for more complex situations, decision makers often find it helpful to rely on a formal 
model such as a computer model. However, the use of computer models is not without danger 
since their outcomes are frequently interpreted as (exact) quantitative predictions of the future 
(Morecroft, 1999; Stouten et al., 2007a). Johnson (1995: 745) concludes therefore that 
“models are often more useful when used as tools to learn more about fisheries and options 
for management”. This approach, looking at computer simulations as learning laboratories, is 
a perfect fit for this study since this study‟s objective is to use a microworld to learn more 
about fisheries systems and the effect fisheries management has on these systems. 
 
Fisheries management can be seen as a problem in multi-objective maximisation (Arnason, 
2009; Mardle et al., 2002b). Although many objectives for fisheries management have been 
suggested (e.g., Charles, 1988; Charles, 2001; Lawson, 1984), they can be broadly classified 
into four major groups: (1) biological, (2) economic, (3) social and (4) political objectives 
(Mardle et al., 2002b). The biological objective, commonly found in legislation and 
international agreements (e.g., Rio Declaration 1992 and Johannesburg Declaration 2002), is 
the maximisation of biological production, which inherently conserves the fish stocks; this is 
the traditional idea of maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Economic objectives usually 
consider economic efficiency or “rent” as the desired outcome of fisheries management, often 
referred to as maximum economic yield (MEY). Social objectives are mainly employment 
and income spread among the people of the fishing industry and maintenance of traditional 
communities, which Hilborn (2007a) terms “maximum job yield” (MJY). Political objectives 
are primarily related to remaining social peace, namely the avoidance of conflict ranging from 
violence to lawsuits. This prompted Pope to introduce the concept of MSW: “minimum 
sustainable whinge” (Pope, 1983). Knowing that not all of these objectives are independent 
and often conflict with each other (Charles, 1988; Hilborn, 2007a; Jennings, 2007; Mardle et 
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al., 2002b), policymakers must agree on the preferred ordering of the importance of these 
objectives (Afriat, 1967) which results in the definition of an objective function. This 
objective function is what economists would refer to as a “utility function” or, in the case of a 
group (or system), a “social welfare function” (Arnason, 2009). This study will refer to an 
objective function in fisheries management as a social welfare function. 
 
Once a social welfare function is agreed upon, policymakers should adopt a management 
system that is able to maximise this function (Sutinen, 1998). The chosen social welfare 
function thus determines the nature of the fisheries management system (Regier et al., 1985). 
Arnason (2009) broadly classifies fisheries management systems into two classes: (1) 
biological fisheries management and (2) economic fisheries management. Biological fisheries 
management (such as gear restrictions, total allowable catches, area closures, nursery ground 
protection, etc.) is focused on conserving the fish stocks. Economic fisheries management is 
further divided into (1) direct restrictions and (2) indirect economic management. The 
difference between these two categories is that direct restrictions (e.g., the effort restriction of 
limiting the days at sea, fishing time, holding capacity of vessels, engine size, etc.) impose 
explicit constraints on the activity of the fishermen, while indirect management merely 
changes the incentives facing the fishermen. Finally, indirect economic management may be 
divided into two categories; (1) subsidies and taxes and (2) property rights (e.g., fishing 
licences, sole ownership, territorial use rights, individual quota, and community rights). 
However, the determination of which of these management systems prevails,  as stated above, 
rests on the policymaker‟s choice of social welfare function (Regier et al., 1985; Sutinen, 
1998). Therefore, this study examines if and how fisheries management systems can be used 
for completely different social welfare functions. Central to this study is the question “Do 
policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to align the real fisheries world with their 
desired social welfare functions?” 
 
We investigated this through different scenarios in Stouten‟s (2009) microworld called 
“Belgian Fisheries Microworld”. This theoretical microworld is grounded in empirical 
research about the Belgian fisheries system. It provides a dynamic representation of the 
changing and interactive relationships between biological, fishing and economic components. 
It also incorporates behavioural intra-industry responses to policy instruments such as vessel 
entry/exit decisions and fishing tactics. The objective of the microworld is to give 
stakeholders room to play, and in the process, gain long-term insights into the effect policy 
instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system.  
 
These policy instruments impact the fisheries system, and that impact is assessed through the 
seven potential objectives for fisheries management included in the microworld. They are (1) 
total industry value (i.e., value of the vessels plus the sum of all savings in the industry minus 
the sum of all debts in the industry), (2) industry value per vessel, (3) fleet size, (4) industry 
employment, (5) average wage, (6) total government expenses, and (7) estimated fish stock 
(i.e., a single species stock that captures the properties of the different species in Belgian 
fisheries). As a result, this microworld allows the configuration of many objective functions 
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(or social welfare functions) based on different orderings of these potential management 
objectives.  
 
The fisheries management system is also included in the microworld. Belgium, a member 
state of the European Union, is bound by the Common Fisheries Policy of the EU (EC, 2002). 
This Common Fisheries Policy combines the biological and economic management system 
and is predominantly based on restrictive policy instruments (Mardle et al., 2002b; Stouten et 
al., 2008). The microworld includes the eight policy instruments that are currently most 
important for managing the Belgian fisheries system. They are (1) total quota, (2) the 
allocation of the total quota over the different sub fleets, (3) maximum fishing days, (4) catch 
restrictions per fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) investment subsidies, 
and (8) fuel subsidies and taxes. As a result, this microworld creates conditions for testing 
whether policymakers can align the real fisheries world (as represented in the microworld) 
with their desired fisheries world (i.e., the different social welfare functions) through the use 
of the eight policy instruments included in the microworld. For further information and full 
details about the development and architecture of Stouten‟s (2009) “Belgian Fisheries 
Microworld”, see Chapter 3 above. 
 
This study contains four sections. Section 1, Materials and Methods, starts by defining four 
realistic social welfare functions (i.e., potential desired fisheries worlds) based on a selection 
of the seven potential management objectives included in the microworld. It concludes with a 
discussion of the way in which scenarios will be run in the microworld. This aims to illustrate 
if and how policy instruments can be used to meet the four selected social welfare functions. 
Section 2 contains the actual results of these different scenarios, showing clearly how policy 
instruments can be used to meet the four selected social welfare functions. Section 3 discusses 
these results in the light of the effectiveness of fisheries management and provides practical 
suggestions in the form of general guidelines for improving fisheries management. Section 4 
presents the conclusions drawn. 
 
4.2 Materials and methods 
 
4.2.1 The social welfare functions 
 
Mathematically speaking, this microworld can create 5040 possible social welfare functions 
(factorial seven possible management objectives = 5040). Most of these are of course 
unrealistic or uninteresting. Therefore it is best to only investigate welfare functions that are 
realistic and interesting combinations of the four earlier discussed classes of management 
objectives, being (1) MSY, (2) MEY, (3) MJY, and (4) MSW. As such, decision has been 
made after consulting fisheries scientists of the Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries 
Research (ILVO) to focus this study on four social welfare functions (see Table 4.1) which 
represent the most extreme views on fisheries currently present in fisheries management 
discussions. The first social welfare function (SWF1) combines MJY with MEY, but MJY is 
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predominant. SWF1 is therefore named “a bigger industry is a better industry” and primarily 
focuses on enhancing industry employment and therefore also fleet size. The second priority 
is the total industry value of the fishing industry. Consequently, policy instruments should be 
put in place that shape a regulatory environment for a large fishing industry that needs lots of 
employees while preserving its overall industry value. The second social welfare function 
(SWF2) is somewhat the opposite of SWF1 since it aims at MEY and not at MJY. In fact, 
even a small fleet (or at least a reduction in fishing effort) is preferred, since it is assumed to 
be an effective way of ensuring a profitable industry or MEY. The aim of SWF2 is thus to 
assure the firms and the people active in this small fishing industry high profits (or more 
generally speaking: high industry value per vessel) and good wages, respectively. Therefore, 
SWF2 is referred to as “small but wealthy”. However, downsizing a fleet will not happen 
without social turbulence and tough management decisions. The third social welfare function 
(SWF3) solely aims to conserve (or install) social peace, being MSW, at minimal or low 
government expense. To make this happen, policy instruments should keep both the industry 
value per vessel and the average wages in the industry at least constant for the vast majority 
of the firms (preferably even slightly increasing over the years). Hence, SWF3 is labelled 
“keep them quiet and satisfied at low expenses”. Finally, the last social welfare function 
(SWF4) is called “let‟s go green”. This social welfare function‟s main objective is to have a 
sea full of fish to harvest in combination with a small ecological fleet. Although ecological 
dysfunctions of fishing are not included in the microworld, they will be alluded to when 
meeting this social welfare function in order to broaden the learning objectives of this study. 
 
Table 4.1: Four selected social welfare functions with their relation to the seven management 
objectives included in the microworld (“+” = “Maximisation”; “-” = “Minimisation”; “=” = 
“Keep at least constant compared to the previous year”; and “Blank” = “not relevant”) 
Nr. Label of the social 
welfare function 
Total 
industry 
value 
Industry 
value per 
vessel 
Fleet size Industry 
employment 
Average 
wages 
Government 
expenses 
Estimated 
fish stock 
SWF1 
A bigger industry is a 
better industry! +  + +    
SWF2 Small but wealthy!  + -  +   
SWF3 
Keep them quiet and 
satisfied at low expenses!  =  = = -  
SWF4 Let‟s go green!   -    + 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
4.2.2 The scenarios 
 
Each scenario contains a policy strategy and has a time horizon of 20 years equal to the time 
horizon of the microworld (from year zero to year 20), with a time unit of one year and a time 
step (dt) of ¼ year. For each of the four selected social welfare functions, multiple scenarios 
will be run to illustrate how policy instruments can be used to meet their predefined 
management objectives. However, the objective of these scenarios is not to use the 
microworld to determine the optimal configuration of policy instruments that maximise each 
of these social welfare functions. This would be meaningless given the theoretical and 
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learning nature of the microworld. In fact, this approach would even have conflicted with 
Johnson‟s (1995: 745) conclusion about the fact that models are more useful when used as 
tools to learn more about fisheries and options for management instead of predicting and 
optimising the future. As such, this study opts to derive scenarios (i.e., policy strategies) from 
socio-economic theory of fisheries, knowledge about fisheries management and fishery 
system behaviour (Sutinen, 1998). Extensive argumentation and discussion will guide the 
reader through each of these scenarios. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Social welfare function 1: A bigger industry is a better 
industry! 
 
Policymakers trying to meet this social welfare function should focus their efforts on shaping 
a regulatory environment for a large fishing industry that needs lots of employees while still 
remaining profitable. Since employment in fisheries is directly linked with fleet size, 
policymakers should put policy instruments in place that aim to increase fleet size. Because 
property rights, in this case fishing licences, mainly protect the industry from overcapacity by 
limiting the number of vessels (Arland et al., 2002), fishing licences will play a vital role in 
allowing such a large fleet. However, setting those licences to a desired high level only shapes 
the condition for a large fleet. It does not naturally result in a large fleet, as it also needs to be 
financially attractive for potential investors to buy new vessels. This attractiveness is mainly 
determined by the return on investment (ROI) of the fleet or sub fleet the investor is trying to 
enter. In an attempt to enhance the attractiveness of investing in the fleet, policymakers can 
decide to use financial incentives such as investment subsidies. Such investment subsidies 
significantly increase the return on the investment, as they decrease the amount of private 
money that needs to be invested when buying new vessels. However, policymakers should be 
careful with both investment subsidies and licences because they each have a big downside - 
investment subsidies are government expenses and therefore paid by the general public (Cox, 
2003). One should be well aware of this, together with the opportunity costs, since this 
influences (or at least should influence) the opinion of the general public about good 
governance. The downside with issuing many licences is the abovementioned problem of 
overcapacity. Overcapacity leads to fleets that cannot work at full capacity (e.g., a low 
capacity utilisation rate). This results in below-optimal revenues and therefore below-optimal 
net profit (Walden et al., 2003). Overcapacity can have an enormous impact on industry 
performance and therefore on industry attractiveness and employment. As a result of these 
downsides, one should not be too generous with investment subsidies and licences. 
 
Recalling the fact that a fleet cannot grow if it is not financially attractive to invest in new 
vessels, policy instruments should be put in place that shape a profitable environment for 
fishermen. Perhaps most important in shaping such a profitable environment is to ensure that 
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the fish stock will not collapse, as they are of course the source of all revenues in fisheries. 
Total quota, when set at the scientifically recommended quota, allows, theoretically speaking, 
for maximal biological production and biological sustainability to happen (i.e., MSY). It is 
used as an output control to the fishing process (Greiner et al., 2000; Sutinen, 1998) and is 
theoretically speaking a very good policy instrument to obtain biological sustainability 
(Greiner et al., 2000), because it only allows fishermen to catch fish that are above the 
biomass that generates maximum production (i.e., 𝐵𝑀𝑆𝑌 ). However, in practice, the 
scientifically recommended quotas are at best delayed, and are rough estimates. As such, 
biological sustainability and especially maximal biological production due to quota 
management needs to be taken in reality with a (large) pinch of salt (e.g., Karagiannakos, 
1996; Sutinen, 1998). Nevertheless, since the “Belgian Fisheries Microworld” is a theoretical 
microworld that includes a rather well-functioning scientific quota recommendation system, 
and given the social welfare function‟s aim at creating a large industry, it is desirable to 
follow these scientifically recommended quotas because it will ensure that the fish stock will 
not collapse due to overfishing. Further, as in Belgium, this total quota needs to be allocated 
over the different sub fleets, five of which are included in the microworld. This thus results in 
five group quotas. This allocation is no simple exercise, as the “best” allocation key needs to 
be determined, and “best” depends on the social welfare function. 
 
There are also disadvantages to using total quota or total group quota restrictions. The most 
important disadvantage is that they enhance competitiveness among fishermen, resulting in a 
“race to fish” (Greiner et al., 2000; Sutinen, 1998). This means that fishermen compete for a 
share of the quota before the total harvest limit is reached. This behaviour frequently results in 
certain fishermen investing in fishing capacity (e.g., more vessels, automation, increased 
engine power, more efficient fishing method) at the expense of others (Arland et al., 2002; 
Greiner et al., 2000; Sutinen, 1998). In turn, these investments and the race to fish increase 
overall harvesting costs, lower the total net returns from fishing and jeopardise the economic 
sustainability of fisheries (Grafton et al., 2006; Greiner et al., 2000; Sutinen, 1998). 
Consequently, in an attempt to eliminate this race-to-fish incentive, policymakers may prefer 
to ensure biological sustainability through controlling the input instead of the output of the 
fishing process (Greiner et al., 2000; Sutinen, 1998). This is mainly done through 
decommissioning schemes and by implementing maximum fishing days (i.e., effort control), 
thereby limiting the amount of days fishermen are allowed to fish. Effort control strives for  
biological sustainability by indirectly managing the catches based on the assumption that 
fishery input and catch are positively correlated (Greiner et al., 2000). However, although it 
eliminates the race-to-fish incentive (at least in abundant fisheries), it is no cure for 
overcapacity because it can still be financially interesting to invest in new vessels. Moreover, 
overcapacity can also still happen at the level of the individual vessel in the form of upgrading 
or modernisations in an attempt to maximise net profits per fishing day (i.e., technological 
creep). It is not clear which of these two policy instruments is best, since total quota and 
maximum fishing days have both positive and negative effects on the fishing system (for a 
more extensive overview of these effects see Danielsson, 2002; Georgianna et al., 2008; 
Karagiannakos, 1996; Rossiter et al., 2003; Sutinen, 1998). Consequently, they are often 
implemented simultaneously (e.g., the Common Fisheries Policy of the EU), presumably in a 
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belief that they will counterbalance each other‟s negative effects or at least significantly 
reduce the risk of depleting the fish stocks. 
 
Based on this discussion the microworld is set up with the following policy strategy: (1) ten 
new licences per year, shaping the condition for a large fleet; (2) investment subsidies up to 
50% of the price of a new vessel, giving high financial incentives to invest in new vessels; (3) 
total quota that are set equal to the scientifically recommended quota, for maximal biological 
production and biological sustainability; (4) equal allocation of the total quota among the five 
sub fleets; and (5) unlimited fishing days, as the total quota policy already exists for 
biological sustainability. Catch restrictions per fishing day, a policy instrument not commonly 
used outside of Belgium, are not implemented since these only limit the catch of the most 
productive vessels to the advantage of the others. As a result, this policy instrument does not 
contribute to meeting the social welfare function. Decommissioning fees and fuel subsidies 
are also not implemented, since government money will in this case primarily be used for 
investment subsidies. Additionally, fuel subsidies are, economically speaking, not the best 
way of spending government money since they do not structurally change the fisheries system 
(Mesnil, 2008). Nevertheless, fishermen frequently ask for them in times of very high fuel 
prices. 
 
Table 4.2 and the solid lines in Figure 4.1-Figure 4.4 show the outcome of the microworld for 
this policy strategy. The figures illustrate that the policy strategy was successful in achieving 
the main objective of augmenting industry employment, since it increased almost linearly 
from initially 400 to 980 persons over the 20 years of simulation time. As such, total 
employment has more than doubled. The same holds true for the fleet size, which has also 
more than doubled, from 125 to 335 vessels, due to the financial attractiveness (i.e., high 
ROIs) of the industry during these 20 years. Hence, this increase in fleet size made the 
increase in employment possible. When looking at the total industry value, it initially started 
off at 115M euro and increased after 20 years to 493M euro. The reason for this is the 
increase in new industry assets (through the increase of new vessels) in combination with 
profitable vessels that are able to build up savings. As a result, these findings certainly 
illustrate that the created regulatory environment has resulted into a “bigger” fishing industry 
with regard to (1) industry employment, (2) fleet size and (3) financial scale. However, this 
policy strategy comes at a price. Firstly, the total cumulative government expenses after 20 
years were 200M euro, meaning that 10M euro of public money was spent annually on 
investment subsidies alone. Secondly, although this policy strategy initially resulted in an 
increase in the average industry value per vessel from initially 0.92M to almost 1.60M euro 
by year 15, it fell back to 1.47M euro by the end of year 20. This negative trend after year 15 
is mainly caused by the race-to-fish behaviour, since a similar amount of fish (i.e., the total 
quota) is now exploited by a larger fleet. This results in reduced catch per unit efforts 
(CPUE). This in turn reduces the profitability of the fleet and eventually results in decreasing 
average industry value per vessel. Finally, the average wages in the industry have perhaps 
suffered most under this policy strategy. Since these wages are in Belgian fisheries a fixed 
proportion (i.e., normally 1/3) of the revenues a vessel makes, low catches per vessel due to 
low CPUE results in low revenues which therefore also results in low average wages (i.e., 
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32780 euro after 20 years of simulation time: a 28% reduction). Lastly, it is also interesting to 
notice that the behaviour of the estimated fish stock is a slightly damping oscillation, which 
illustrates that following the recommended quota has prevented the fish stock from depletion. 
This damping oscillating behaviour is caused by the delays in (1) the estimation of stock 
dynamics and (2) the process of smoothly adjusting the recommending quota. In sum, it may 
be stated that this policy strategy does result in creating a vast industry and therefore meets 
the social welfare function. This came at a certain cost of scoring badly on other less 
important objectives since both average industry wages and industry value per vessel were 
low and government expenses were rather high. 
 
As a result, one wonders if the high government expenses in the form of investment subsidies 
were really necessary. After all, administering investment subsidies transfers money from the 
general public to the fishing community (Cox, 2003). Therefore, it would be interesting to see 
if a vast industry could still be created without investment subsidies. A second scenario omits 
investment subsidies from the original policy strategy (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). 
The outcome for this scenario is represented by the dotted lines (small dots) in Figure 4.1-
Figure 4.4 (see also Table 4.2). It is clear from these figures that even without investment 
subsidies, both industry employment and fleet size had still more than doubled in 20 years‟ 
time. There are now 939 persons working in fisheries on 323 vessels after 20 years of 
simulation time instead of 980 persons on 335 vessels. Hence, they were both eventually only 
four percent lower than the original policy strategy. This outcome is not expected, as it is 
assumed that investment subsidies significantly accelerate fleet expansion. However, in this 
case, it remains highly financially attractive for potential investors to buy new vessels due to 
the high ROIs in the industry. Additionally, omitting investment subsidies from the policy 
strategy did not result in major changes in average wages and estimated fish stock. However, 
the main difference lies within the significantly lower total industry value and average 
industry value per vessel, mainly because government is not financially supporting the 
increase in fleet size anymore through investment subsidies. Total industry value and average 
industry value per vessel were, after 20 years, both roughly 30 percent lower compared to the 
original policy strategy; they were 150M euro and 0.4M euro lower, respectively. It is 
interesting that 200M euro of investment subsidies eventually only result in 150M euro of 
additional industry value in the original policy strategy. This results in a quarter of the 
invested government money leaving the fishing industry. The reason for this is that the 
original policy strategy invests government money in overcapacity (i.e., due to the race-to-
fish behaviour of the fishermen who are eager to invest in overcapacity since they want to 
ensure a larger share of the quota). In sum, even without investment subsidies, the industry 
remains large with regard to industry employment and fleet size (only 4% difference with the 
original policy strategy), but it is not large in its financial scope anymore. As such, investment 
subsidies are effective in enhancing total industry value, but one should beware of 
government money draining away in overcapacity. 
 
Last, it may also be interesting to see what the effect would be if fuel subsidies were 
administered on top of the original policy strategy since it is assumed by fishermen that such 
subsidies vastly contribute to the fleet‟s economic performance. To test this policy strategy, 
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fuel subsidies are set to 20% of the fuel price (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). The 
outcome of this scenario is given by the dashed lines (long dashes) in Figure 4.1-Figure 4.4 
(see also Table 4.2). This addition to the original policy strategy only marginally contributes 
to both total industry employment and total fleet size; respectively only 53, or 5%, more 
persons and 8, or 2%, more vessels by the end of year 20. Nor does it have any significant 
effect on average wages (only 5% higher in year 20), nor on the estimated fish stock. The 
main difference lies in the increase in total industry value and average industry value per 
vessel; these were 98M euro or 20%, and 0.25M euro or 17% lower, respectively. This 
difference is made purely by the vast amount of government money poured into the industry 
in the form of fuel subsidies. However, 126M euro of fuel subsidies only resulted in 98M euro 
additional industry value. This ratio is not expected, as again the government money drains 
out of the fishing industry. Since the amount of government expense is inferior to creating a 
large industry, including fuel subsidies in the original policy strategy contributes to SWF1. 
However, when taking into account the pros and cons of adding fuel subsidies to the original 
policy strategy, it is neither economically rational nor necessary to implement fuel subsidies 
on top of the original policy strategy. 
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Figure 4.1: Outcomes for “total industry 
value” (€) and “government expenses” (€) for 
the different policy strategies (scenarios) to 
meet social welfare function 1 (“A bigger 
industry is a better industry”) 
Figure 4.2: Outcome for “total industry value 
per vessel” (€) for the different policy 
strategies (scenarios) to meet social welfare 
function 1 (“A bigger industry is a better 
industry”) 
 
 
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
 
Figure 4.3: Outcomes for “employment” 
(#persons) and “fleet size” (#vessels) for the 
different policy strategies (scenarios) to meet 
social welfare function 1 (“A bigger industry 
is a better industry”) 
Figure 4.4: Outcomes for “average wages” 
(€) and “estimated fish stock” (tonne) for the 
different policy strategies (scenarios) to meet 
social welfare function 1 (“A bigger industry 
is a better industry”) 
  
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
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Table 4.2: Overview of the results for the different scenarios aiming to meet social welfare 
function 1 (“A bigger industry is a better industry!”) (“SWF” = “Social Welfare Function”) 
SWF1: A BIGGER INDUSTRY IS A BETTER INDUSTRY!   
 Management objectivesa:    
  Total industry value +   
  Fleet size +   
  Industry employment +   
    
 Scenario Policy strategy Outcome on management objectivesb Evaluationc  
 1 Quota = recommended quota Total industry value 493M euro +++  
  Quota equally allocated over sub fleets Industry value per 
vessel 
1.47M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 335 vessels   
  Ten new licences per year Industry employment 980 persons   
  Investment subsidies = 50% of price new 
vessel 
Average wages 32777 euro   
   Government expenses 200M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 50.27  tonne   
 2 Quota = recommended quota Total industry value 343M euro +  
  Quota equally allocated over sub fleets Industry value per 
vessel 
1.06M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 323 vessels   
  Ten new licences per year Industry employment 939 persons   
   Average wages 34237 euro   
   Government expenses 0 euro   
   Estimated fish stock 50.29 tonne   
 3 Quota = recommended quota Total industry value 591M euro +  
  Quota equally allocated over sub fleets Industry value per 
vessel 
1.72M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 343 vessels   
  Ten new licences per year Industry employment 1032 persons   
  Investment subsidies = 50% of price new 
vessel 
Average wages 31060 euro   
  Fuel subsidies = 20% of the fuel price Government expenses 326M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 50.23 tonne   
       
a: where “+” means “as high as possible”; “-” means “as low as possible”; and “=” means “keep at least constant compared to 
the previous year”. 
b: by the end of the 20 years of simulation time 
c: range from “+++” meaning “very good policy strategy” to “---” meaning “very bad policy strategy”. 
 
4.3.2 Social welfare function 2: Small but wealthy! 
 
This social welfare function is sought through shaping a regulatory environment that 
primarily focuses on high average industry value per vessel. Since average industry value per 
vessel is a ratio with total industry value as the numerator and number of vessels in the fleet 
as the denominator, its value increases when (1) total industry value increases or (2) total fleet 
size decreases (or when both happen simultaneously). Previous scenarios related to SWF1 
have illustrated that total industry value can mainly be increased by expanding the fleet 
through investment subsidies and shaping a regulatory environment that allows high profits. 
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However, for this social welfare function, expanding the fleet would not be such a good idea 
since this would also increase the denominator in the “average industry value per vessel”-
ratio. To meet this SWF, the fleet should be converted and if necessary reduced to one that is 
highly profitable without losing too many industry assets (i.e., industry value). In general, 
industry assets are mainly lost (1) when vessels encounter financial losses and (2) when 
vessels are scrapped or sold for less than their remaining value (given the microworld‟s 
assumption that the money remains in the fishing industry). As a result, the fleet should be 
reconverted based on decommissioning fees that equal the remaining value of the vessels. 
This would give non-profitable vessels important incentives to leave the fleet but would not 
deplete industry assets. Consequently, in a first policy strategy, decommissioning fees are set 
at the average remaining value of the vessels. Additionally, recalling the fact that it would be 
unwise to allow the current fleet to expand, zero new licences are allowed per year. This zero 
value is also the only way in which decommissioning fees are able to reduce long-term 
fishing effort (in the form of reduced fleet size) and help stocks recover (Grafton et al., 2006; 
Holland et al., 1999).  
 
A regulatory environment that allows high profits requires a sustainable fish stocks greater 
than that which may maximize biological production. The scenarios related to SWF1 illustrate 
that following the scientifically recommended quota is a robust strategy to ensure sustainable 
fish stocks. However, compared to SWF1, the likelihood of depleting the fish stock is now 
considerably lower since the focus is now on a small fleet. Next, the allocation of quota 
among the sub fleets and the amounts of maximum fishing days for each sub fleet are both 
policy instruments that can be used to convert the fleet towards a more profitable one by 
pushing out the less profitable vessels. Chapter 2 of this dissertation has studied the 
profitability of the five Belgian sub fleets included in this microworld and found that large 
beam trawlers need to catch much more fish compared to the other sub fleets in order to be as 
financially viable. This is not beneficial for SWF2. Therefore, the first scenario below opts to 
push large beam trawlers out of the fleet, leaving more fish for the others. For this to happen, 
this scenario allocates the total quota as follows: (1) 6/25 for small beam trawlers, (2) 2/25 for 
large beam trawlers, (3) 7/25 for otter trawlers, (4) 5/25 for trammel netters and (5) 5/25 for 
shrimp beam trawlers. Next, there are no restrictions to the amount of fishing days, nor are 
there catch restrictions per fishing day. Finally, investment subsidies and fuel subsidies are 
not used, as government money in this case should primarily be going to decommissioning 
fees. 
 
The solid lines in Figure 4.5-Figure 4.8 are the outcome of this scenario (i.e., policy strategy) 
(see also Table 4.3). The main target of increasing average industry value per vessel has 
definitely been successful, since it has multiplied nearly six times over 20 years, following an 
almost linear increase from 0.9 to 5.7M euro per vessel. This is caused by the fact that total 
industry value (i.e., its numerator) has also multiplied almost six times from 115M to 644M 
euro, whereas the fleet size (i.e., its denominator) was reduced by 10% from 125 to 113 
vessels. This policy strategy also caused average wages to double, from 45000 to 89000 euro. 
Consequently, this combination tremendously increased average industry value per vessels 
and almost doubled average wages. This clearly illustrates that SWF2 can be met through 
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applying this current policy strategy. However, the graphs also illustrated that this policy 
strategy comes at a cost of a 10% reduction in fleet size. As a result of this reduction in fleet 
size, total industry employment also reduced from 400 to 339 persons by the end of year 20; a 
reduction of 18%. Finally, it is also interesting to notice that government expenses are very 
small (only 22M after 20 years) and that the estimated fish stock behaves like a damping 
oscillation towards the level that seems to generate maximum production. In sum, this policy 
strategy resulted indeed in a wealthy fleet, both in terms of industry value per vessel and 
average wages. However, this reduced the fleet size and therefore also reduced industry 
employment. 
 
Having investigated this policy strategy, the following question arises: how does paying 
decommissioning fees equal to the remaining value of the vessels impact the fisheries system? 
To answer this question, a new scenario was run with exact the same policy strategy except 
with decommission fees set to zero (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). The outcome of this 
scenario is given by the dotted lines (small dots) in Figure 4.5-Figure 4.8 (see also Table 4.3). 
It is clear from these graphs that the lack of decommission fees lowers the average industry 
value per vessel with 0.84M euro or 15% in year 20 compared to the original policy strategy. 
This reduction is caused by a 5% or 35M euro reduction in total industry value in combination 
with a fleet that keeps 125 vessels over the 20 years of simulation time. Paying 
decommissioning fees certainly contributes to meeting the main objective of SWF2 by buying 
out vessels much faster than the market would. It is also interesting to note that 22M euro of 
decommissioning fees results in 35M euro additional industry value. Consequently, 
government money and therefore public money (Cox, 2003; Grafton et al., 2006) is in this 
case better spent compared to the investment subsidies in the original policy strategy of 
SWF1. This makes this finding counterintuitive. As noted previously, eliminating 
decommissioning fees from the policy strategy also results in a constant total fleet size of 125 
vessels. However, the relative sizes of the sub fleets mutually do have changed (data not 
shown). Large beam trawlers left the fleet and their licences became available for others since 
they were not decommissioned. These licences were then used by the other profitable sub 
fleets to expand their fleet size. Consequently, industry employment was also higher 
compared to the original policy strategy (i.e., 35 persons or 10%). Finally, the outcome for the 
estimated fish stock did not differ compared to original policy strategy and therefore neither 
did the quota. As such, more vessels were now “hunting” for the same amount of fish (i.e., 
total quota), resulting in lower average revenues per vessel and therefore lower average wages 
(i.e., 7000 euro or 8% lower). In sum, administering decommissioning fees certainly 
contributes to meeting SWF2 and to the fisheries system as a whole. Therefore, they should 
not be omitted from the original policy strategy. 
 
The final scenario allocates no quota at all to the large beam trawlers. This pushes them out of 
the fleet immediately (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). Although this policy strategy is 
perhaps highly unrealistic to implement, it still is interesting to see how this would affect the 
fisheries system. The outcome of this policy strategy is given by the long dashed lines in 
Figure 4.5-Figure 4.8 (see also Table 4.3). These graphs illustrate that the average industry 
value is 1.06M euro (or 19%) higher by year 20 compared to the original policy strategy. 
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Additionally, average wages also increased 20% or 18000 euro. In contrast to the original 
policy strategy, average wages remain at the same level after five years. The strategy of 
pushing out the large beam trawler fleet immediately by giving them no group quota thus 
definitely improves the original policy strategy to meet SWF2. However, this improvement 
comes at a higher governmental cost, since government expenses are now 17M or 76% 
higher, because more large beam trawlers were decommissioned. Nevertheless, this additional 
17M euro of decommissioning fees resulted in an additional 36M euro (6%) in total industry 
value. This additional value thus generously compensates for the additional government 
expenses. This policy strategy also results in a fleet and employment level that are 12 vessels 
(10%) and 61 persons (18%) lower, respectively, than the original policy strategy. However, 
when one is striving for SWF2, one is willing to accept this cost because of the vast increase 
in both average industry value per vessel and average wages. 
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Figure 4.5: Outcomes for “total industry 
value” (€) and “government expenses” (€) for 
the different policy strategies (scenarios) to 
meet social welfare function 2 (“Small but 
wealthy”) 
Figure 4.6: Outcome for “total industry value 
per vessel” (€) for the different policy 
strategies (scenarios) to meet social welfare 
function 2 (“Small but wealthy”) 
 
 
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
 
Figure 4.7: The outcomes for “employment” 
and “fleet size” for the different policy 
strategies (scenarios) to meet social welfare 
function 2 (“Small but wealthy”). 
Figure 4.8: The outcomes for “average 
wages” and “estimated fish stock” for the 
different policy strategies (scenarios) to meet 
social welfare function 2 (“Small but 
wealthy”). 
  
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
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Table 4.3: Overview of the results for the different scenarios striving for social welfare 
function 2 (“Small but wealthy!”) (“SWF” = “Social Welfare Function” and “LBT”  = “Large 
Beam Trawler”) 
SWF2: SMALL BUT WEATHY!   
 Management objectivesa:    
  Industry value per vessel +   
  Fleet size -   
  Average wages +   
    
 Scenario Policy strategy Outcome on management objectivesb Evaluationc  
 1 Quota = recommended quota Total industry value 644M euro ++  
  Quota unequally allocated over sub fleets 
in which 2/25 to LBT 
Industry value per 
vessel 
5.71M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 113 vessels   
  Decommissioning fees = remaining value 
of  vessel 
Industry employment 339 persons   
   Average wages 88796 euro   
   Government expenses 22.37M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 49.31 tonne   
 2 Quota = recommended quota Total industry value 609M euro -  
  Quota unequally allocated over sub fleets 
in which 2/25 to LBT 
Industry value per 
vessel 
4.87M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 125 vessels   
   Industry employment 374 persons   
   Average wages 81825 euro   
   Government expenses 0M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 48.83 tonne   
 3 Quota = recommended quota Total industry value 681M euro +++  
  Quota unequally allocated over sub fleets 
in which nothing to LBT 
Industry value per 
vessel 
6.77M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 101 vessels   
  Decommissioning fees = remaining value 
of  vessel 
Industry employment 278 persons   
   Average wages 106943 euro   
   Government expenses 39.33M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 49.78 tonne   
       
a: where “+” means “as high as possible”; “-” means “as low as possible”; and “=” means “keep at least constant compared to 
the previous year”. 
b: by the end of the 20 years of simulation time 
c: range from “+++” meaning “very good policy strategy” to “---” meaning “very bad policy strategy”. 
 
4.3.3 Social welfare function 3: Keep them quiet and satisfied at low 
expenses! 
 
The main objective of this social welfare function is to have a stable fishing industry in which 
shipping companies and crews are both earning good money. Setting total quota equal to the 
scientifically recommended quota would have been a starting point for building such stability 
into the fisheries system. However, previous scenarios have illustrated that total quota are 
only able to build relative stability into the fisheries system. This means that there are still 
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fluctuations in the fisheries system caused by fluctuations in the total quotas because they are 
delayed (i.e., the observed damping oscillating behaviour of estimated fish stocks). As such, 
biological sustainability is sought in this scenario through limiting both (1) the days fishermen 
can go fishing and (2) licences. The reason why maximum fishing days are preferred to total 
quota is that they can be more easily kept constant over the years without becoming a subject 
of major social pressure. In fact, effort restrictions, and especially maximum fishing days, are 
regularly reported by fishermen as their preferred policy instrument (Rossiter et al., 2003). 
One important reason for this is that they believe it brings stability to their business and 
transparency towards the future (Rossiter et al., 2003). Hence, this policy strategy opts to give 
each vessel 200 fishing days. Giving each vessel the same amount of fishing days ensures 
equality among sub fleets and thus contributes to social peace. However, only limiting a 
vessel‟s maximum fishing days does not necessarily result in biological sustainability because 
overcapacity also needs to be restrained. Since overcapacity in this microworld can only be 
manifested in an over-expanded fleet size, setting yearly new licences to zero will stop 
additional overcapacity from happening. Next, total quota policy should be switched off in the 
microworld. However, this is not technically possible. Therefore, the next best option is to set 
the quota unrealistically high, which virtually equals no quota at all. Consequently, this 
eliminates the way in which the total quota is allocated over the five sub fleets. Finally, since 
this social welfare function aims at social peace with a limited amount of government 
expenses, all forms of subsidies and fees should be limited. This scenario interprets “limited” 
very strictly and therefore provides no investment subsidies, decommissioning fees or fuel 
subsidies at all. Last, catch restrictions per fishing day are also set to zero. 
 
The full lines in Figure 4.9-Figure 4.12 give the outcomes for this scenario (see also Table 
4.4). The five horizontal or almost horizontal lines are striking in these graphs: (1) industry 
employment, which remained constant over the years at 400 persons, (2) fleet size, which also 
stayed constant at 125 vessels, (3) government expenses, which remained zero, (4) average 
wages, which increased by only 8% (from 67000 to 72500 euro), and (5) the estimated fish 
stock, which steadily increased its biomass from 40 to 51 tonnes by the end of year 20 (i.e., 
28%). The total industry value and industry value per vessel increased more than fourfold, 
from 115M to 501M euro and from 0.92M to 4.01M euro, respectively. As such, these 
findings illustrate a fishing environment that is likely to have a high degree of social peace, 
given that (1) the industry is highly profitable and profitability is still increasing, (2) average 
wages are high and are also still increasing, and (3) the remainder of the fisheries system is 
stable. 
 
Although this policy strategy seems successful in meeting SWF3, it is also interesting to 
check what happens if the policy strategy allows room for fleet expansion. To test this, the 
original policy strategy is now extended with one new additional licence per year (under the 
“ceteris paribus” clause). The dotted lines (small dots) in Figure 4.9-Figure 4.12 illustrate how 
devastating this new policy strategy is for the entire industry (see also Table 4.4). Both total 
industry value and average industry value per vessel are more than 60% lower in year 20 
compared to the original policy strategy (i.e., 336M and 2.45M euro, respectively). Moreover, 
both their trajectories fall after first having increased. This behaviour can be mainly explained 
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by the collapse in the fish stock (and therefore also revenues) in the second half of the 
simulation time in combination with vessels (i.e., industry assets) leaving the fleet as a 
reaction to this collapse. To be more precise, by the end of year 20, the estimated fish stock is 
dramatically depleted by 53% (21280 tonne), and the fleet size ends with 19 vessels (or 16%) 
less than the original policy strategy. This also reduces employment by 75 persons (or 19%). 
This policy strategy also severely negatively impacted average wages, which decreased by 
more the 50% (or 34054 euro) by the end of year 20. This is a counterintuitive result, given 
that the fleet was allowed to expand. One presumes that these behaviours will not preserve 
social peace in the long run. It is thus no understatement to say that this scenario has proven 
the importance of strict licence limitations in the original policy strategy in order to ensure 
social peace. Even allowing one additional licence per year had a devastating impact on social 
peace. 
 
One last scenario illustrates all the missed opportunities for the fisheries system when the 
maximum fishing days are too severely limited (i.e., too low), for instance 100 fishing days 
instead of 200 (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). The outcome of this policy strategy is 
given by the long dashed lines in Figure 4.9-Figure 4.12 (see also Table 4.4). These graphs 
illustrate that when vessels have only 100 fishing days instead of 200, both total industry 
value and average industry value per vessel only increase by 103M and 0.82M euro, 
respectively, instead of 386M and 3.09M euro as in the original policy strategy. Nevertheless, 
in the absence of knowing the outcome of the original policy strategy, there is no reason to 
suspect that this would lead to social unrest, as both increase linearly over the 20 years of 
simulation time. However, comparison of this policy strategy with the original one reveals a 
large amount of unexploited industry value: revenues are capped because the fishing effort is 
so strictly regulated. Similarly, average wages remain constant after two years of slight 
increase. Compared to the original policy strategy, wages are 33750 euro or 47% lower by the 
end of year 20. In contrast, both fleet size and industry employment were virtually the same at 
a constant level of 125 vessels and 400 employees, respectively, and the estimated fish stock 
is better off compared to the original policy strategy (almost 70000 tonne). The latter is no 
surprise, given the strictly limited number of fishing days. In sum, following the policy 
strategy of strictly limited fishing days will probably not result in social disorder, but nor will 
it result in a high level of social peace, since it misses important opportunities for the fishing 
industry and system as a whole. 
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Figure 4.9: Outcomes for “total industry 
value” (€) and “government expenses” (€) for 
the different policy strategies (i.e., scenarios) 
to meet social welfare function 3 (“Keep 
them quiet and satisfied at low expenses”) 
Figure 4.10: Outcome for “total industry 
value per vessel” (€) for the different policy 
strategies (i.e., scenarios) to meet social 
welfare function 3 (“Keep them quiet and 
satisfied at low cost”) 
 
 
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
 
Figure 4.11: Outcomes for “employment” 
(#persons) and “fleet size” (#vessels) for the 
different policy strategies (i.e., scenarios) to 
meet social welfare function 3 (“Keep them 
quiet and satisfied at low cost”) 
Figure 4.12: Outcomes for “average wages” 
(€) and “estimated fish stock” (tonne) for the 
different policy strategies (i.e., scenarios) to 
meet social welfare function 3 (“Keep them 
quiet and satisfied at low cost”) 
  
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
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Table 4.4: Overview of the results for the different scenarios aiming at meeting social welfare 
function 3 (“Keep them quiet and satisfied at low expenses!”) (“SWF” = “Social Welfare 
Function”) 
SWF3: KEEP THEM QUIET AND SATISFIED AT LOW EXPENSES!   
 Management objectivesa:    
  Industry value per vessel =   
  Industry employment =   
  Average wages =   
  Government expenses -   
    
 Scenario Policy strategy Outcome on management objectivesb Evaluationc  
 1 No quota Total industry value 501M euro +++  
  200 fishing days per vessel Industry value per 
vessel 
4.01M euro   
   Fleet size 125 vessels   
   Industry employment 400 persons   
   Average wages 72502 euro   
   Government expenses 0M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 51.13 tonne   
 2 No quota Total industry value 165M euro ---  
  200 fishing days per vessel Industry value per 
vessel 
1.56M euro   
  One new licence per year Fleet size 106 vessels   
   Industry employment 325 persons   
   Average wages 32947 euro   
   Government expenses 0M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 18.72 tonne   
 3 No quota Total industry value 218M euro -  
  100 fishing days per vessel Industry value per 
vessel 
1.74M euro   
   Fleet size 125 vessels   
   Industry employment 399 persons   
   Average wages 38751 euro   
   Government expenses 0 euro   
   Estimated fish stock 69.02 tonne   
       
a: where “+” means “as high as possible”; “-” means “as low as possible”; and “=” means “keep at least constant compared to 
the previous year”. 
b: by the end of the 20 years of simulation time 
c: range from “+++” meaning “very good policy strategy” to “---” meaning “very bad policy strategy”. 
 
4.3.4 Social welfare function 4: Let’s go green! 
 
This social welfare function is ecological in nature, since it aims at high levels of biomass in 
the sea in combination with a small ecological fleet. To ensure high biomass, quota 
recommendations are not followed. Instead, actual total quota is set at only half the 
recommended quota. In practice, this means that MSY is abandoned and biologically 
maximum production is not sought. More concern now goes to the well-being of the aquatic 
resources. This may seem disastrous for the fishing industry at first glance, but there still is an 
advantage since such a policy strategy almost certainly results in higher fish densities and 
 135 
 
allows vessels to catch their fish more efficiently (i.e., high CPUE). This reduces the time and 
effort spent harvesting the total quota and consequently reduces operational costs. In sum, this 
quota policy will lead to reduced catch and revenues due to the lower total quota, but it will 
also lead to a more than proportional reduction in operational costs since quota are lower and 
CPUE will be higher. Hence, vessels can remain profitable if their share of fixed costs in the 
total costs is low. Next, total quota needs to be allocated over the different sub fleets, which 
for this policy strategy will be done in the light of converting the fleet into an ecological one. 
Since flatfish beam trawling is commonly known to be environmentally unfriendly (Anon., 
2005; Hilborn, 2007b; Lindeboom et al., 1998; Polet et al., 2006; Polet et al., 2007), this sub 
fleet should be reduced. This scenario thus allocates the total quota as follows: (1) 2/25 for 
small beam trawlers, (2) 2/25 for large beam trawlers, (3) 7/25 for otter trawlers, (4) 7/25 for 
trammel netters and (5) 7/25 for shrimp beam trawlers. 
 
Since the total quota is set at half the recommended quota, this policy strategy chooses not to 
restrict the number of fishing days. New licences per year is set to zero, in line with the 
ecological character of the social welfare function. Decommissioning fees are set equal to the 
remaining value of the vessels, which gives non-profitable vessels an incentive to leave the 
fleet. The fees are set high because this also ensures that when vessels leave the fleet, their 
licences are destroyed. Next, given that government money in this case goes primarily to 
these decommissioning fees, investment subsidies and fuel subsidies are set to zero. Finally, 
catch per fishing day restrictions are not used because they are ecologically pernicious. Limits 
on the catch a vessel can land per fishing day almost certainly results in high grading, which 
in turn leads to a high mortality of many discarded species (Cappell, 2001; Catchpole et al., 
2005; Lindeboom et al., 1998; Wileman et al., 1999). 
 
The outcome for this policy strategy is given by the full lines in Figure 4.13-Figure 4.16 (see 
also Table 4.5). The main target of having plenty of fish in the sea has been well reached, 
since the fish stock increases its biomass from 40000 tonnes to more than 65000 tonnes by the 
end of the simulation time. This is mainly caused by setting the quota at half the 
recommended quota, which very effectively preserves the fish stock. Additionally, the second 
objective of reducing and converting the fleet towards a small and ecological one has also 
been successful since (1) the total fleet size has decreased from 125 to 96 vessels (a reduction 
of 23%) by the end of the simulation time; and (2) both the large beam trawler fleet and the 
small beam trawler fleet were reduced by 64% (or 16 vessels) and 44% (or 11 vessels), 
respectively, whereas the trammel netter fleet, the shrimp beam trawler and the otter trawler 
fleet remained constant (the otter trawlers only encountered a small loss of two vessels). 
However, as a result of this decrease in fleet size, industry employment fell from 400 to 282 
persons; a reduction of 29%. Although the ecological focus exacts a heavy cost for the fishing 
industry, there is also an economically positive side to these sacrifices. Total industry value 
has increased more than fourfold (from 115M to 473M euro) and average industry value per 
vessel has increased even more than fivefold (from 0.92M to 4.91M euro). The same is true 
for average wages; they have more than tripled from 23370 to 75400 euro. These financial 
outcomes were not expected since we halved the recommended quota. The conversion and 
reduction of the fleet resulted in highly profitable fisheries. Lastly, this policy strategy also 
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results in low government expenses of only 38M euro after 20 years. In sum, this ecological 
policy strategy ensures a bright economic future, albeit only for the employees of the 
ecological sub fleets that are able to remain in the industry. 
 
Decommissioning fees probably play an important role in this policy strategy since there is 
some similarity between this policy strategy and the one employed for meeting SWF2. To 
quickly test this, the microworld is rerun but now with the elimination of decommission fees 
from the original policy strategy (under the “ceteris paribus” clause) (see small dotted lines in 
Figure 4.13-Figure 4.16; see also Table 4.5). In this case, the fleet does not decrease to 96 but 
remains constant at its initial level of 125 vessels. As such, when licences became available, 
they were immediately used by the other profitable sub fleets to expand their fleet size. 
Hence, the composition of the fleet changed to 20 small beam trawlers, 10 large beam 
trawlers, 29 otter trawlers, 33 trammel netters and 33 shrimp beam trawlers. In sum, high 
decommissioning fees are necessary to be sure that licences become destroyed when vessels 
exit the fleet. As a result of not reducing the fleet size, industry employment was also 80 
employees higher by year 20 compared to the original policy strategy. Next, omitting 
decommissioning fees from the original policy strategy also had an enormous impact on the 
total industry value and average industry value per vessel. In fact, total industry value is 11% 
(or 54M euro) lower whereas average industry value per vessel is even 32 percent lower (or 
1.55M euro) compared to the original policy strategy. Hence, administering decommission 
fees equal to the remaining value of the decommissioned vessels cost 38M euro after 20 year 
but resulted into 54M additional industry value. Average wages were also 17 percent lower 
(or 13070 euro) (because revenues were lower since more vessels were competing for the 
same amount of quota) and the estimated fish stock was slightly worse off (i.e., a slight 
decrease of 0.69 tonne or 1%) compared to the original policy strategy. In sum, these are all 
similar findings as compared to the findings on the policy strategy for SWF2 when 
decommissioning fees were omitted, except for the slight decrease in estimated fish stock. 
However, although the fact that both social welfare functions aim at different object 
functions, administering decommissioning fees also contributes to meeting the ecological 
character of SWF4 through reducing the fleet. 
 
Finally, and to completely follow the same structure of policy tests as for SWF2, large beam 
trawlers and small beam trawlers were immediately pushed out of the fleet by setting their 
quota share to zero (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). The dotted lines (small dots) in Figure 
4.13-Figure 4.16 give the results of this policy strategy (see also Table 4.5). Compared to the 
original policy strategy, the estimated fish stock has only increased by 9000 tonnes or 1%. 
However, the total fleet size was 21% (or 20 vessels) lower by the last year of the simulation 
run. Additionally, the large beam trawler fleet and small beam trawler fleet has completely 
disappeared. The otter trawlers, trammel netters and shrimp beam trawlers have not 
decommissioned vessels as they remained profitable over the years. Consequently, this rigid 
policy strategy resulted in a more ecological fleet but not in a significant increase of the fish 
stock compared to the original policy strategy. The latter is quite counterintuitive since one 
would have expected that pushing out the whole large beam trawler fleet and small beam 
trawler fleet would have resulted in a significant increase in estimated fish stock. However, 
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the estimated fish stock was in the original policy strategy already very high. Therefore, net 
increase in fish stock becomes more difficult given the microworld‟s assumption of S-shaped 
growth. Next, a reduced fleet also resulted in a reduction in industry employment of 78 
persons (or 28%). However, as in the original policy strategy, such a decrease in fleet size and 
employment has a positive financial effect for the remaining industry. Moreover, (1) total 
industry value increased by an additional 15.88M euro (or 3%), (2) average industry value per 
vessel increased by 1.53M euro (or 31%) and (3) average wages increased by 22120 euro (or 
29%) compared to the original policy strategy. Finally, the additional increase in total 
industry value (15.88M euro) needs to be compared to the additional increase in government 
expenses, which is 17.26M euro. Consequently, additional government expenses are 1.38M 
euro more than the additional industry value. Given the earlier findings on the relationship 
between decommissioning fees and total industry value, this ratio was not expected. It can be 
explained by the (almost) total buy-out of the large beam trawler fleet and small beam trawler 
fleet, in which decommissioning fees were equal to the remaining value of these vessels. In 
sum, eliminating large beam trawlers and small beam trawlers results in a smaller, more 
ecological fleet at higher additional government expenses and is not fully compensated for by 
the increase in industry value. However, this compensation is not that important for SWF4. 
These findings are in line with the findings from the similar scenario of SWF2, with the 
difference that here the additional government expenses were not generously compensated for 
by additional industry value. 
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Figure 4.13: Outcomes for “total industry 
value” (€) and “government expenses” (€) for 
the different policy strategies (i.e., scenarios) 
to meet social welfare function 4 (“Let‟s go 
green”) 
Figure 4.14: Outcomes for “total industry 
value per vessel” (€) for the different policy 
strategies (i.e., scenarios) to meet social 
welfare function 4 (“Let‟s go green”) 
 
 
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
 
Figure 4.15: Outcomes for “employment” and 
“fleet size” for the different policy strategies 
(i.e., scenarios) to meet social welfare 
function 4 (“Let‟s go green”) 
Figure 4.16: Outcomes for “average wages” 
and “estimated fish stock” for the different 
policy strategies (i.e., scenarios) to meet 
social welfare function 4 (“Let‟s go green”) 
  
(Source: Own compilation) (Source: Own compilation) 
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Table 4.5: Overview of the results for the different scenarios aiming at meeting social welfare 
function 4 (“Let‟s go green!”) (“SWF” = “Social Welfare Function”; “LBT” = “Large Beam 
Trawler”; and “SBT” = “Small Beam Trawler”) 
SWF4: LET’S GO GREEN!   
 Management objectivesa:    
  Fleet size -   
  Estimated fish stock +   
    
 Scenario Policy strategy Outcome on management objectivesb Evaluationc  
 1 Quota = ½ recommended quota Total industry value 473M euro ++  
  Quota unequally allocated over sub fleets 
in which 2/25 to LBT and SBT 
Industry value per 
vessel 
4.91M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 96 vessels   
  Decommissioning fees = remaining value 
of  vessel 
Industry employment 282 persons   
   Average wages 75402 euro   
   Government expenses 37.97M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 65.11 tonne   
 2 Quota = ½ recommended quota Total industry value 419M euro +  
  Quota unequally allocated over sub fleets 
in which 2/25 to LBT and SBT 
Industry value per 
vessel 
3.35M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 125 vessels   
   Industry employment 362 persons   
   Average wages 62331 euro   
   Government expenses 0 euro   
   Estimated fish stock 64.42 tonne   
 3 Quota = ½ recommended quota Total industry value 489M euro +++  
  Quota unequally allocated over sub fleets 
in which nothing to LBT and SBT 
Industry value per 
vessel 
6.44M euro   
  Unlimited fishing days Fleet size 76 vessels   
  Decommissioning fees = remaining value 
of  vessel 
Industry employment 204 persons   
   Average wages 97518 euro   
   Government expenses 55.23M euro   
   Estimated fish stock 66.04 tonne   
       
a: where “+” means “as high as possible”; “-” means “as low as possible”; and “=” means “keep at least constant compared to 
the previous year”. 
b: by the end of the 20 years of simulation time 
c: range from “+++” meaning “very good policy strategy” to “---” meaning “very bad policy strategy”. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
The answer to the research question “do policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to 
align the real fisheries world with their desired fisheries world (i.e., the social welfare 
functions)?” is affirmative. This study illustrates, through running multiple scenarios in our 
microworld, that policymakers in Belgian fisheries currently have the policy instruments at 
hand to install management systems that are able to meet four realistic but totally different 
social welfare functions. It is important to note that our microworld‟s aim is not to assess 
exactly what the impact is of a certain management system on the fisheries system. Instead, 
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the goal is more to illustrate the dynamic complexity between the fisheries system and the 
fisheries management system. Additionally, the microworld also illustrates how the omission 
of certain policy instruments from the management system can often have devastating results. 
Hence, the right combination of policy instruments must be found to maximise the preferred 
social welfare function. However, this study has also vividly illustrated that counterintuitive 
outcomes can emerge from these mixtures of policy instruments (i.e., management systems). 
Counterintuitive behaviour of the fisheries system happened frequently and “reveals flaws 
and blind spots in people‟s thinking” (Morecroft, 2008: 82). These flaws and blind spots are 
caused by what is referred to as “misperception of feedback” (Atkins et al., 2002; Diehl et al., 
1995; Sterman, 1989); the apparent inability to see the feedback at work in systems (Ford, 
1999). This occurs when people‟s mental models are deficient in understanding the dynamic 
complexity of the system they are trying to manage (Sterman, 2000). Such dynamic 
complexity (Senge, 1990) appears in systems consisting of many interlocking negative and 
positive feedback loops in combination with time delays, which generates nonlinear and 
delayed system behaviour. Since fisheries systems are dynamically complex, it is therefore 
not surprising that misperception of feedback occurs when managing fisheries. This has also 
been confirmed by other studies on managing fisheries systems or natural resource 
management in general (Moxnes, 1998a, 1998b; Stouten et al., 2008). 
 
This study also illustrated the interdependency and often conflicting nature of management 
objectives. Mardle and Pascoe (2002a: 50) state that “generally, the major conflict for 
management occurs between the attempts to conserve the stocks and the desire for 
policymakers to satisfy the needs of the fishing community with respect to jobs and income”. 
However, this study has also visualised the existence of the other trade-offs such as the trade-
offs between (1) industry employment and average wages and (2) fleet size and average 
industry value per vessel. As such, like in all feedback systems, conflicts and trade-offs are 
proven to be inherent to the nature of the fisheries system (Richardson et al., 1999). 
Consequently, this study concludes that if policymakers consider the interdependencies 
between objectives when defining their desired social welfare function, they mostly do have 
the policy instruments at hand to actually meet them. This statement has one important 
problem: the assumption that policymakers actually define the social welfare functions before 
implementing a management system. According to Pope (1997), this is not the case. He states 
that “a key deficiency in policy statements is that they do not set priorities or trade-offs 
between the various objectives nor do they set measurable targets for individual objectives” 
(Pope, 1997). A similar statement has been made by Degnbol (2009), a member of the 
Directorate-General of Maritime Affaires and Fisheries of the European Commission, about 
the CFP: “the CFP objectives are not focused and prioritized”. Future research should 
therefore determine to what extent fisheries management prioritises its management 
objectives. A good starting point is already given by Pascoe‟s et al. (2009) for Australia. 
 
This study also sheds a different light on the effectiveness of fisheries management, albeit 
indirectly. The lessons learned from this study reveal that the assessment of the effectiveness 
of fisheries management depends on one‟s belief of what the real management objectives are. 
In strategic management, Mintzberg (1978) pointed out that there is often a huge difference 
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between a firm‟s intended and realised strategy, which roughly corresponds to differences 
found between respectively a firm‟s written and unwritten strategy. This distinction can also 
be made with regard to public policy strategies. For instance, if one believes that the written 
management objectives of the CFP (i.e., predominantly MSY) are its “real” objectives, then it 
is perhaps fair to say that the CFP is not hugely effective. The EU itself has even 
acknowledged this in its “green papers” (EC, 2001, 2009). However, a few studies (e.g., 
Boude et al., 2001) state that the CFP‟s most predominant management objective is the 
unwritten objective of preserving social peace. If one looks through this lens, then it is 
perhaps fair to say that the CFP is actually rather effective. Although social peace is never 
stated officially as a management objective, studies have often considered it as a highly 
important unwritten management objective, if not the primary objective of fisheries 
policymakers (Hilborn, 2007a; Mardle et al., 2002b; Mesnil, 2008; Stouten et al., 2008). Such 
unwritten objectives, in combination with highly politicised fisheries management processes 
(Hilborn, 2007a), can often explain “irrational” fisheries management decisions. One of the 
most famous “irrational” policies is continuing to subsidise fisheries, even though studies 
have highlighted governmental subsides as a primary cause of overcapacity and overfishing 
(Mesnil, 2008). One can view this as a political process gone wrong, one which attempts to 
reduce the whining from the sectors being subsidised (Hilborn, 2007a: 155). When evaluating 
the outcome of the effectiveness of a fisheries management system and the rationale behind 
the use of policy instruments, it is thus essential to choose an objective function which you 
accept as the real social welfare function the fisheries policymakers are trying to meet. 
 
Finally, the ultimate goal of modelling studies is the application of their insights to the real 
world. One hopes that microworlds will assist people to manage some activities better in the 
future (Richardson et al., 1999). Consequently, the results of this study must be translated into 
practical suggestions for policymakers to improve fisheries management. However, since this 
study is based on a theoretical microworld, the practical suggestion will be limited to general 
guidelines for improving fisheries management. First and most importantly, policymakers 
should start focusing and prioritising their management objectives (if this is indeed not yet 
done). If social peace is a priority, then it should be written down, instead of remaining 
unwritten. This would allow evaluation research to include this objective in their assessments 
of the effectiveness of the applied fisheries policy strategy. If social peace is not officially 
stated as an important management objective, policymakers should start adopting a 
management system that is effective and efficient in the light of the agreed social welfare 
function, even if it affects the social peace of the (fishing) community. This is a difficult 
strategic exercise. It requires political courage and visionary leadership. Second, policymakers 
need to be aware of misperceptions of feedback when installing or altering a fisheries 
management system. This clearly points to a future role for microworlds or learning 
laboratories in advising fisheries policymakers, even though this advice will not take the form 
of concrete answers to concrete problems. The advice will rather unveil the dynamical 
complexity of the fisheries system and prepare policymakers for alternative futures by 
bringing these futures to life in a way that is not otherwise possible. Moreover, such 
microworlds not only help fisheries policymakers to generate alternative futures but also 
change and enrich their interpretation of a complex world (Morecroft, 2008: 6). In sum, they 
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will serve the purpose of visualising and rehearsing policy strategy (Morecroft, 1999) 
bringing them into debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984). A final practical suggestion for 
policymakers to improve fisheries management is to find the right combination of policy 
instruments in order to best meet their desired social welfare function. Consequently and as a 
matter of general principle, this study, like the study of Greiner et al. (2000), also puts forth 
that it is very unlikely for one single policy instrument to be capable of solving a complex 
problem. Microworlds can play a crucial role in finding the right mixture of policy 
instruments to achieve the desired social welfare function. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Through use of a microworld or learning laboratory, this study illustrates that policymakers 
usually have the policy instruments at hand to meet their desired social welfare functions, but 
only when those functions take into account the interdependencies between objectives. As a 
result, the research question of whether policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to 
align the real fisheries world with their desired fisheries world (i.e., the social welfare 
functions) can be answered in the affirmative. Nevertheless, policymakers should be careful 
when implementing these management systems, as counterintuitive (surprising) outcomes 
may occur due to “misperceptions of feedback”. This conclusion has one significant problem: 
the assumption that policymakers define social welfare functions before implementing a 
management system. Doubt remains about to what extent fisheries policymakers truly 
prioritise their management objectives. Further, this study sheds a different light on the 
assessment of the effectiveness of fisheries management systems and the rationale behind the 
use of policy instruments. It concludes, albeit indirectly, that this assessment depends on 
which objective function one accepts as the real social welfare function the fisheries 
policymakers are trying to meet. Discovering unwritten objectives and hidden agendas, which 
are often the rationale behind seemingly irrational policy strategies, can shed new light on the 
effectiveness of fisheries management systems. 
 
Since the ultimate goal of modelling studies is to apply their insights to the real world, this 
study formulates general guidelines for improving fisheries management. First and most 
important, policymakers should start by focusing and prioritising their management objectives 
(if they haven‟t already). Only after setting these priorities and agreeing on a social welfare 
function can policymakers adopt a management system that is effective and efficient in the 
light of the given social welfare function. Second, policymakers need to be aware of the 
abovementioned problem of misperceptions of feedback when installing or altering a fisheries 
management system. These findings indicate a certain future role for microworlds or learning 
laboratories in advising fisheries policymakers, even though this advice does not provide 
concrete answers to concrete problems. Microworlds or learning laboratories will serve the 
purpose of visualising and rehearsing policy strategies, bringing them into debate and 
discussion. Finally, since it is very unlikely for one single policy instrument to be capable of 
solving a complex problem, policymakers should determine the right mixture of policy 
instruments to achieve their desired social welfare function. Future research should work at 
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facilitating these “tasks” for fisheries policymakers. This should be done mainly by (1) 
defining a framework/methodology for prioritising fisheries management objectives; and (2) 
developing a broader range of microworlds that include different mixtures of policy 
instruments, including policy instruments outside the scope of our microworld, to see how 
those instruments interact with different fisheries systems in service of different desired social 
welfare functions. 
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Chapter 5: Stakeholder learning from 
microworlds 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Microworlds, as a specific form of simulation models, are in many fields often referred to as: 
(1) insight generators (Morecroft, 1984), (2) tools for inquiry into dynamic decision-making 
processes (Brehmer, 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2005), (3) tools to visualise and rehearse decisions 
and strategies (Morecroft, 1999; Morecroft, 1984), (4) tools to debate and discuss strategies 
(Morecroft, 1999; Morecroft, 1984), (5) laboratories for ex ante evaluation of decision-
making (De Geus, 1997; Keys et al., 1996), (6) learning laboratories (Kim, 1993b; Romme et 
al., 1997), (7) learning environments (Wolfe, 1976), (8) learning spaces (Senge, 1996), and 
(9) educational tools (Sindre et al., 2009). In other words, various scientists believe, explicitly 
or implicitly, that some form of “learning” occurs when using microworlds. Nevertheless, this 
belief still generates widespread disagreement within several scientific communities (Bakken 
et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2008; Cavaleri et al., 1996; Langley, 1993; Langley et al., 1996). The 
main reason for this disagreement is the continued absence of a well-structured body of 
evaluation research that systematically examines whether any valuable learning takes place 
from the use of microworlds (Akili, 2007; Bakken et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2008; Cavaleri et 
al., 1997; Gosen et al., 2004; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Huz et al., 1997; Raia, 
1966; Sweeney et al., 2000; Tonks et al., 1997; Wolfe, 1976). There is no justified reason for 
this lack of evaluation research. This study aims to remedy this situation. 
 
Up to the beginning of the 1990s, with few exceptions (e.g.: McKenney, 1962, 1963; Raia, 
1966), this research question remained the province of anecdotes, reactions, impressions and 
opinions rather than rigorous research (Cavaleri et al., 1997; Wolfe et al., 1975). Impressions 
and opinions do have value, but Raia (1966: 340) had already stated in the 1960s that “a 
survey of the literature reveals a continuing need to improve research methodology and 
design …[since]… there have been few attempts to properly control some of the more 
significant variables in the environment”. He also said, “there is a need to appraise the 
effectiveness of games [i.e., microworlds] in terms of more objective criteria. These might 
include measures of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and levels of interest and motivation” (Raia, 
1966: 341). From the 1990s onwards, improvement in the research methodology and design 
was mainly addressed through applying “controlled” experimental designs (Huz et al., 1997). 
But the control in these designs was often lamentable, leaving room for many alternative 
explanations (Akili, 2007; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009). In fact, some studies were 
only applying quasi-experiments since they (1) lacked a control group (e.g.: Cavaleri et al., 
1997; Dill et al., 1963; Hung, 2008) or (2) the random assignment of the subjects to 
experimental treatments could be questioned (e.g.: Wolfe et al., 1975). Others who did 
attempt to use a true experimental design often lacked other forms of control or a strict 
“before-after” research design (e.g.: Hancock et al., 1961; McKenney et al., 1966). Such 
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before-after research design is necessary because, even if participants are randomly assigned 
to groups, one group may well perform better than the other (especially with the small sample 
sizes often found in this kind of evaluation research) (Sindre et al., 2009). Administering a 
pre-test before the learning intervention controls for this effect (Sindre et al., 2009). 
 
However, evaluation studies need more than well-controlled true experimental designs to 
tackle the research question of whether any valuable learning takes place from the use of 
microworlds. For instance, these true experiments may attempt to address research questions 
that are methodologically impossible to answer. The best-known illustrations of this error are 
the vast number of studies (e.g.: Franz et al., 1992; McKenney, 1962, 1963; Moore, 1967; 
Raia, 1966; Shields, 1999, 2001; Wolfe, 1975b; Wolfe et al., 1975) that have tried to compare 
the (relative) effectiveness and efficiency of microworlds to other learning and training tools, 
usually conventional paper case studies (Clark, 1983). However, the (relative) effectiveness 
and the efficiency of microworlds in comparison to other training methods can hardly be 
measured. This is because the methods under observation consist of a sample of 
characteristics which can be varied in essentially infinite ways (Clark, 1983; Stolurow, 1962). 
Because of this, such comparisons have nearly died out (Größler, 2001; Weidenmann, 1993). 
This type of error is mainly due to the absence of a broadly-supported objective evaluation 
framework (based on objective evaluation criteria for learning from microworlds) and 
uniform methodology (Carvalho, 1991; Feinstein et al., 2001, 2002; Gentry et al., 1998; Keys 
et al., 1990). 
 
Several problems exist when developing an objective evaluation framework and uniform 
methodology for the case of learning from microworlds. The trouble begins with the very 
definition of “learning” (Gentry et al., 1998; Keys et al., 1990). Many studies  (e.g.: Anderson 
et al., 1992; Hancock et al., 1961) conceptualised “learning” as improvement in controlling 
the microworld and improving “game performance” (i.e., better performing in the 
microworld) (Faria, 2001; Gosen et al., 2004; Warren et al., 1999). As a result, these studies 
assumed that the higher the score on the performance measures in the microworld, the more 
has been learned about how the microworld works and therefore how the real world works. 
These studies assumed that improved “game performance” results in improved performance 
in similar real-life situations. However, the capability of microworlds to stimulate a learning 
transfer has not yet been confirmed (Größler, 2001). Moreover, studies have even shown that 
these assumptions do not always hold the truth (Anderson et al., 1992; Bakken, 1993; Diehl, 
1992; Thorngate et al., 1987; Washbush et al., 2001; Wellington et al., 1992). In addition, the 
microworld in these experimental studies also serves a double function: it is the treatment as 
well as a means to measure the results of the treatment. As a result, further methodological 
problems can occur and have not yet been widely discussed (Funke, 1993; Größler, 2001). 
For these reasons, studies abandoned the use of “game performance” as the only measure of 
learning. Instead, game performance became included in a broader evaluation framework 
(Faria, 2001; Gosen et al., 2004). Huz et al. (1997) developed a highly interesting (albeit 
broad) framework. It is built along three levels of deepening analysis, being: (1) formal or 
informal reflections on the modelling intervention (Level 1), (2) participant‟s self-reporting of 
intervention impact on his or her attitudes, beliefs, and actions (i.e., behaviour) (Level 2), and 
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(3) measurement of actual system change (Level 3). Similarly, Gröβler (2001) presented a 
working definition of learning that can also serve as an evaluation framework since it includes 
“two processes and the result of these processes, being: (1) a change in cognitive structure 
[knowledge], and (2) a change in behavior, which lead to (3) a change in performance” 
(Größler, 2001: 5). Although these frameworks consist of valuable and objective evaluation 
criteria for learning from microworlds, they have barely been used in empirical research. 
 
With only few exceptions (e.g.: Cavaleri et al., 1997; Huz et al., 1997), a final frequently 
occurring methodological shortcoming is that most studies use students (e.g., college students 
(Hancock et al., 1961), undergraduate students (Brekke et al., 2003; Gresse von Wangenheim 
et al., 2009; Pala et al., 2005; Pfahl et al., 2001), MBA students (McKenney, 1962, 1963; 
Moffie et al., 1968; Starbuck et al., 1966), graduate students enrolled in other educational 
programs (Hung, 2008; Pfahl et al., 2004; Sweeney et al., 2000; Wolfe, 1975a, 1975b; Wolfe 
et al., 1975) and/or faculty staff (Raia, 1966) as subjects in their studies. The conclusions 
about learning from microworlds from these studies are therefore limited in their applicability 
to decision makers like managers or public policymakers (Burns et al., 1990). These studies 
used students mostly out of practical reasons, namely: university-based participants are easier 
to target, there is a possibility of high participation rates, and costs are lower (Brekke et al., 
2003). While previous experiments indicated that there are reasons to expect that differences 
between students and actual decision makers could be small and insignificant (Bakken et al., 
1994; Moxnes, 1998a), there remains doubts to whether this jeopardises the external validity 
of these studies (Bell et al., 2008; Brekke et al., 2003; Burns et al., 1990). 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the inquiry of whether any valuable learning takes 
place from the use of microworlds. We have made an effort to overcome these 
methodological problems or at least address them. This study examines if actual decision 
makers learn from using microworlds. The scope of this study is the Belgian fishing industry. 
The objective is to determine whether stakeholders learn from a microworld used to gain 
insight into the long-term effect of policy instruments on the Belgian fisheries system. Three 
stakeholder groups (i.e., policymakers, scientists and ship owners and skippers) were tested 
using a “before-after with control group”-experiment. We tested the influence this microworld 
had on their subjective knowledge about the most common policy instruments in Belgian 
fisheries, as well as their attitude toward them and their behavioural intention in relation to 
these instruments. In addition, this study also examines their attitude towards the microworld 
used as well as their perceived internal validity of the microworld. Last, it examines whether 
stakeholders reported differences in learning from the microworld about (1) the impact policy 
instruments have on fisheries systems, and (2) how difficult it is to manage fishery systems. 
All these learning criteria were drawn from the suggested frameworks of Huz et al. (1997) 
and Gröβler (2001) and applied to the case of Belgian fisheries. An examination of this study 
in light of Huz et al.‟s (1997) evaluation framework reveals that this study captures formal 
reflections on the modelling intervention (Level 1) and participants‟ self-reporting impacts of 
the intervention on their attitudes, behavioural intentions and behavioural expectations (Level 
2). However, this study does not aim to measure changes in actual behaviour and system 
changes (Level 3), because that would require a longitudinal study. Such longitudinal studies 
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are subject to an enormous number of methodological and ethical problems that often lead to 
questionable results and outcomes (Größler, 2001). To compensate for the shortcoming of not 
measuring actual behaviour and system changes, this study uses the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Hardeman et al., 2002) for approximating future behaviour through 
measuring behavioural-intentions-and-expectations (Gibbons, 2009). Gröβler‟s (2001) 
working definition is taken into account since this study also assesses the influence of 
microworlds on the participants‟ knowledge. This is done through measuring changes in 
participants‟ subjective knowledge, a worthy surrogate for objective knowledge (Carlson et 
al., 2009). Subjective knowledge is chosen because it can be easily measured through a short 
and reliable self-reported measure (Flynn et al., 1999). 
 
This study contains four sections. Section 1, Materials and Methods, describes the 
microworld, which this study uses as the experimental condition. The population, sample and 
recruitment of the stakeholder groups are then given. A detailed overview of the experiment 
follows, which presents (1) the before-after with control group design, (2) the pre-and post-
test questionnaires, and (3) the experimental procedure. The hypotheses are then presented, 
based on the objectives and experimental procedure. The section concludes with the method 
of data analysis. Section 2 contains the results of the experiment which clearly indicate that 
using the microworld did not result in changes in the participants‟ subjective knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention towards commonly used policy instruments in Belgian 
fisheries management. In contrast, all stakeholders groups reported that they had learned from 
the microworld about the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries system and that they 
had confidence in the microworld and perceived its behaviour as valid. Section 3 discusses 
these contradictory results and provides possible explanations for these findings. It also 
discusses the limitations of this study. Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
 
5.2 Materials and Methods 
 
5.2.1 The microworld: the experimental condition 
 
The microworld used in this research is called the “Belgian Fisheries Microworld” (Stouten, 
2009). It based on a system dynamics simulation model and allows stakeholders to “play” and 
gain long-term insight into the effect policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. 
The approach is a game run in a dynamic decision-making mode (Langley et al., 1996; 
McCormack et al., 1998; Wolfe, 1975a) where the players of the microworld can alter policy 
instruments each year. The story behind the game is that the player is the only policymaker in 
Belgian fisheries and needs to maximise votes for the upcoming elections. The player can use 
most of the Belgian policy instruments to formulate his or her policy strategy: (1) total quota, 
(2) the allocation of the total quota over Belgium's five sub fleets, (3) maximum fishing days 
per vessel, (4) maximum catch per fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) 
investment subsidies, and (8) fuel subsidies and taxes. After having formulated a policy 
strategy, the collective group of stakeholders then vote in function of how well the player paid 
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attention to their needs, as captured by (1) total industry value, (2) industry value per vessel, 
(3) fleet size, (4) industry employment, (5) average wages, (6) government expenses, and (7) 
estimated fish stock. The player‟s score on each of these objectives is indicated by “status 
lamps”. A green light means “doing very well” and the player gains 20000 votes, yellow light 
means “can do better” but the player still gains 10000 votes and red means “highly neglecting 
this objective” and the players loses 30000 votes. The total number of votes is simply the sum 
of the votes for each of these seven objectives. The more votes the player obtains, the higher 
the score and the higher the chance of being re-elected. For further information and full 
details about the development and architecture of this microworld, see Chapter 3 above.  
 
5.2.2 The stakeholders: population, sample and recruitment 
 
This study invited three groups of stakeholders in the Belgian fisheries to participate on a 
voluntary basis in our experiment. They were: (1) policymakers, (2) scientists and (3) ship 
owners and skippers. Policymakers, involved directly or indirectly in the Belgian fisheries, 
were invited via post from (1) the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Flemish 
Government, (2) the Cabinet of the Flemish Government for Sea Fisheries, (3) DG Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission, and (4) the Cabinet of EU Commissioner 
Joe Borg. The experiment‟s designer also called each member of the DG Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries and the Cabinet of EU Commissioner Joe Borg in an attempt to increase their 
participation rate. Fisheries scientists were defined as all employees of the Institute of 
Agricultural and Fisheries Research (ILVO) whose wage scale equals that of a scientist. 
These scientists were invited via e-mail with a follow-up visit from the experiment‟s designer. 
Representatives of the fishing industry were limited to ship owners and skippers as they have 
principal responsibility for running the fishing industry according to regulations. Each 
shipping company (based on the “Fisheries Yearbook 2009” (Pronk, 2009)) received a letter 
inviting their ship owners and skippers to participate in the experiment. In addition, 
advertisements (i.e., posters and flyers) were placed in fish auctions, pubs, and administrative 
authorities that ship owners or skippers often visit. Whenever a vessel was stationed in a 
Belgian port, the experiment‟s designer visited and invited those ship owners and skippers. 
They were also recruited via phone calls to every shipping company that operates a Belgian 
vessel. 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the (1) population, (2) sample (the number of actual participants), and (3) 
participant rate for each of the organisations of these stakeholder groups. It shows that 
policymakers at the national level were well represented (i.e., 81% and 67%), but those at the 
European level were less eager to participate (i.e., 9% and 0%). These low participation rates 
at the European level were expected since these policymakers are highly inaccessible. The 
participation rate of the scientists was high, given that five scientists were excluded from 
participation because they have served as the scientific expert group who helped with design 
of the microworld. Inviting them would have biased the results of this study because of their 
knowledge of the microworld prior to the experiment. Ship owners and skippers were less 
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well represented. This was as expected since they are difficult to target, especially when it 
concerns scientific research involving computers and simulation. 
 
Table 5.1: Overview of population, participants and participation rate by stakeholder group 
Stakeholdergroup Organisation Population* Participants Part. rate 
Policymakers The Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 
of the Flemish Government 
21 17 81% 
 The Cabinet of the Flemish Government in 
charge of sea fisheries  
3 2 67% 
 DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the 
EU 
69 6 9% 
 Cabinet of Commissioner Joe Borg 13 0 0% 
Scientists Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries 
Research (ILVO) 
35 20 57% 
Fishing industry Ship owners and skippers (Unknown) 12  
*This is an approximation of the population; it consists only of the people who are involved directly or indirectly in Belgian 
fisheries. 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
5.2.3 The experiment: before-after with control group design 
 
The experiment was held during five consecutive sessions (daily from 14:00 to 17:00 on 29 
June - 3 July 2009) in two almost identical but separate PC-rooms at the “IOC Project Office 
for IODE” at Ostend, Belgium (Table 5.2). Each of these sessions was designed as a “before-
after with control group”-design (Christensen, 1997: 339) (Table 5.3). This design makes it 
possible to assess the effect a microworld has on (1) subjective knowledge, (2) attitude, and 
(3) behavioural intention through the comparison of pre- and post tests. Additionally, the 
post-test allows for comparison of the stakeholder‟s attitude towards the microworld as well 
as his or her perceived internal validity of the microworld. It also shows whether stakeholders 
have reported differences in learning from the microworld about (1) the impact policy 
instruments have on fisheries systems, and (2) how difficult it is to manage fishery systems. 
Finally, such a design does an excellent job of controlling for rival hypotheses such as history, 
maturation and instrumentation variables, although intra-group differences could still exist 
(Christensen, 1997). This design is also the most recommended for assessing learning from 
microworlds (Cohen et al., 2000; Größler, 2001). Many similar studies have also used this 
design (e.g.: Drappa et al., 2000; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Huz et al., 1997; Pala 
et al., 2005; Pfahl et al., 2001; Pfahl et al., 2004; Raia, 1966; Sindre et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 
1975). Participants were randomly assigned to a computer in the experimental or control 
group, which controlled for regression and selection variables. Each participant got his or her 
own computer showing the microworld. In order to eliminate peer interaction, we left one seat 
free between participants whenever possible. In addition, participants were requested to 
remain seated for the duration of the experiment. These measures assure that all participants 
received the same treatment. 
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Participant effects (and especially demand effects, positive self-presentation and the 
Hawthorn effect (Christensen, 1997)) were controlled since the experiment was “disguised” 
(Christensen, 1997: 294). Participants were told they would participate in a gaming 
competition in which they needed to manage the Belgian fisheries through using the 
microworld to the best of their ability. But this competitive setting was a deception 
(Christensen, 1997: 292) that was enforced by administering a valuable prize (one iPod Touch 
8GB) to the winner of each group. This prize also motivated the subjects to (1) participate in 
the research, (2) take the exercise seriously, (3) reduce trial-and-error gaming, and (4) learn 
from the microworld (Camerer et al., 1999; Starbuck et al., 1966; Wolfe, 1976). Next, the 
organisation of the sessions reduced demand characteristics such as rumours among 
subsequent sessions as (1) participants of the same organisation almost always participated in 
the same session, eliminating “intra-organisation” rumours; and (2) sessions were organised 
only once per day, eliminating direct contact between participants before and after each 
session. Experimenter effects were controlled by using the “partially blind technique” 
(Christensen, 1997: 302) since the experimenters knew only the experimental condition the 
subjects were in when the subjects took place in the two PC-rooms. Next, the time between 
the pre-and post-test was kept the same for both experimental and control group, since the 
participants of the control group were occupied with another task while the experimental 
groups played with the microworld. The control group spent their time learning about 
strategic groups in Belgian fisheries, a subject that was far enough removed from the 
objective of the experiment that it would not interfere in the post-test. Finally, three 
experimenters performed the experiment over the five sessions. The designer of the 
experiment (a male junior fisheries scientist) led the control group during all five sessions. 
The experimental group was led in the first three sessions by a male junior fisheries scientist 
and in the last two by a male senior fisheries scientist, all employees of ILVO. As a result, 
this study tried to control the experimenter attributes (Christensen, 1997: 247) by matching 
the three experimenters as much as possible qua gender, age and appearance.  
 
Table 5.2: The five sessions of the experiment 
Session Day Date Stakeholder group Organisations Language 
1 Mon June 29th, 2009 Policymakers 1) The Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 
of the Flemish Government 
2) The Cabinet of the Flemish Government for 
Sea Fisheries 
Dutch 
2 Tue June 30st, 2009 Fishing industry Ship owners and skippers Dutch 
3 Wed July 1st, 2009 Scientists Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries Research 
(ILVO) 
Dutch 
4 Thu July 2nd, 2009 Fishing industry Ship owners and skippers Dutch 
5 Fri July 3th, 2009 Policymakers 1) DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the EC 
2) Cabinet of EU Commissioner Joe Borg 
English 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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Table 5.3: “Before-after with control group”-design for each session 
SESSION (≈ STAKEHOLDER GROUP) 
Experimental group* Control group* 
Pre-test Pre-test 
Play to learn for gaming competition  
Post-test Post-test 
Gaming competition Gaming competition 
* Participants were randomly assigned to experimental and control group 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
5.2.4 The pre-and post-test: the questionnaires 
 
Both pre-and post-tests in this study were questionnaires. Development of these 
questionnaires started with a preliminary questionnaire that aimed to identify (1) subjective 
knowledge of commonly used policy instruments in Belgian fisheries and (2) attitude toward 
them and (3) behavioural intention in relation to these instruments. The questionnaires also 
included two possible covariates: (1) their attitude toward computers (ACOMP) and (2) their 
attitude toward computer simulation models (ACSM) were also included. The inclusion of 
covariates is common practice in questionnaires for evaluation research, especially the 
measurement of subject‟s belief in microworlds (e.g.: Brekke et al., 2003). This questionnaire 
was anonymous but included a few personal characteristics like gender, age and work. 
“Subjective knowledge” was measured by Flynn‟s and Goldsmith‟s (1999) short and reliable 
self-reported measure of subjective knowledge. It consisted of five prepositions and employed 
a seven point Likert-type response format. “Attitude towards policy instruments” was 
measured through a direct measure that identified the attitude toward each of the policy 
instruments (included in the microworld) individually by means of a semantic differential 
(Raia, 1966). Each of these semantic differentials consist of exactly the same four pairs of 
bipolar adjectives which were based on Francis et al.‟s (2004) “manual for constructing 
questionnaires based on the theory of planned behaviour”. The four bipolar adjectives 
included both instrumental items (whether the behaviour achieves something; e.g., harmful-
beneficial) and experiential items (how it feels to perform the behaviour; e.g. fair – unfair) 
and were all based on a seven point Likert scale. “Behavioural intentions toward policy 
instruments” can be measured following three methods: (1) intention performance, (2) 
generalised intention, and (3) intention simulation (Francis et al., 2004). In this study, the 
“intention performance”-measure was not suitable because it refers to how many time a 
subject intends to perform a behaviour in a certain amount of time or number of cases. The 
“intention simulation”-measure was assumed to be much too demanding for the subjects of 
some of our stakeholder groups. It also would have significantly increased the length of the 
questionnaire. Consequently, we opted for the most commonly used method, “generalised 
intention”. Finally, Shaft, Sharfman and Wu‟s (2004) “attitude towards computers instrument 
(ATCI)”-measure was used to measure both “attitude toward computers” and “attitude toward 
computer simulation models”  with the only difference that for measuring the „attitude toward 
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simulation models‟ the term „computer‟ was replaced by „computer simulation model‟ in the 
ATCI-measure. 
 
The preliminary questionnaire was developed in order to find out if it would pass some 
important reliability tests. The questionnaire passed through three stages of testing. First, a 
small “expert panel” (Czaja, 1998: 59) from ILVO reviewed the questionnaire. This panel 
consisted of (1) the designer of the questionnaire, a junior fisheries scientists involved with 
fisheries management issues, (2) a senior fisheries scientist with knowledge of questionnaire 
design, and (3) a senior fisheries scientist and coordinator of Belgium‟s research group on 
fishing technology. Second, “cognitive interviews” (Czaja, 1998: 58) were conducted one-on-
one between the designer of the questionnaire and four respondents from ILVO. 
Unfortunately, we could not conduct cognitive interviews with subjects of the study‟s target 
population without heavily jeopardising the study itself, given the limited number of 
individuals in each stakeholder group. Interviews with four technicians from ILVO proved to 
be a suitable substitute, as these technicians are as familiar with the effect policy instruments 
have on the Belgian fisheries system as most members of the population. Third, a “field 
pretesting” (Czaja, 1998: 60) was held by administering the questionnaire to 15 technicians 
and/or laboratory assistants of ILVO. The aim of this “field pretesting” was to estimate the 
reliability and internal consistency of the questionnaire through (1) the “Test/retest” method 
(Raia, 1966: 344), and (2) calculating the Cronbach‟s Alpha for each construct. Due to the 
results of these different tests, the preliminary questionnaire became the pre-test questionnaire 
(Appendix 1 and 2), with the only difference that behavioural intention is now measured 
through (1) behavioural intention and (2) behavioural expectations (Gibbons, 2009).  
 
The post-test questionnaire for the control group differs from the pre-test questionnaire in four 
ways (Appendix 3 and 4). First, it does not double-check the subject‟s demographic 
characteristics, attitudes toward computers and computer simulation models, since these are 
already known from the pre-test. Second, similar questions to the pre-test were extended with 
legitimating that the respondent were allowed to alter his or her opinion as compared to the 
pre-test. Third, the order in which the prepositions or bipolar adjectives were given was often 
changed. Last, this questionnaire also allowed the subjects to make comments and/or 
suggestions about the proposed simulation model. The post-test questionnaire for the 
experimental group is the same as the post-test questionnaire for the control group, except that 
it is extended with measures of (1) the participants‟ attitude towards the microworld, (2) 
which policy instruments the participant had tested when playing with the microworld, (3) the 
validity of the microworld, and (4) learning from the microworld about both the effect policy 
instruments have on the fisheries system and about how difficult it is to manage a fisheries 
system.  
 
These questionnaires were originally designed in English, since most of the scales used are 
based on or fully borrowed from peer-reviewed literature. To eliminate language errors, these 
questionnaires were reviewed by a native English speaker. However, since most stakeholders 
are native Dutch speakers, these questionnaires were translated to Dutch by the designer of 
the questionnaire (a native Dutch speaker). The Dutch translation was reviewed by a 
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colleague at ILVO who is also a native Dutch speaker. Pilot-testing the questionnaire revealed 
some typos and language errors which were then corrected. 
 
5.2.5 The experimental procedure 
 
The experimental procedure is given in Table 5.4. On arrival, participants were welcomed and 
registered, and each participant received a personal file including (1) two identical numerical 
IDs, (2) a green or blue coloured paper, and (3) the business card of the experiment‟s 
designer. The two identical numerical IDs were used to protect the participant‟s privacy since 
these were used instead of names in coding and analysis (Sweeney et al., 2000). One of the 
IDs was assigned to the computer and one was for the subject, making it possible to link a 
person to a computer. This was necessary when determining the group winners of the gaming 
competition. The coloured papers were used to randomly assign each participant to the 
experimental or control group (where “green” equalled “experimental group” and “blue” 
equalled “control group”). When all the participants had arrived, they were escorted at the 
same time to the two PC rooms, which were located next to each other. Before entering, 
participants were requested to look at their coloured paper in their personal file to know 
which room they were allocated to. After having entered the right room, the two groups were 
kept completely separate until the end of the experiment. 
 
After participants had taken their place at the computer, the experimenter of both groups 
started by outlining the practical arrangements then administered the pre-test. After having 
filled out the pre-test, the subjects in the experimental group were introduced to the 
microworld and then spent 45 minutes intensively playing with the microworld. During that 
time, the subjects of the control group attended a lecture on strategic groups in Belgian 
fisheries. This subject matter was far enough removed from the objective of the experiment so 
it could not introduce undesired learning effects in the control group. Next, the post-tests were 
administered (as mentioned above, these questionnaires were not fully identical for both 
experimental and control group). Finally, a debriefing took place in each of the two groups 
that unveiled the true experimental nature and value of the study. During the entire procedure, 
the time slots reserved for completing a certain step of the schedule were identical for both the 
experimental and control group (Pfahl et al., 2004). After the experiment was performed, the 
participants were escorted by the experimenters to a room with refreshments. This time for 
refreshments also gave the experiment‟s designer time to correctly determine the group 
winners. 
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Table 5.4: Procedure followed during each of the five sessions of the experiment (the dotted 
line indicates the physical separation between experimental and control group) 
Time Duration Experimental group (green) Control group (blue) 
14:00 – 14:15 15‟ Registration + random assignment of the subjects to the groups 
14:15 – 14:20 5‟ Participants are escorted to the PC rooms 
14:20 – 14:25 5‟ Practical arrangements Practical arrangements 
14:25 – 14:45 20‟ Pre-test Pre-test 
14:45 – 15:00 15‟ Introduction to microworld Strategic group lecture  
15:00 – 15:45 45‟ Playing the microworld Strategic group lecture (cont.) 
+ Introduction to microworld 
15:45 – 16:05 20‟ Post-test Post-test 
16:05 – 16:35 30‟ Gaming competition Gaming competition 
16:35 – 16:50 15‟ Debriefing Debriefing 
16:50 – 17:00 10‟ Participants are escorted to the reception 
17:00 – 17:30 30‟ Reception + prize ceremony 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
5.2.6 Hypotheses 
 
Based on the objectives of this study, the null hypotheses for this experiment are: 
 
H01: There will be no differences in pre-test scores between the two treatment groups (i.e., 
the two randomly selected treatment groups will be equal). 
H02: There will be no differences in pre-test scores between the different stakeholder 
groups (i.e., all stakeholder groups are initially the same related to the dependent 
variables). 
H03: For the dependent variables that were measured in both experimental treatments, there 
will be no differences in the post-test scores between the two treatment groups (i.e., 
the two groups will (still) be equal after having played with the microworld). 
H04: There will be no differences in post-test scores between the different stakeholder 
groups (i.e., all stakeholder groups are (still) the same related to the dependent 
variables after having played with the microworld). 
H05: There will be no differences between pre- and post-test scores for the dependent 
variables that were measured in these two tests (i.e., both treatments caused no 
changes in subjective knowledge, attitude, and behavioural intention). 
H06: The differences between the pre- and post-test scores on the dependent variables that 
were measured in both tests are the same for both treatment groups (i.e., the 
microworld caused no changes in subjective knowledge, attitude, and behavioural 
intention). 
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H07: The differences between the pre- and post-test scores for the dependent variables that 
were measured in both tests are the same for all stakeholder groups (i.e., stakeholder 
groups report the same changes in subjective knowledge, attitude, and behavioural 
intention independent from the treatment condition). 
 
5.2.7 Method of data analysis 
 
The data of the experiment are analysed in four steps. First, data of the “field pre-test” (i.e., 
the pilot-test) are analysed for its reliability. Second, pre-test data were analysed to check for 
initial differences between experimental and control group. This determines whether the 
random assignment of subjects to both experimental and control group has resulted in two 
initially “identical” groups in which all confounding variables are eliminated. Additionally, 
pre-test data are also analysed to shed light on the initial differences between stakeholder 
groups. Third, post-test data are analysed to determine the differences between stakeholder 
groups and experimental conditions after the experiment. Fourth, the differences between pre- 
and post-test are examined in order to determine changes due to the experiment in (1) 
subjective knowledge, (2) attitude and (3) behavioural intention towards commonly used 
policy instruments. 
 
For the pilot data, (1) subjective knowledge, (2) attitude towards policy instruments, (3) 
behavioural intention towards policy instruments, (4) attitude towards computers and (5) 
attitude towards computer simulation models were all normally distributed in the “test” 
sample of the test-retest procedure (i.e., first sample) following both Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 
(with Lilliefors significant correction) and Shapiro-Wilk W tests, respectively. For the retest 
data, very similar results are obtained for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D test (with Lilliefors 
significant correction). However, when the more powerful test of Shapiro-Wilk W is 
performed, attitude towards policy instruments is non-significant (W(15)=0.85, p<0.05). 
Additionally, the variance is equal for all five variables when comparing the test to the retest 
data. As a result of these statistics, the test-retest reliability is assessed through paired sample 
t-tests on (1) subjective knowledge, (2) behavioural intention towards policy instruments, (3) 
attitude towards computers, and (4) attitude towards computer simulation models. Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used for attitude towards policy instruments since normality cannot be 
assumed. Next, the internal consistency is assessed through computing Cronbach‟s Alphas for 
each construct. 
 
For the pre-test, this study visually inspects through crosstabs if the demographic 
characteristics for each stakeholder group is equal among experimental and control group. 
This study only allow visual inspections since chi-square cannot be calculated because some 
cells in this crosstab have expected counts less than five. Next, the correlations between each 
of the five constructs are investigated. Pearson‟s r is used on (1) subjective knowledge, (2) 
attitude towards policy instruments, (3) behavioural intention towards policy instruments, and 
(4) attitude towards computer simulation models since they are normally distributed. 
Kendall‟s tau is used for attitude toward computers since the K-S test is significant, 
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D(57)=0.13, p<.05. Based on the outcome of these correlations and the theoretical evaluation 
frameworks of both Huz et al. (1997) and Gröβler (2001), we perform a factorial ANOVA on 
subjective knowledge to test if the mean scores are significantly different between 
experimental conditions and stakeholder groups. A factorial ANOVA is appropriate because 
homogeneity of variances is assumed (F(5,51)=0.36, p=.88) and there is only doubt whether 
subjective knowledge for policymakers in the experimental group is normally distributed 
since D(13)=0.20, p=.15 but W(13)=0.83, p<.05. Hochberg‟s GT2 are used as post hoc tests 
because sample sizes differ. Next, attitude and behavioural intention towards policy 
instruments are analysed together through an MANOVA followed by separate (factorial) 
ANOVAs and Hochberg‟s GT2 post hoc tests. MANOVA is appropriate since (1) 
homogeneity of variances and (2) equality of covariance matrices (F(15,5084)=0.97, p=.48) 
are assumed and normality is only questioned for policymakers in the experimental condition 
since W(13)=0.91, p=.24 contrasts D(13)=0.24, p<.05. Finally, the same procedure is used to 
conjointly analyse attitude towards computer and computer simulation models. 
 
For the post-test data, the correlations between each of the seven constructs are first 
investigated to see (1) if correlations are similar to those found in the pre-test and (2) if 
multivariate or univariate data analysis techniques shall apply in further analysing the data. 
Pearson‟s r is used on (1) subjective knowledge, (2) attitude towards policy instruments, (3) 
behavioural intention towards policy instruments, (4) attitude towards the computer 
simulation model used and (5) perceived internal validity of the computer simulation model 
used, since they are all normally distributed. Kendall‟s tau is used for those who are not 
normally distributed: (1) learning about the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries 
system and (2) learning about how difficult it is to manage a fisheries system. Next, to analyse 
the subjective knowledge between stakeholder groups and experimental conditions, a factorial 
ANCOVA is first used with both ACOMP and ACSM as covariates. ANCOVA can be 
performed because (1) tests of normality were all non-significant and (2) homogeneity of 
variance is assumed (F(5,51)=1.13, p=.36). In addition, these two covariates can be used 
since the assumptions of (1) independence of the covariate and treatment and (2) homogeneity 
of regression slopes are both met. The first assumption was already tested through the 
MANOVA on the pre-test data of attitude towards computers and computer simulation 
models. The second assumption is tested through looking at the “independent 
variable*covariate”-interactions, all four of which are non-significant. After running the 
factorial ANCOVA, the results illustrate a non-significant effect for each of the two 
covariates, F(1,49)=0.01, p=.93 for ACOMP and F(1,49)=0.19, p=.67 for ACSM. In 
addition, since each covariate absorbs one degree of freedom, this study excludes the 
covariates from the analysis. As a result, this study ends up with running a factorial ANOVA 
on the post-test data for subjective knowledge with stakeholder group and experimental 
condition as the independent variables. 
 
To analyse the post-test data on the attitude and behavioural intentions toward policy 
instruments among stakeholder groups and experimental conditions, a MANCOVA is first 
performed with ACOMP as a covariates. In this MANCOVA, ACSM cannot be used as a 
covariate since the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes is violated by the 
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significant interaction between stakeholder group and ACSM (Pillai‟s trace, V=0.23, 
F(4,88)=0.93, p<.05). When running this MANCOVA, normality is assured and the variance 
among groups appears to be equal for both attitude (F(5,50)=1.38, p=.25) and behavioural 
intention towards policy instruments (F(5,50)=1.27, p=.29). However, the assumption about 
equality of covariance matrices is violated: F(15,3631)=2.65, p<0.01. The literature is not 
clear about what the implications of this violation are and which of the test statistics of 
MANCOVA is the most robust against this violation. As a result, this study will compare and 
take into account all four test statistics, i.e., Pillai‟s trace, Hotelling‟s trace, Wilks‟ lambda 
and Roy‟s largest root. Taking this complication into account, the result of this MANCOVA 
proves on all four test statistics that the covariate ACOMP has a non-significant effect on the 
statistical model (all four ps=.15). Because of this, and since this covariate accounts for one 
degree of freedom, the covariate is omitted from the statistical model. As a result, the attitude 
and behavioural intentions toward policy instruments among stakeholder groups and 
experimental conditions for the post-test data are analysed through a MANOVA instead of an 
MANCOVA. 
 
Last, Kruskal-Wallis tests are performed for the post-test data on (1) the attitude towards the 
used computer simulation model, (2) the perceived internal validity of the simulation model, 
(3) learning about the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries system, and (4) learning 
about how difficult it is to manage a fisheries system in an attempt to determine significant 
differences among stakeholder groups. Mann-Whitney U tests are the post hoc tests, all 
Bonferroni adjusted (α‟=0.02 since k=3 where k equals the number of stakeholder groups). 
Non-parametric tests are chosen because (1) tests for normality are often heavily violated, (2) 
data transformations do not work, and (3) sample sizes are small. 
 
The last step is to investigate the differences between pre- and post-test among stakeholder 
groups in a quest to determine changes in (1) subjective knowledge, (2) attitude and (3) 
behavioural intention towards policy instruments due to the experimental condition. The 
difference in subjective knowledge is originally analysed through a mixed design ANCOVA 
with both ACOMP and ACSM as covariates. A mixed design ANCOVA can be performed 
since (1) normality can only be slightly doubted for the pre-test data of the group of 
policymakers in the experimental group since D(13)=0.20, p=.15 but W(13)=0.83, p<.05, 
and (2) homogeneity of variance is assumed for both pre- and post-test data: F(5,50)=0.30, 
p=.91 and F(5,50)=1.23, p=.31, respectively. Additionally, ACOMP and ACSM can be used 
as covariates since the assumptions of (1) independence of the covariate and treatment and (2) 
homogeneity of regression slopes are both met. However, the results of this mixed design 
ANCOVA illustrate a non-significant effect for each of the two covariates on both “within-
subject variables” and “between-subject variables”. Since each covariate absorbs one degree 
of freedom, this study omits the covariates from the analysis resulting in a mixed design 
ANOVA with (1) “the state” of subjective knowledge in pre- and post-test as “within-subject 
variables” and (2) stakeholder group and experimental condition as “between-subject 
variables”. The analysis of both attitude and behavioural intention towards commonly used 
policy instruments follow the same approach. They also both start off with a mixed design 
ANCOVA and discover that or (1) the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes is not 
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met, or (2) the covariates do not have a significant effect on the statistical model. As a result, 
differences between pre-and post-test data for attitude and behavioural intention towards 
commonly used policy instruments are also analysed through mixed design ANOVAs. 
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Pilot testing the questionnaire for its reliability 
 
The paired sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistically prove that the developed 
questionnaire is reliable since (1) subjective knowledge, (2) attitude towards policy 
instruments, (3) behavioural intention towards policy instruments, (4) attitude towards 
computers, and (5) attitude towards computer simulation models do all not significantly differ 
between test and retest (Table 5.5). In addition, the Cronbach‟s Alphas for each of these 
constructs and for both test and retest data all range between “very satisfying” to “excellent” 
(Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5: Test-retest reliability and Cronbach‟s Alphas for the pilot test data 
 Test-retest reliability Cronbach's Alpha 
 Descriptive statistics Test 
statistic 
Sig. r Test 
(n=15) 
Re-test 
(n=15)  Test (n=15) Re-test (n=15) 
Subjective knowledgea 4.28 (1.40) 4.19 (1.05) t=0.378 .711 .10 .90 .67 
Attitude towards policy instrumentsb 4.64 4.50 z=0.201 .201 -.23 .86 .93 
Behavioural intention toward policy instrumentsa   4.27 (0.82) 4.50 (0.74) t=-2.132 .051 .50 .81 .84 
Attitude toward computersa 5.36 (0.87) 5.20 (1.03) t=0.763 .458 .20 .78 .87 
Attitude toward computer simulation modelsa 4.83 (0.84) 4.71 (0.90) t=0.786 .445 .21 .84 .77 
a: Paired sample t-test, descriptive statistics: Mean (St dev) 
b: Wilcoxon signed-rank test, descriptive statistic: Median 
(Source: Own data) 
 
5.3.2 Results of the pre-test data 
 
Table 5.6 reveals some slight differences in demographic characteristics. The ship owners and 
skippers in the experimental group are older compared to those in the control group and that 
the opposite is true for the policymakers. As a result, these two differences between 
experimental and control group should be taken into account when interpreting the results that 
follow.  
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Table 5.6: Demographic characteristics of the experimental and control group by stakeholder 
group (#subjects (%)) 
  Experimental group (n=29) Control group (n= 28) 
  Fishermen 
(n=6) 
Scientists 
(n=10) 
Policymakers 
(n=13) 
Fishermen  
(n=6) 
Scientists 
(n=10) 
Policymakers 
(n=12) 
Gender Male 6 (100%) 7 (70%) 12 (92.3%) 6 (100%) 6 (60%) 9 (75%) 
 Female 0 (0%) 3 (30%) 1 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 4 (40%) 3 (25%) 
Age <36 0 (0%) 7 (70%) 2 (15.4%) 0 (0%) 7 (70%) 7 (58.3) 
 36-45 1 (16.7%) 2 (20%) 2 (15.4%) 4 (66.7%) 1 (10%) 1 (8.3%) 
 >46 5 (83.3) 1 (10%) 9 (69.2%) 2 (33.3) 2 (20%) 4 (33.3%) 
(Source: Own data) 
 
Table 5.7 shows the correlations between each of the five constructs of the pre-test. There are 
only two highly significant and relatively strong correlations (indicated in bold). First, 
attitude is significantly and positively related to behavioural intention towards policy 
instruments, r=.55, p(two-tailed)<.01. Second, attitude towards computers is significantly and 
positively related to attitude towards computer simulation models, r=.44, p(two-tailed)<.01. 
Following the theoretical evaluation frameworks of both Huz et al. (1997) and Gröβler 
(2001), these correlations were expected and result in (1) a factorial ANOVA on subjective 
knowledge, (2) a MANOVA on both attitude and behavioural intention towards policy 
instruments, and (2) a MANOVA on both attitude towards computer and computer simulation 
models. 
 
Table 5.7: Correlations between each of the five constructs of the pre-test (n=57) (superscript 
“a” = “Pearson‟s r” and “b” = “Kendall‟s tau”) 
  SK
a
 APOINS
a
 BIPOINS
a
 ACOMP
b
 ACSM
a
 
SK 1.00 -.15 -.19 .17 .16 
APOINS  1.00 .55** -.14 .00 
BIPOINS   1.00 -.29* -.29* 
ACOMP    1.00 .44** 
ACSM     1.00 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
(Source: Own data) 
 
Table 5.8 summarises the descriptive statistics for the pre-test data. The factorial ANOVA on 
subjective knowledge unveils only a significant main effect of stakeholder group on 
subjective knowledge, F(2,51)=4.32, p<.05, partial η²=.15. Subsequent Hochberg‟s GT2 post 
hoc tests indicate that subjective knowledge is significantly lower for scientists (average of 
3.99) compared to policymakers (average of 5.15), both ps<.05. Subjective knowledge is not 
significantly different between the other stakeholder groups. The other main effect of 
experimental condition on subjective knowledge was non-significant (F(1,51)=0.01, p=.93, 
partial η²=0) as well as the interaction effect between stakeholder group and experimental 
condition (F(2,52)=0.73, p=.49, partial η²=.03). 
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Using Pillai‟s trace, the MANOVA on attitude and behavioural intention towards policy 
instruments only reveals a significant effect of stakeholder group on attitude and behavioural 
intention towards policy instruments, V=0.24, F(4,102)=3.39, p<.05. The experimental 
condition (V=0.01, F(2,50)=0.14, p=.87) and the interaction effect between stakeholder 
group and experimental condition (V=0.06, F(4,102)=0.75, p=.57) are both non-significant. 
Subsequently, separate univariate ANOVAs on both dependent variables with stakeholder 
group as the independent variable reveal only a significant effect on attitude towards policy 
instruments among the different stakeholder groups, F(2,54)=4.20, p<.05, η²=.14. As a result, 
behavioural intention towards policy instruments between stakeholder groups does not differ 
significantly, F(2,54)=0.24, p=.79, η²=.01. Finally, the Hochberg‟s GT2 post hoc tests reveal 
that policymakers have a significantly better attitude towards commonly used policy 
instruments on average (i.e., 4.46) than ship owners and skippers (i.e., 3.90). 
 
Finally, the MANOVA that analyses attitude towards computer and computer simulation 
models conjointly finds neither a significant effect of stakeholder group, nor of experimental 
condition on both attitude and behavioural intention towards computers and computer 
simulation models. Using Pillai‟s trace, the test statistics are respectively V=0.10, 
F(4,102)=1.36, p=.25 and V=0.05, F(2,50)=1.18, p=.32. The interaction effect between 
stakeholder group and experimental condition is also non-significant, V=0.10, F(4,102)=1.34, 
p=.26. 
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics of the pre-test data (Mean (St Dev)) 
 Experimental group (n=29) Control group (n= 28) 
 Fishermen 
(n=6) 
Scientists 
(n=10) 
Policymakers 
(n=13) 
Fishermen  
(n=6) 
Scientists 
(n=10) 
Policymakers 
(n=12) 
Subjective 
knowledge 
4.63 (1.36) 3.80 (1.13) 5.42 (1.26) 4.70 (1.37) 4.18 (1.49) 4.87 (1.28) 
Attitude towards 
policy instruments 
3.84 (0.94) 4.38 (0.45) 4.46 (0.46) 3.97 (0.57) 4.42 (0.73) 4.46 (0.43) 
Behavioural 
intention 
4.35 (1.20) 4.18 (0.63) 4.09 (.067) 4.29 (0.57) 4.15 (0.84) 4.51 (0.44) 
Attitude towards 
computers 
5.21 (1.32) 5.30 (0.69) 5.74 (0.50) 4.75 (0.89) 5.46 (0.60) 5.48 (0.80) 
Attitude towards 
computer simulation 
models 
4.90 (1.09) 4.66 (0.73) 5.35 (0.54) 4.97 (0.87) 5.36 (0.65) 5.04 (0.83) 
(Source: Own data) 
 
5.3.3 Results of the post test  
 
Table 5.9 contains the correlations between each of the seven constructs of the post-test. 
There are five highly significant and rather strong correlations (indicated in bold). First, 
attitude towards policy instruments is significantly and positively related to behaviour 
intention towards policy instruments, r=.65, p(two-tailed)<.01. This correlation is in line with 
the correlation found in the pre-test and therefore confirms the choice of MANOVA. Second, 
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the attitude towards the used simulation models is significantly and positively related to its 
perceived validity, r=.60, p(two-tailed)<.01. Third, both attitude towards the simulation 
model used and its perceived validity are significantly and positively related to learning from 
the use of the microworld about the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries system: 
r=.48, p(two-tailed)<.01 and r=.52, p(two-tailed)<.01, respectively. Finally, learning from 
the microworld about the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries system is 
significantly and positively correlated to learning from the microworld about how difficult it 
is to manage a fisheries system, r=.61, p(two-tailed)<.01. 
 
Table 5.9: Correlations between each of the five construct under research for the post-test data 
(superscript “a” = “Pearson‟s r” and “b”= „Kendall‟s tau”) 
  SKa APOINSa BIPOINSa AMODELa VALMODELa LEARNEFFb LEARNMANb 
SK 1.00 -.14 -.11 .03 .23 -.06 -.20 
APOINS  1.00 .65** .46* .25 .26 .20 
BIPOINS   1.00 .12 .09 -.02 -.06 
AMODEL    1.00 .60** .48** .29* 
VALMODEL     1.00 .52** .31* 
LEARNEFF      1.00 .61** 
LEARNMAN       1.00 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
(Source: Own data) 
 
Table 5.10 summarises the descriptive statistics for the post-test data. The factorial ANOVA 
on subjective knowledge unveils only a significant main effect of stakeholder group on 
subjective knowledge, F(2,51)=6.58, p<0.01, partial η²=.21. Subsequent Hochberg‟s GT2 
post hoc tests indicate that subjective knowledge is significantly lower for scientists (average 
3.63) compared to both policymakers (average 4.81) (p<.01) and ship owners and skippers 
(average 4.93) (p<.05). The subjective knowledge is not significantly different between 
policymakers and ship owners and skippers (p=.99). The other main effect of experimental 
condition (F(1,51)=0.83, p=.37, partial η²=.02) and the interaction between stakeholder 
group and experimental condition (F(2,51)=0.70, p=.50, partial η²=.03) are both non-
significant.  
 
The results of the MANOVA on the attitude and behavioural intentions toward policy 
instruments among stakeholder groups and experimental conditions are all non-significant 
based on all four test statistics (i.e., Pillai‟s trace, Hotelling‟s trace, Wilks‟ lambda and Roy‟s 
largest root). To illustrate this yet remain concise, this study only gives the Pillai‟s trace 
statistics: (1) V=0.11, F(4,100)=1.44, p=.23 for stakeholder group, (2) V=0.03, 
F(2,49)=0.79, p=.46 for experimental condition, and (3) V=0.07, F(4,100)=0.87, p=.49 for 
the interaction  effect. However, taking into account the violation of the assumption on 
equality of covariance matrices (F(15,3631)=2.65, p<0.01), one should interpret these 
findings with caution. Nevertheless, even if statistical differences were overlooked, these 
differences would only be marginally relevant because all group means are closely situated 
around 4.5 for both attitude and behavioural intentions toward policy instruments. 
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests for (1) attitude towards the computer simulation model 
(H(2)=0.91, p=.63, η²=.03), (2) perceived internal validity of the simulation model 
(H(2)=4.53, p=.10, η²=.16), (3) learning about the effect policy instruments have on the 
fisheries system (H(2)=1.43, p=.49, η²=.05), and (4) learning about how difficult it is to 
manage a fisheries system (H(2)=3.26, p=.20, η²=.12) were all non-significant. As a result, 
all stakeholder groups have the same positive attitude towards the used computer simulation 
model (overall median: 5.25) and all stakeholder groups perceive the internal validity of the 
simulation model as medium-high (overall median: 4.56). Finally, they also reported that they 
all have learned the same high amount (1) about the effect policy instruments have on the 
fisheries system (overall median: 7.00), and (2) about how difficult it is to manage a fisheries 
system (overall median: 7.00). 
 
Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics of the post-test data (Mean (St Dev) or Median) 
 Experimental group (n=29) Control group (n= 28) 
 Fishermen 
(n=6) 
Scientists 
(n=10) 
Policymakers 
(n=13) 
Fishermen  
(n=6) 
Scientists 
(n=10) 
Policymakers 
(n=12) 
Subjective 
knowledge 
5.33 (0.73) 3.52 (1.10) 4.97 (1.00) 4.53 (1.32) 3.74 (1.49) 4.63 (1.36) 
Attitude towards 
policy instruments 
4.14 (1.00) 4.47 (0.61) 4.53 (0.54) 4.23 (0.74) 4.52 (0.80) 4.46 (0.58) 
Behavioural 
intention 
4.74 (1.13) 4.50 (0.67) 4.35 (0.64) 4.25 (0.52) 4.50 (0.97) 4.38 (0.44) 
Attitude towards the 
used model 
5.44 4.94 5.50    
Perceived internal 
validity of the model 
4.94 4.91 4.38    
Learning about 
effects policy 
instruments have on 
the fisheries system 
6.50 7.00 7.00    
Learning about how 
difficult it is to 
manage fisheries 
systems 
7.00 8.00 7.00    
(Source: Own data) 
 
5.3.4 Differences between pre-and post-test 
 
The mixed design ANOVA on subjective knowledge unveils no significant differences 
between pre-and post-test data (F(1,51)=1.45, p=.23, partial η²=.03) even when taking into 
account the interaction with (1) stakeholder group (F(2,51)=2.41, p=.10, partial η²=.09), (2)  
experimental condition (F(1,51)=1.28, p=.26, partial η²=.03), and (3) both of them 
(F(2,51)=1.59, p=.22, partial η²=.06). Next, the main effect of experimental condition was 
also non-significant (F(1,51)=0.27, p=.61, partial η²=.01), but the main effect of stakeholder 
group was highly significant (F(2,51)=5.75, p<.01, partial η²=.18). Subsequent Hochberg‟s 
GT2 post hoc tests indicate that the subjective knowledge of scientist (average of 3.81) was 
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significantly lower compared to policymakers (average of 4.98) (p<.01) but not compared to 
ship owners and skippers (average of 4.80) (p<.10). Policymakers and ship owners and 
skippers did not significantly differ (p=.96). Finally, the interaction between stakeholder 
group and experimental condition was non-significant, F(2,51)=0.60, p=.55, partial η²=.02. 
 
The mixed design ANOVA on attitude towards policy instruments unveils a significant 
difference between pre-and post-test data, F(1,51)=5.93, p<.05, partial η²=.10. As a result, 
attitude towards policy instruments was slightly lower in the pre-test (average 4.32) compared 
to the post-test (average 4.43). The interaction of this effect with (1) stakeholder group 
(F(2,51)=1.52, p=.23, partial η²=.06), (2)  experimental condition (F(1,51)=0.09, p=.77, 
partial η²=0), and (3) both stakeholder group and experimental condition (F(2,51)=0.05, 
p=.95, partial η²=0) were all non-significant. The main effects of stakeholder group and 
experimental condition were both non-significant, respectively F(2,51)=2.30, p=.11, partial 
η²=.09 and  F(1,51)=0.06, p<.81, partial η²=0. Lastly, the interaction between stakeholder 
group and experimental condition was also non-significant, F(2,51)=0.06, p=.94, partial 
η²=0. 
 
Finally, the mixed design ANOVA on behavioural intention towards policy instruments 
unveils a significant difference between pre-and post-test data, F(1,50)=5.66, p<.05, partial 
η²=.10. As a result, attitude towards policy instruments was lower in the pre-test (average 
4.25) compared to the post-test (average 4.44). The interaction of this effect with (1) 
stakeholder group (F(2,50)=2.13, p=.13, partial η²=.08), (2)  experimental condition 
(F(1,50)=2.02, p=.16, partial η²=.04), and (3) both stakeholder group and experimental 
condition (F(2,51)=1.12, p=.33, partial η²=.04) were all non-significant. Next, the main 
effects of stakeholder group and experimental condition were both non-significant, 
respectively F(2,50)=0.16, p=.86, partial η²=.01 and  F(1,50)=0.10, p<.76, partial η²=0. 
Finally, the interaction between stakeholder group and experimental condition was also non-
significant, F(2,50)=0.79, p=.46, partial η²=.03. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
For many years, there has been a dearth of well-structured evaluation research that tackles the 
research question whether any valuable “learning” takes place from the use of microworlds 
(Akili, 2007; Bakken et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2008; Cavaleri et al., 1997; Gosen et al., 2004; 
Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Huz et al., 1997; Raia, 1966; Sweeney et al., 2000; 
Tonks et al., 1997; Wolfe, 1976). This study starts to remedy this lack by investigating if 
actual decision makers learn from using microworlds. We use the Belgian fisheries system as 
a case study using an existing microworld that allows stakeholders to learn about the effects 
policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. Learning is measured through 
learning criteria drawn from the evaluation frameworks of Huz et al. (1997) and Gröβler 
(2001) and applied to the case of Belgian fisheries. This study tests the influence a 
microworld has on stakeholder‟s (policymakers, scientists and ship owners and skippers) 
subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention about commonly used policy 
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instruments in Belgium using a “before-after with control group”-experimental design. In 
addition, this study also compares the attitude of stakeholders towards the microworld used as 
well as their perceived internal validity of the microworld. Finally, the study compares if 
stakeholders have reported differences in learning from the microworld about (1) the impact 
policy instruments have on fisheries systems, and about (2) how difficult it is to manage 
fishery systems. 
 
The results of the analysis on the pre-test data addressed the first two hypotheses listed in 
Table 5.11. Only small differences were found in the age structure of participants between 
experimental and control group. More importantly, however, there were no significant 
differences discovered between those two groups on (1) subjective knowledge, attitude and 
behavioural intention towards policy instruments; and (2) attitude towards computers and 
computer simulation models. As a result, the first hypothesis is accepted. This implies that the 
two randomly selected treatment groups were initially equal. Further analysis on the pre-test 
data discovered that subjective knowledge was significantly higher for policymakers 
compared to scientists. In addition, they had also a significantly better attitude towards policy 
instruments compared to ship owners and skippers. Consequently, the second hypothesis is 
rejected. Next, the results of the analysis on the post-test data addressed the third and fourth 
hypothesis. These results accept the third hypothesis: the two treatment groups did not differ 
significantly on subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention towards policy 
instruments after being exposed to the experimental treatments. The fourth hypothesis is 
rejected since subjective knowledge was after the experiment significantly lower for scientists 
compared to both (1) policymakers and (2) ship owners and skippers. Finally, results of the 
analyses on the differences between pre- and post-test addressed the last three hypotheses. 
These results reveal no significant differences between pre-and post-test for subjective 
knowledge. However, both attitude and behavioural intention toward policy instruments were 
slightly lower in the pre-test compared to the post-test. Consequently, hypothesis five is 
rejected. Both treatments (even the treatment in the control group which was not relevant) 
caused changes in stakeholder‟s attitude and behavioural intention. This could be due to the 
Hawthorn effect, although this seems highly unlikely since the experiment was “disguised” 
(Christensen, 1997: 294) and informal contact with the participants after the experiment 
confirmed that they had no idea that they were participating in an experiment. Next, this study 
found no differences due to the experimental condition between subjective knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention towards policy instruments when taking pre-and post-test 
into account. As a result, differences in attitude and behavioural intention could not be 
attributed to the use of the microworld. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is accepted. Finally, 
when taking pre-and post-test into account, the seventh hypothesis is rejected since the 
subjective knowledge of scientists was significantly lower compared to policymakers. 
Policymakers and ship owners and skippers did not significantly differ. 
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Table 5.11: Summary of the outcomes for the hypotheses 
Hypothesis Accepted or 
rejected 
H01: There will be no differences in pre-test scores between the two treatment groups (i.e., 
the two randomly selected treatment groups will be equal). 
Accepted 
H02: There will be no differences in pre-test scores between the different stakeholder groups 
(i.e., all stakeholder groups are initially the same related to the dependent variables). 
Rejected 
H03: For the dependent variables that were measured in both experimental treatments, there 
will be no differences in the post-test scores between the two treatment groups (i.e., the 
two groups will (still) be equal after having played with the microworld). 
Accepted 
H04: There will be no differences in post-test scores between the different stakeholder 
groups (i.e., all stakeholder groups are (still) the same related to the dependent 
variables after having played with the microworld). 
Rejected 
H05: There will be no differences between pre- and post-test scores for the dependent 
variables that were measured in these two tests (i.e., both treatments caused no changes 
in subjective knowledge, attitude, and behavioural intention). 
Rejected 
H06: The differences between the pre- and post-test scores on the dependent variables that 
were measured in both tests are the same for both treatment groups (i.e., the 
microworld caused no changes in subjective knowledge, attitude, and behavioural 
intention). 
Accepted 
H07: The differences between the pre- and post-test scores for the dependent variables that 
were measured in both tests are the same for all stakeholder groups (i.e., stakeholder 
groups report the same changes in subjective knowledge, attitude, and behavioural 
intention independent from the treatment condition). 
Rejected 
(Source: Own compilation) 
 
This research indicates that using the microworld did not result in changes in participants‟ 
subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention towards commonly used policy 
instruments in Belgian fisheries management. This outcome contradicts all stakeholders‟ 
reports that they had learned from the microworld about the effect policy instruments have on 
the fisheries system and that they had confidence in the microworld and perceived the 
microworld to be valid. As such, alternative explanations for these results need to be 
considered. Three alternative explanations for this outcome are worth discussing: (1) 
methodological issues made it impossible to detect changes in participant‟s subjective 
knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention, or (2) the way in which the microworld was 
administered did not result in changes in participant‟s subjective knowledge, attitude and 
behavioural intention, or (3) participants have not “learned” anything new from the 
microworld and therefore no changes in participant‟s subjective knowledge, attitude and 
behavioural intention occurred. Let‟s discuss each of these possible explanations in more 
details in an attempt to determine which of these is most plausible. 
 
Although this study has paid extensive attention to methodology compared to most other 
similar studies, there still remain methodological limitations that could have jeopardised the 
detection of any actual change in subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention. 
The first and perhaps most important limitation is the questionable testing of the validity of 
the questionnaires. Although the measurement scales in these questionnaires were derived or 
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even literally borrowed from the peer reviewed literature and tested for their reliability, it is 
possible that these scales were not sensitive enough to discover subtle changes in subjective 
knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention. In addition, applying structural equations 
modelling next to the test-retest reliability and the Cronbach‟s Alphas could have confirmed 
the validity of these questionnaires more thoroughly. However, the small sample size would 
have made this difficult, if not impossible. As such, future research on assessing learning 
from microworlds, at least the ones with sufficiently large sample sizes, should test all 
dimensions of the validity of their questionnaires through structural equations modelling. 
Second, and also next in order of importance, is that this study (subjectively) measured 
learning from microworlds through a questionnaire which may not have measured the real 
learning effect (Ely et al., 2007; Gentry et al., 1998; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; 
Pfahl et al., 2004) (i.e., questionable construct validity) . A third methodological limitation of 
this study could have been its small sample size. Cowles (1974) suggests that if an analyses of 
variance design with several levels of the dependent variable is being used, then fifteen 
participants per group (i.e., cell in crosstab) is recommended. Many previous studies have 
also encountered the problem of small sample sizes (e.g.: Cavaleri et al., 1997; Drappa et al., 
2000; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Hung, 2008; Huz et al., 1997; Pfahl et al., 2001; 
Pfahl et al., 2004; Sindre et al., 2009). But the Belgian fishing industry is small and larger 
sample sizes are difficult to obtain. In addition, performing rigidly controlled experiments on 
large samples, especially when using computers, is not only expensive but also difficult (hard 
to guarantee strict control), if not impossible. Nevertheless, in an attempt to collect more data, 
the authors of this study have a request pending to replicate this study within the European 
Commission. A fourth, fifth and sixth limitation lie within the nature of the “before-after with 
control group”-design. Although such a design has a lot of strengths compared to other true 
experimental designs, it has a major disadvantage: the “pre-test effect” (Christensen, 1997: 
486). As a result, participants could have remembered what they have answered in the pre-test 
and stuck to these pre-test answers in the post-test rather than reconsider their answers based 
on the learning activity in between. Similar studies (e.g.: Sindre et al., 2009) have also 
considered this as a possible explanation for not detecting a learning effect in their studies. 
However, this study has tried to limit the “pre-test effect” by clearly indicating in the post-test 
questionnaire, and even in its individual measurement scales, that is was legitimate to change 
answers compared to the pre-test. Besides this pre-test effect, a “before-after with control 
group”-design can also not control for “intra-group difference” (Christensen, 1997). However, 
the latter has been limited through isolating the participants from each other during the 
experiment as much as possible. Nevertheless, in the experimental group of the scientists, a 
dominant figure repeatedly distorted the scientific integrity of the experiment through making 
his personal opinions known. However, the results of this group were not significantly 
different from the observations in the other sessions. Hence, it remains unclear to what extent 
these personal opinions hypothecated the results of this study. A last limitation of the “before-
after with control group”-design is that it cannot completely control for “confounding user 
characteristics” (Größler, 2001: 14) (e. g., participant‟s motivation, their expertise in working 
with computers, their general intelligence etc.) either. However, this study has partly dealt 
with these confounding user characteristics by (1) a successful random assignment of 
participants to the experimental and control group, and (2) including two of these potentially 
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confounding user characteristics as covariates (i.e., attitude towards (1) computers and (2) 
computer simulation models) in our analyses. Nevertheless, complete control over these 
confounding user characteristics is impossible and is a problem for all evaluation studies 
based on experiments (Größler, 2004). An seventh limitation could have been that the small 
differences which were found in the age structure of the participants between experimental 
and control group may have jeopardised the results of this study. However, this is highly 
unlikely since there were no significant differences discovered between those two groups on 
(1) subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention towards policy instruments; and 
(2) attitude towards computers and computer simulation models before the actual experiment 
started. An eighth limitation could have been that participants were insufficiently motivated 
by the monetary incentives, in this case the iPods. Consequently, participants may have not 
put much effort into the tasks related to the experiment (Sweeney et al., 2000). Perhaps this 
study should have used real monetary incentives proportionally to each participant‟s 
performance in the experiment (Smith, 1982). However, studies have encountered conflicting 
evidence about the value monetary incentives have when investigating learning from 
microworlds (Camerer et al., 1999; Sweeney et al., 2000). In fact, monetary incentive could 
also have blocked learning through the phenomenon of “competitive gaming”. This refers to 
the process in which learning becomes subordinate to winning due to competition. People 
want to be the winner of the competition and as such, learning becomes only a by-product (De 
Geus, 1997). Hence, it is not clear what the effect of our monetary incentives were on learning 
from our microworld. Nevertheless, we included them since there is still stronger evidence in 
favour of including such incentives in the experimental design instead of not including them 
(e.g.: Camerer et al., 1999). Last but far from least is the limited amount of time participants 
were able to play with the microworld (Sweeney et al., 2000). Perhaps a one hour 
introduction to the microworld was insufficient to result in changes in subjective knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention. This discussion brings us to the second potential 
explanation of the failure in detecting differences between subjective knowledge, attitude and 
behavioural intention: perhaps the way in which we have administered the microworld to the 
participants could not have had resulted in changes in participant‟s subjective knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention. 
 
This potential explanation is highly interesting. The administration of the microworlds needs 
to be “realistic”, meaning that one should administer the microworld to the participants as if it 
were not for an experiment. In addition, the duration of letting the participants play with the 
microworlds also contains a “dangerous” hidden trade-off in an experimental design. On the 
one hand, participants need to be exposed long enough to the microworld to allow them to 
play and learn from it. As a result, the probability that learning occurs from the microworld is 
increased when extending the time participants can play with the microworld. However, on 
the other hand, prolonging the time participants can play with the microworlds also prolongs 
the duration of the whole experiment. This results in an increased probability of inaccurately 
measuring learning, since higher error rates may occur when filling out the post-test due, for 
instance, to the increased fatigue of the participants (Christensen, 1997; Gresse von 
Wangenheim et al., 2009; Größler, 2004). Although one can counter with the argument that 
such problems are controlled through using a control group, they can still make it impossible 
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to detect a potential learning effect since an increased error rate mostly results in increased 
variation in the data which makes it often impossible to statistically discover actual existing 
differences between treatment groups (i.e., type II error in statistics (Field, 2009)). Therefore, 
as a result of this trade-off, this study chooses to administer the microworld to the participants 
for about one hour (i.e. similar to Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009 and; Sindre et al., 
2009 who administered the model for respectively 100 and 90 min). One hour was seen as a 
good compromise. Additionally, it was also seen as a realistic proxy of the time stakeholders 
would have played with the microworld in a non-experimental setting. Nevertheless, it 
remains highly possible that the participants did not have enough time to play. Similar studies 
(e.g.: Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Sweeney et al., 2000) also questioned the short 
duration of the administration of their microworld to the participants when learning effects 
were not detected. Additionally, some of these studies (e.g.: Cavaleri et al., 1997; Gresse von 
Wangenheim et al., 2009; Warren et al., 1999) also question whether playing the microworld 
once is sufficient to result in significant learning effects since it is difficult to change the 
deeply held mental models (i.e., a person‟s “deeply held internal images of how the world 
works” (Senge, 1990: 174), which also contains the attitudes and beliefs (Cavaleri et al., 
1997)) that drive behaviour. Hence, it may be possible that participants will only benefit from 
repeated exposure to different sessions. 
 
Other ways in which the microworld could have been administered should also be discussed. 
In fact, similar studies in which the participants (although often students) could only play with 
the microworld came to similar conclusions of participants not learning from the microworld. 
In a recent study, Gresse von Wangenheim et al. (2009: 443) concluded that “although most 
participants subjectively believe that playing the game helped them to learn, results from the 
statistical tests do not support these subjective evaluations”. Similarly, Pfahl et al. (2001: 284) 
concluded that “just running a simulation model as a black box may not be sufficient to have 
people gain insights into the software development process, and accept to alter their mental 
model” whereas Drappa et al. (2000: 207) concluded that “just playing is not enough, because 
the students are not able to understand the reasons why they have failed”. A number of other 
studies have also failed to find learning effects from simulation models (e.g.: Cameron et al., 
2005; Ellis et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 1991). As a result, scientific communities are currently 
still discussing how microworlds should be used or designed in an attempt to allow decision 
makers to learn from them. Many options are possible, which leads to unstructured research 
(Wolfe, 1976). For instance, one group of studies (e.g.: Langley, 1995; Langley et al., 2004; 
Sengupta et al., 1993a; Sengupta et al., 1993b) focuses on extending the microworld with 
cognitive feedback and feedforward as a valuable attempt to make learning possible from 
microworlds. The user-friendly interface, for instance, should make key linkages between 
policy choices and outcomes explicit. It should illustrate how causal mechanisms operate in 
the simulation model. Others (e.g.: Langley et al., 1996; McCormack et al., 1998) have 
investigated the importance of running the microworlds in the policy development mode 
(“continuous simulation”, sometimes called “simulation”) versus the dynamic decision-
making mode (“stepwise simulation”, sometimes called “gaming”) but could not prove that 
one is superior to the other. Again others (e.g.: Terek et al., 1999) have investigated the 
impact of different predefined performance goals in playing the microworld on learning from 
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microworlds. These studies found that the way these predefine goals are set resulted in 
different learning effects. A final group of studies, and perhaps the most promising one of 
them all, claim that “learning” and therefore the main benefit of microworld lies within the 
model building and thus not within the application of an existing microworld (Lane, 1995; 
Pfahl et al., 2004). As such they believe that if decision makers have to learn from a 
microworld, then they need to be actively involved from the beginning of the modelling 
process (Pfahl et al., 2004). As such, they are the advocates of group model building (e.g.: 
Rouwette et al., 2002; Vennix, 1990; Vennix, 1996). However, the downside to group model 
building is that it requires a vast amount of different resources (skills, time, money, etc.). 
Hence, most modelling exercises still do not follow the principles of group model building 
(see Andersen et al. (1997)). Consequently, future research on learning from microworlds 
should not focus too heavily on learning from microworlds in group model building 
processes. 
 
The final alternative explanation of why this study was unable to detect changes in subjective 
knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention is that participants may have not “learned” 
anything new from the microworld and therefore did not change their subjective knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention compared to the pre-test (Sindre et al., 2009). It could be 
that the microworld only confirmed what they already knew about the impact policy 
instruments have on the fisheries system and therefore did not change their subjective 
knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention towards these policy instruments. As such, the 
microworld was perhaps too simple or the participants already had an accurate idea of the 
effect policy instruments have on the Belgian fisheries system. However, studies (e.g.: Raia, 
1966) have clearly indicated that simple microworlds provided essentially the same learning 
benefits as relatively more complex ones. Hence, learning is most likely not directly 
proportional to the degree of complexity of the microworld. Alternatively, it is also possible 
that participants only enriched their ideas rather than revising them, which led to no change in 
their subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention towards these policy 
instruments  (Pala et al., 2005; Vosniadou, 1994). Another possibility is that the participants‟ 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1976) could have blocked actual learning from the microworld 
(Sweeney et al., 2000: 251). Finally, it may also be the case that learning will only take place 
later when the participants reflect on the microworld in response to exposure to information 
regarding fisheries management strategies in the real world. 
 
However, all of these alternative explanations miss the most obvious interpretation of them 
all: perhaps the participants simply didn‟t learn anything from the microworld, despite having 
reported the opposite. Perhaps the microworld was too difficult, too dynamically complex (or 
too boring) for learning to occur  (Pfahl et al., 2004). In such cases, “trail-and-error gaming” 
(Größler, 2004) can become more attractive even if monetary incentives are used to limit such 
behaviour. Other studies have come to the conclusion that participants frequently applied only 
relatively simple and unsophisticated problem-solving and decision-making techniques and 
that more attention was devoted to reacting to events than planning for them (Wolfe, 1975b). 
Research also suggests that individuals often do not make effective use of the “control” 
provided by simulation- or, even more broadly, technology-based trainings (Bell et al., 2002; 
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DeRouin et al., 2004; Reeves, 1993). Participants frequently do not accurately assess their 
current knowledge level or devote enough effort to training, and make poor decisions like 
skip over important learning opportunities (Brown, 2001; Ely et al., 2007). Drappa et al. 
(2000) came to similar conclusions and even found that participants commit the same 
mistakes over and over again. Hence, participants did not reflect on the details of their game-
performance and neither did they take the effort to analyse these results. 
 
This brings us to discuss more fundamental questions like whether “experience is the best 
teacher” (Wolfe, 1975a: 450). Although this seems obvious in many cases, Wolfe et al. 
(1975a) reports that experiential learning is so unstructured that knowledge gained from 
experience may be fragmentary and haphazard. Additionally, they conclude that “there is no 
assurance that the student learns the „right‟ thing” (Wolfe, 1975a: 450). As a result, it may be 
true that microworlds do not work on their own, meaning that there probably needs to be 
some structuring of the participants‟ interactions with the microworld to obtain (or increase) 
learning effects (Bell et al., 2008; Wolfe, 1975a). This greater learner control may be an 
important challenge facing simulation-based training designs since it seems important to 
identify effective guidance and support strategies for learning that can be embedded in the 
design of simulation-based training (Bell et al., 2008; Cannon-Bowers et al., 2009; Wolfe, 
1975a). Reid et al. (2003), for instance, argue that learners need three types of support when 
handling microworlds. The first is “interpretive support”, which helps learners analyse the 
problem and activate relevant prior knowledge. The second is “experimental support” which 
helps learners engage in meaningful discovery learning activities. The final form of support is 
“reflective support”, which increases learners‟ awareness of the discovery processes and helps 
them integrate those discovered rules and principles. Nevertheless, future research is needed 
to further determine the type of guidance that is most effective and how to embed guidance 
naturally into simulations so that it is not disruptive (Cannon-Bowers et al., 2009). However, 
many researchers believe that guidance alone is not sufficient. They advocate that the true 
value of microworlds lies within its capability to rehearse and visualise strategies (Morecroft, 
1999) so they can be brought into debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984) among people. In 
our case, this could mean that microworlds could allow policymakers to better illustrate the 
implications of different policy strategies to other stakeholder groups, whereas these other 
stakeholder groups will see the difficulties encountered when managing fisheries more 
clearly. Hence, a better mutual understanding of the problems in fisheries policy could 
emerge from debate and discussion among the stakeholder groups of the fisheries system, 
resulting in changing attitudes toward policy systems. Consequently, high-order learning (i.e., 
changes in attitude and behaviour) may only occur through debating and discussing the results 
from the microworld within and between stakeholder groups. This idea is backed by Dill‟s et 
al. (1963) finding that students remember what they have learn from the interactions with 
other people more vividly than what they have learn from playing with the microworld. 
Hence, it seems that a form of human interaction, and not only guidance, is required in 
learning from microworlds (Bell et al., 2008). There are even researchers who go one step 
further and believe that a certain form of “classroom atmosphere” needs to be created for 
learning to take place in which the interactions among trainees and between trainees and 
trainers stands central. It is their belief that the kind of “learning community” offered by 
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traditional, face-to-face instruction is essential for learning (Katz, 1999; Webster et al., 1997). 
Nevertheless, advocates of the naturalistic decision-making movement argue the opposite. 
They claim that it is exactly this often unfamiliar and unrealistic “classroom atmosphere” 
which limits learning (Sweeney et al., 2000). They believe people can perform well in 
familiar, naturalistic settings yet poorly on the same type of task in unfamiliar laboratory or 
training settings. Last, as already mentioned above, some researchers believe that the most 
effective way (and perhaps the only way) people learn from microworlds is when they are 
involved from the beginning of the modelling process in the form of group model building 
sessions. 
 
In any case, the research presented here is a first step in contributing to evaluating learning 
from microworlds. This study cannot conclude that decision makers actually learn from 
microworlds. More work is needed to fully realise the potential of microworlds in learning 
processes, yet researchers are left with little guidance on how to develop an effective 
“learning system” as the factors that influence the effectiveness of simulation-based training 
remain unclear (Bell et al., 2008; Warren et al., 1999). Perhaps the most valuable guideline is 
to not only test “features” of microworlds on learning outcomes, but also to test which 
characteristics of the “users” and the “situation” (i.e., learning environment) determines these 
learning outcomes (Bell et al., 2008; Größler, 2004). To be more effective, this kind of 
evaluation research should apply “before-after with control group”-designs in which the 
experimental group only differs from the control group by exactly one characteristic of the 
microworld, users or situation (Größler, 2001; Pfahl et al., 2004). It should also adopt a 
“process-based approach” (Bell et al., 2008) in which it aims to providing insights into the 
actual processes or mechanisms that explain learning effects from microworlds. Finally, 
future studies should also focus on replication, as studies have indicated the need for such 
replications because evaluation research often deals with low sample sizes (e.g.: Cavaleri et 
al., 1997; Drappa et al., 2000; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Hung, 2008; Huz et al., 
1997; Pfahl et al., 2001; Pfahl et al., 2004; Sindre et al., 2009). Although such scientific 
research is often viewed as less valuable, the authors believe it is the only way to yield more 
generalised results in the future. We intend to replicate our experiment at the European 
Commission in an attempt to validate our findings and improve its external validity. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This study addressed the research question of whether any valuable “learning” takes place 
from the use of microworlds. Moreover, it took the opportunity to investigate if actual 
decision makers learn from using microworlds. For this, the Belgian fisheries was chosen as a 
case study and three stakeholder groups (policymakers, scientists and ship owners and 
skippers) were invited to participate in a “before-after with control group”-experiment which 
indicates that using the microworld did not result in changes in participant‟s subjective 
knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention towards commonly used policy instruments in 
Belgian fisheries policy. This outcome contradicts the reports from all stakeholders groups 
where they state that they had learned from the microworld about the effect policy 
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instruments have on the fisheries system and that they had confidence in the microworld and 
perceived its behaviour as valid. Alternative explanations for these results were discussed, 
being: (1) methodological issues made it impossible to detect changes in participant‟s 
subjective knowledge, attitude and behavioural intention, (2) the way in which the 
microworld was administered did not result in changes in participant‟s subjective knowledge, 
attitude and behavioural intention, or (3) participants have not learned anything new from the 
microworld and therefore no changes in participant‟s subjective knowledge, attitude and 
behavioural intention occurred. 
 
However, all these alternative explanations ignore the most obvious one: participants perhaps 
did not learn anything from the microworld, even though participants reported the opposite. 
This calls the notion of  “experience is the best teacher” (Wolfe, 1975a: 450) into question, 
since experiential learning is so unstructured that knowledge gained from experience may be 
fragmentary and haphazard. Hence, there probably needs to be some structuring of the 
participants‟ interactions with the microworld to obtain (or increase) learning effects (Bell et 
al., 2008; Wolfe, 1975a). However, guidance alone is perhaps not sufficient since it seems 
that a form of human interaction in the form of debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984) is 
required in learning from microworlds. There are even researchers who go one step further 
and believe that a certain form of “classroom atmosphere” or “learning community” is 
essential for learning (Katz, 1999; Webster et al., 1997). Finally, most advocates of group 
model building (e.g.: Rouwette et al., 2002; Vennix, 1990; Vennix, 1996) go still even further 
and state that group model building is the most effective, if not the only, way to learn from 
microworlds. 
 
In any case, the research presented here is a first contribution to evaluating learning from 
microworlds. This study cannot conclude that decision makers learn from playing in 
microworlds. This suggests that more work is needed to fully realise the potential of 
microworlds in learning processes, yet researchers are left with little guidance on how to 
develop an effective “learning system” as the factors that influence the effectiveness of 
simulation-based training remain unclear (Bell et al., 2008). Perhaps the most valuable 
guideline for future evaluation research is to start to apply “before-after with control group”-
designs in which the experimental group only differs from the control group by exactly one 
characteristic of the microworld, users or environmental context (Größler, 2001; Pfahl et al., 
2004). It should also start adopting a “process-based approach” (Bell et al., 2008) in which it 
aims to provide insights into the actual processes or mechanisms that explain learning effects 
from microworlds. 
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5.7 Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Pre-test questionnaires of the experimental group 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Thanks for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. This questionnaire aims to determine your knowledge of 
commonly used policy instruments in Belgian fisheries, as well as your attitude toward them and your behaviour 
in relation to these instruments. Please answer these questions completely and truthfully. We guarantee that your 
answers will be treated anonymously and that only aggregated data will be included in reports and publications. 
 
NOTE!: Many questions refer to the terms „fisheries system‟, „policy instruments‟ and „sub fleet‟. 
 
 The term „fisheries system‟ includes (i) the Belgian fishing fleet and its overall performance, (ii) fish 
stocks, and (iii) governmental issues (both national and European) concerning fisheries. 
 The term „policy instruments‟ refers to the group of instruments policy maker can use to manage the 
Belgian fisheries system. This group of instruments consists of (1) total quota, (2) the allocation of the 
total quota over Belgian's five sub fleets, (3) maximum fishing days per vessel, (4) maximum catch per 
fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) investment subsidies, and (8) fuel subsidies and 
taxes. 
 The term „sub fleet‟ means a grouping of vessels with similar vessel characteristics, fishing method and 
target species. 
 
Your personal characteristics 
 
Your gender: 
Male 
 
Female 
 
 
Your age: 
0-25 
 
26-35 
 
36-45 
 
46-55 
 
56-65 
 
65+ 
 
 
Your work : Owner or captain of a boat  
ILVO  
The Department of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Flemish Government  
The Cabinet of the Flemish Government in charge of sea fisheries  
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the EU  
Cabinet of Commissioner Joe Borg  
De Redercentrale  
 
Your knowledge about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries system. 
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
I know pretty much about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not feel very knowledgeable about the effects policy instruments have on the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Among my close colleagues, I am one of the “experts” on assessing the effects of 
policy instruments on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to most other people, I know less about the effect policy instruments 
have on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When it comes to the impact policy instruments have on the fisheries system, I 
really do not know a lot. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your attitude towards policy instruments. 
For each proposition, four pairs of adjectives are given. Please circle the number for each pair of adjectives 
that best reflects your opinion about the proposition. 
Limiting total catches of a fleet through total quota is …………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Dividing total quota over sub fleets is …………………………………………………………....... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Useful  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Limiting the number of fishing days per vessel is ……………….……….…………………..….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Limiting the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land is …………………….………………..... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Limiting the amount of vessels in a fleet through licences is …………………………………….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Decommissioning fees are ………………......................................................................................... for the fisheries  system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Investment subsidies are ……..…………………………………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Fuel subsidies are.......………………………………………………………………………….….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
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 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Fuel taxes are...…………………………………………………………………………...……….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
If I find myself in a position to decide on fisheries management, I intend to ...        
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Please circle the number that best indicates how likely or unlikely your behaviour for each of 
the following propositions is. 
 
Very 
unlikely 
 
Neither likely 
nor unlikely  
 
Very 
likely 
If you find yourself in a position to decide on fisheries management, how likely 
or unlikely is it that you would ... 
       
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your attitude towards computers.  
Please circle the number for each pair of adjectives that best reflects your opinion about computers. Think of 
computers in general terms. 
Restrain creativity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Enhance creativity 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
Enjoyable to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frustrating to use 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intriguing 
A sound investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A waste of money 
Difficult to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy to use 
Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening 
Decrease productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Increase productivity 
 
Your attitude towards computer simulation models. 
Please circle the number for each pair of adjectives that best reflects your opinion about computer simulation 
models. Think of computer simulation models in general terms. 
Restrain creativity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Enhance creativity 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
Enjoyable to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frustrating to use 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intriguing 
A sound investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A waste of money 
Difficult to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy to use 
Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening 
Decrease productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Increase productivity 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
  
 183 
 
Appendix 2: Pre-test questionnaires of the control group 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Thanks for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. This questionnaire aims to determine your knowledge of 
commonly used policy instruments in Belgian fisheries, as well as your attitude toward them and your behaviour 
in relation to these instruments. Please answer these questions completely and truthfully. We guarantee that your 
answers will be treated anonymously and that only aggregated data will be included in reports and publications. 
 
NOTE!: Many questions refer to the terms „fisheries system‟, „policy instruments‟ and „sub fleet‟. 
 
 The term „fisheries system‟ includes (i) the Belgian fishing fleet and its overall performance, (ii) fish 
stocks, and (iii) governmental issues (both national and European) concerning fisheries. 
 The term „policy instruments‟ refers to the group of instruments policy maker can use to manage the 
Belgian fisheries system. This group of instruments consists of (1) total quota, (2) the allocation of the 
total quota over Belgian's five sub fleets, (3) maximum fishing days per vessel, (4) maximum catch per 
fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) investment subsidies, and (8) fuel subsidies and 
taxes. 
 The term „sub fleet‟ means a grouping of vessels with similar vessel characteristics, fishing method and 
target species. 
 
Your personal characteristics 
 
Your gender: 
Male 
 
Female 
 
 
Your age: 
0-25 
 
26-35 
 
36-45 
 
46-55 
 
56-65 
 
65+ 
 
 
Your work : Owner or captain of a boat  
ILVO  
The Department of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Flemish Government  
The Cabinet of the Flemish Government in charge of sea fisheries  
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the EU  
Cabinet of Commissioner Joe Borg  
De Redercentrale  
 
Your knowledge about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries system. 
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
I know pretty much about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not feel very knowledgeable about the effects policy instruments have on the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Among my close colleagues, I am one of the “experts” on assessing the effects of 
policy instruments on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to most other people, I know less about the effect policy instruments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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have on the fisheries system. 
When it comes to the impact policy instruments have on the fisheries system, I 
really do not know a lot. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your attitude towards policy instruments. 
For each proposition, four pairs of adjectives are given. Please circle the number for each pair of adjectives 
that best reflects your opinion about the proposition. 
Limiting total catches of a fleet through total quota is …………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Dividing total quota over sub fleets is …………………………………………………………....... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Useful  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Limiting the number of fishing days per vessel is ……………….……….…………………..….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Limiting the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land is …………………….………………..... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Limiting the amount of vessels in a fleet through licences is …………………………………….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Decommissioning fees are ………………......................................................................................... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Investment subsidies are ……..…………………………………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Fuel subsidies are.......………………………………………………………………………….….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
Fuel taxes are...…………………………………………………………………………...……….... for the fisheries system. 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
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 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
If I find myself in a position to decide on fisheries management, I intend to ...        
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Please circle the number that best indicates how likely or unlikely your behaviour for each of 
the following propositions is. 
 
Very 
unlikely 
 
Neither likely 
nor unlikely  
 
Very 
likely 
If you find yourself in a position to decide on fisheries management, how likely 
or unlikely is it that you would ... 
       
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Your attitude towards computers.  
Please circle the number for each pair of adjectives that best reflects your opinion about computers. Think of 
computers in general terms. 
Restrain creativity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Enhance creativity 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
Enjoyable to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frustrating to use 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intriguing 
A sound investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A waste of money 
Difficult to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy to use 
Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening 
Decrease productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Increase productivity 
 
Your attitude towards computer simulation models. 
Please circle the number for each pair of adjectives that best reflects your opinion about computer simulation 
models. Think of computer simulation models in general terms. 
Restrain creativity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Enhance creativity 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
Enjoyable to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frustrating to use 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intriguing 
A sound investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A waste of money 
Difficult to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy to use 
Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening 
Decrease productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Increase productivity 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Appendix 3: Post-test questionnaires of the experimental group 
 
Questionnaire 2 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Thanks for taking the time to fill out this second questionnaire. This questionnaire aims at evaluating the 
simulation model and determining your knowledge of commonly used policy instruments in Belgian fisheries, as 
well as your attitude toward them and your behaviour in relation to these instruments now that you know more 
about the simulation model. Please answer these questions completely and truthfully. We guarantee that your 
answers will be treated anonymously and that only aggregated data will be included in reports and publications. 
 
NOTE!: Many questions refer to the terms „fisheries system‟, „policy instruments‟ and „sub fleet‟. 
 
 The term „fisheries system‟ includes (i) the Belgian fishing fleet and its overall performance, (ii) fish 
stocks, and (iii) governmental issues (both national and European) concerning fisheries. 
 The term „policy instruments‟ refers to the group of instruments policy maker can use to manage the 
Belgian fisheries system. This group of instruments consists of (1) total quota, (2) the allocation of the 
total quota over Belgium's five sub fleets, (3) maximum fishing days per vessel, (4) maximum catch per 
fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) investment subsidies, and (8) fuel subsidies and 
taxes. 
 The term „sub fleet‟ means a grouping of vessels with similar vessel characteristics, fishing method and 
target species. 
 
Your attitude towards the used simulation model. 
Having played with the simulation model, please circle the number for each pair of adjectives that best reflects 
your opinion about the used simulation model. 
Restrain creativity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Enhance creativity 
Helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
Enjoyable to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Frustrating to use 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intriguing 
A sound investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A waste of money 
Difficult to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Easy to use 
Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening 
Decrease productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Increase productivity 
 
Policy instruments you have tested during the session. 
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you have tested each of the following 
policy instruments on their effects on the fisheries system. 
 
Not 
tested 
 
Heavily 
tested  
Total quota 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dividing total quota over sub fleets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limiting the number of fishing days per vessel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Limiting the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Licences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Decommissioning fees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Investment subsidies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fuel subsidies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fuel taxes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Validity of the used simulation model. 
Please circle the number that best indicates your opinion about the validity of the used simulation model. 
 Not valid at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely valid 
 
Validity of the used simulation model. 
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
The used simulation model behaved logically when playing with it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I had faith in the results of the used simulation model. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The used simulation model was an excellent representation of the real Belgian 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The used simulation model allowed me to learn about the effect policy 
instruments have on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Learning from the used simulation model. 
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you have learned from the use of the simulation model 
about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries system. 
 Learned nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Learned a lot 
 
Learning from the used simulation model. 
Please circle the number that best indicates how much you have learned from the use of the simulation model 
about how difficult it is to manage a fisheries system. 
 Learned nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Learned a lot 
 
Your knowledge about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries system. 
Having played with the simulation model, please circle the number that best indicates how 
much you now agree or disagree with each of the following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
When it comes to the impact policy instruments have on the fisheries system, I 
really do not know a lot. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Among my close colleagues, I am one of the “experts” on assessing the effects of 
policy instruments on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not feel very knowledgeable about the effects policy instruments have on the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I know pretty much about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to most other people, I know less about the effect policy instruments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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have on the fisheries system. 
 
Your attitude towards policy instruments. 
For each proposition, four pairs of adjectives are given. Having played with the simulation model, please circle 
the number for each pair of adjectives that now best reflects your opinion about the proposition. 
Limiting total catches of a fleet through total quota is …………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Dividing total quota over sub fleets is …………………………………………………………....... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Limiting the number of fishing days per vessel is ……………….……….…………………..….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Limiting the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land is …………………….………………..... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Limiting the amount of vessels in a fleet through licences is …………………………………….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Decommissioning fees are ………………......................................................................................... for the fisheries  system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Investment subsidies are ……..…………………………………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Fuel subsidies are.......………………………………………………………………………….….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Fuel taxes are...…………………………………………………………………………...……….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
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Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Having played with the simulation model, please circle the number that best indicates how 
much you now agree or disagree with each of the following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
If I find myself in a position to decide on fisheries management, I intend to ...        
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Now that you know more about the simulation model, please circle the number that best 
indicates how likely or unlikely your behaviour for each of the following propositions now is. 
 
Very 
unlikely 
 
Neither likely 
nor unlikely  
 
Very 
likely 
If you find yourself in a position to decide on fisheries management, how likely 
or unlikely is it that you would ... 
       
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your comments and/or suggestions about the used simulation model. 
Please feel free to make any comments and/or suggestions about the used simulation model. Your comments are 
valuable and will be taken into account when further developing this simulation model or other simulation 
models at ILVO. 
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Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Appendix 3: Post-test questionnaires of the experimental group 
 
Questionnaire 2 
 
Dear participant, 
 
Thanks for taking the time to fill out this second questionnaire. This questionnaire aims at evaluating the 
simulation model and determining your knowledge of commonly used policy instruments in Belgian fisheries, as 
well as your attitude toward them and your behaviour in relation to these instruments now that you know more 
about the simulation model. Please answer these questions completely and truthfully. We guarantee that your 
answers will be treated anonymously and that only aggregated data will be included in reports and publications. 
 
NOTE!: Many questions refer to the terms „fisheries system‟, „policy instruments‟ and „sub fleet‟. 
 
 The term „fisheries system‟ includes (i) the Belgian fishing fleet and its overall performance, (ii) fish 
stocks, and (iii) governmental issues (both national and European) concerning fisheries. 
 The term „policy instruments‟ refers to the group of instruments policy maker can use to manage the 
Belgian fisheries system. This group of instruments consists of (1) total quota, (2) the allocation of the 
total quota over Belgium's five sub fleets, (3) maximum fishing days per vessel, (4) maximum catch per 
fishing day, (5) licences, (6) decommissioning fees, (7) investment subsidies, and (8) fuel subsidies and 
taxes. 
 The term „sub fleet‟ means a grouping of vessels with similar vessel characteristics, fishing method and 
target species. 
 
Your knowledge about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries system. 
Now that you know more about the simulation model, please circle the number that best 
indicates how much you now agree or disagree with each of the following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
When it comes to the impact policy instruments have on the fisheries system, I 
really do not know a lot. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Among my close colleagues, I am one of the “experts” on assessing the effects of 
policy instruments on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not feel very knowledgeable about the effects policy instruments have on the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I know pretty much about the effects policy instruments have on the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to most other people, I know less about the effect policy instruments 
have on the fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your attitude towards policy instruments. 
For each proposition, four pairs of adjectives are given. Now that you know more about the simulation model, 
please circle the number for each pair of adjectives that now best reflects your opinion about the proposition. 
Limiting total catches of a fleet through total quota is …………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
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Dividing total quota over sub fleets is …………………………………………………………....... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Limiting the number of fishing days per vessel is ……………….……….…………………..….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Limiting the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land is …………………….………………..... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Limiting the amount of vessels in a fleet through licences is …………………………………….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Decommissioning fees are ………………......................................................................................... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Investment subsidies are ……..…………………………………………………………………...... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Fuel subsidies are.......………………………………………………………………………….….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
Fuel taxes are...…………………………………………………………………………...……….... for the fisheries system. 
 Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable  
 Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair  
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial  
 Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad  
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Now that you know more about the simulation model, please circle the number that best 
indicates how much you now agree or disagree with each of the following propositions. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Neither agree 
nor disagree  
 
Strongly 
agree 
If I find myself in a position to decide on fisheries management, I intend to ...        
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your behavioural intentions towards policy instruments.  
Now that you know more about the simulation model, please circle the number that best 
indicates how likely or unlikely your behaviour for each of the following propositions now is. 
 
Very 
unlikely 
 
Neither likely 
nor unlikely  
 
Very 
likely 
If you find yourself in a position to decide on fisheries management, how likely 
or unlikely is it that you would ... 
       
 ... use total quota as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... divide the total quota over the sub fleets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the number of fishing days per vessel as a way to manage the fisheries 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
... limit the catch per fishing day that a vessel can land as a way to manage the 
fisheries system. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use licences as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use decommissioning fees as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use investment subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel subsidies as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ... use fuel taxes as a way to manage the fisheries system. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Your comments and/or suggestions about the proposed simulation model. 
Please feel free to make any comments and/or suggestions about the proposed simulation model. Your 
comments and/or suggestions are valuable and will be taken into account when further developing this 
simulation model or other simulation models at ILVO. 
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Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo: Jay Forrester and me at the 
25th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society 
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Chapter 6: General conclusions 
 
This thesis describes the process of developing a microworld in which fisheries policy 
initiatives can be visualised and rehearsed (Morecroft, 1999). It first presents insights into the 
real fisheries system and determines whether the theory of strategic groups is relevant for the 
Belgian fishing fleet. These findings are then used to develop a microworld in which 
stakeholders can “play” and discover the long term effects that policy instruments may have 
on the Belgian fisheries system. This makes the microworld a useful instrument to test 
whether policymakers have the policy instruments at their disposal to align the real fisheries 
system with their desired one. Because this microworld has been developed following a 
“create-and-share”-approach (Kreutzer, 1995: 218), the last part of this thesis is about 
reaching and informing a group larger than the model-development team about the outcomes. 
This is done, in tandem with a true experiment in which we test if stakeholders in the Belgian 
fisheries system actually learn from our microworld. Such a test of learning is seen as the 
ultimate criterion for assessing the validity of microworlds (Morecroft, 2008). 
 
This concluding chapter begins with a synopsis of the answers to the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1. Second, the main findings and contributions of this thesis are listed, 
further discussed and translated into policy recommendations. Then follows a discussion of 
the limitations of this thesis and this chapter ends by pointing out avenues for future research. 
 
6.1 Answering the research questions 
 
This thesis addresses four research questions (Figure 6.1).  
 
1. Do firms in the Belgian fishing industry cluster around a limited array of 
competitive strategies (i.e., strategic groups) that result in performance differences? 
 
This research question determines if intra-industry groupings need to be taken into account 
when developing our microworld which is important if the industry does not consist of 
strategically homogenous agents. Clearly, the answer is yes. Chapter 2 defines five strategic 
groups in the Belgian fishing fleet that have clearly distinct performance outcomes on 
financial, operational and overall performance measures. These strategic groups are derived 
through clustering firms based on their state of resources, built up through the collection of 
their past competitive strategic decisions, which are perceived as the main sources of mobility 
barriers in the fishing industry, namely: (1) technology, (2) product range and (3) geographic 
reach. Highly valid cluster solutions are obtained through use of excessive within- and 
between-method triangulation (Ketchen et al., 1996). Following this method, the five 
identified strategic groups are (1) the large beam trawler fleet: vessels with high-powered 
engines, enabling them to cover all of the Belgian fishing grounds, operate the beam trawl and 
land the highest variety of species; (2) the small beam trawler fleet: vessels similar to the 
large beam trawlers but with significantly less engine power and slightly less diverse 
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landings; (3) the shrimp beam trawler fleet: vessels similar to the small beam trawlers but 
slightly less powerful and heavily specialised towards landing brown shrimp; (4) the otter 
trawler fleet: vessels which differ from the small beam trawler fleet in that they operate the 
otter trawl, which results in a slightly less mixed product range; and (5) the trammel netter 
fleet: vessels operating passive fishing methods specialised in just a few species comparable 
to the span in product range of the shrimp beam trawlers. 
 
2. Do firms in the Belgian fishing industry stick to their competitive strategy in the 
long term? 
 
Investigating whether the firms stick to their competitive strategy in the long run allows us to 
omit “firm-movement” (Fiegenbaum et al., 1993: 75) between groups from the microworld. 
This drastically simplifies the microworld. This research question can be answered in the 
affirmative, according to the findings presented in Chapter 2. Once a vessel has decided on its 
strategic position in the fishing industry (i.e., the strategic group), in 80% of the cases, it stays 
in that position for a significant amount of time (in this case ten years). However, not every 
strategic group enjoys this high level of group loyalty, since firm-movement differs 
significantly between the strategic groups. The large beam trawler fleet is the strategic group 
whose group members shift the least, whereas small beam trawlers shift the most. Firm-
movement between small beam trawlers and shrimp beam trawlers is also high. However, the 
strategic group of the shrimp beam trawlers has more stable memberships compared to the 
small beam trawlers. The shrimp beam trawlers, together with the trammel netters, are the 
second most stable strategic groups. Finally, like the small beam trawlers, the otter trawlers 
also encounters important fluctuations in firm-movement but those otter trawlers do not have 
a “second best option” like the “small beam trawlers-shrimp beam trawler”-trade off. The 
analysis performed to obtain these results is based on simple counts and percentages of firm-
movement, where “firm-movement” is defined as “cluster analytic assignment of a firm to a 
different group than it had been in during the prior year” (Mascarenhas, 1989: 346). 
 
3. Do policymakers have the policy instruments at hand to align the real fisheries 
world with the desired world of their individual mental models? 
 
This research question can be answered in the affirmative, as Chapter 4 illustrates. Running 
multiple scenarios in our microworld clearly shows that policymakers in Belgian fisheries 
have the policy instruments at hand to install management systems that are able to meet four 
realistic but totally different management objective functions (social welfare functions). These 
four objective functions are labelled: (1) “a bigger industry is a better industry”, (2) “small but 
wealthy”, (3) “keep them quiet and satisfied at low expenses” and (4) “let‟s go green”.  These 
different management objective functions serve the purpose of reflecting possible differences 
in policymakers‟ desired states of the fisheries system (part of their individual mental 
models). This study also vividly illustrates that policymakers should be aware of 
counterintuitive and surprising outcomes in their attempts to align the real fisheries world 
with their desired one. Counterintuitive behaviour of the fisheries system is a frequently 
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returning observation and mainly occurs due to “misperceptions of feedback” (Atkins et al., 
2002; Diehl et al., 1995; Sterman, 1989). 
 
4. Do stakeholders learn (differently) from playing with microworlds? 
 
This research question must be answered negatively, since Chapter 5 concludes that the three 
main stakeholder groups of the Belgian fisheries system, i.e., (1) policymakers, (2) scientists 
and (3) ship owners and skippers, have not learned about the effect policy instruments have 
on the fisheries system from playing in the microworld. This surprising outcome contradicts 
all of the stakeholder groups‟ subjective reports about having learned from the microworld. 
They all stated that they learned about the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries 
system, that they have confidence in the microworld and perceived its behaviour as valid. 
This study cannot confirm that individual double-loop learning from microworlds occurs. 
These results are based on a strictly controlled “before-after with control group”-experiment 
in which 57 stakeholders (i.e., 25 policymakers, 20 scientists and 12 ship owners or skippers) 
participated, where learning is conceptualised as a process altering knowledge, attitude and 
behaviour (i.e., parts of the individual mental model). 
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Figure 6.1: Summary of the answers to the research question visualising what this dissertation 
has covered from its underlying conceptual framework (“thumbs up” and “thumbs down” 
means a “positive” and “negative” answer to the research question, respectively) 
 
(Source: Own compilation, composed of Kim, 1993b; Kunc et al., 2006; Morecroft, 1984; Sterman, 
2000) 
 
6.2 Findings, contributions and policy recommendations 
 
The findings, contributions and policy recommendations of this thesis are related to its three 
main topics: (1) strategic groups in the Belgian fisheries industry, (2) outcomes from the 
microworld of the Belgian fisheries system, and (3) measuring whether learning occurred 
from playing in the microworld. 
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6.2.1 Strategic groups in the Belgian fisheries industry. 
 
This research on strategic groups in Belgian fisheries borrows the concept of strategic groups, 
together with its theory from the field of strategic management, and applies it for the first time 
to the field of fisheries management science. The aim is to test whether strategic group theory 
is of value to determine intra-industry groupings in the Belgian fishing fleet based on different 
orientations in the vessels‟ competitive strategies. Following Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan‟s 
(2007) classification on theoretical contributions of empirical research, this study is classified 
as a theory “tester” and therefore contributes to the further generalisation of strategic group 
theory. Strategic group theory is shown to be valuable to determine intra-industry groupings 
within the Belgian fishing fleet. It discovers the existence of five strategic groups based on the 
differences in their state in resource configurations; this reflects a firm‟s past strategic 
investments resulting from the different choices in past competitive strategies. This study also 
finds a link between group membership and performance; different strategic groups have 
different performance levels on different financial, operational and overall performance 
measures (Venkatraman et al., 1986). This is no sinecure, since strategic group research is 
still unable to consistently find this “group membership-performance link” (Cool et al., 1988; 
Ketchen et al., 1997). Therefore, this finding contributes to generalising the “group 
membership-performance link” to a new industry. 
 
This study also shows that these five strategic groups are very stable over time, revealing 
limited firm-movement among strategic groups over time. This indicates that the differences 
in the state of resource configurations among these strategic groups are most likely important 
sources of mobility barriers and thus also sources of competitive advantage within the Belgian 
fishing industry. As a result, these findings support the theory of the existence of mobility 
barriers between strategic groups. However, not every strategic group has the same high level 
of group loyalty, which indicates that these mobility barriers are “asymmetric” (Caves et al., 
1977; Harrigan, 1985; Hatten et al., 1987). This implies that not all mobility barriers between 
strategic groups are equally high. Some shifts between strategic groups are more easily made 
because the resource(s) required are not too costly or risky. The results on the average yearly 
firm movement across strategic groups between pairs of adjacent years illustrated different 
firm movement patters for different strategic groups. Unloyal small beam trawlers move to 
the shrimp beam trawler fleet. The inverse patter can be observed for the unloyal shrimp beam 
trawler. Hence, there is back-and-forth-movement between these two strategic groups. 
Unloyal otter trawlers move to both the small beam trawler fleet and shrimp beam trawler 
fleet, but inverse movement is only marginally observed. It seems therefore that vessels which 
have made the shift towards the otter trawler fleet are satisfied with their new strategic 
direction. Finally, the results of average yearly firm movement across strategic groups 
illustrates that all other potential firm movement patters between the strategic groups are 
marginal or absent. This illustrate that certain shifts are (too) costly or risky. Additionally, and 
probably even more important in explaining these absent or marginal firm-movements is what 
Rumelt (1984) refers to as a firm‟s “isolating mechanisms”. Isolating mechanisms represent 
“firm specific commitments (i.e., resources) that restrict the individual firm‟s degrees of 
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strategic freedom and thus may prevent a firm from switching from one strategy to another” 
(Leask et al., 2005: 459). This is for instance the case for the current trammel netting fleet in 
Belgium. These vessels are often catamarans that have not the capability to tow fishing gear 
over the sea-bed. Hence, their past strategic decisions have isolated them from any form of 
beam- or otter trawling. This clearly limits their strategic freedom. 
 
This study on strategic groups in Belgian fisheries is of practical relevance to both 
policymakers and ship owners. We recommend that policymakers consider strategic group 
theory as a way to simplify fisheries management, along with its regulation. Strategic group 
theory gives insight into “which firms compete strongly with each other” (Fiegenbaum et al., 
1988: 21). Knowing the strategic differences between firms and the patterns of rivalry 
between firms within the same industry is crucial when managing fisheries and implementing 
public policies (Oster, 1982: 376). Therefore, strategic groups should form the basis for 
developing regulation instead of using (1) tremendously detailed typologies of sub fleets 
solely based on technical characteristics (i.e., fishing methods, gear modifications and mesh 
sizes) (EC, 2002) or (2) overly specified classification systems based on métiers (EC, 2008) 
which probably need simplification (i.e., aggregation of métiers in fleet segments) to become 
practical. This strategic group approach could result in a more strategic form of regulation, 
meaning that the regulation will be more focused on (1) affecting strategic groups‟ 
competitive advantages (i.e., mobility barriers), (2) affecting “isolating mechanisms” of firms, 
and (3) managing rivalry between strategic groups. In addition, this will shrink the number of 
policy instruments required to regulate fisheries. Introducing strategic group theory to 
fisheries management can be a useful way to reengineer and simplify the current Common 
Fisheries Policy of the European Union.  
 
Ship owners and skippers can use the results of this study on performance differences 
between these strategic groups to determine if they are still satisfied with their current 
strategic direction. If so, they can compare their performance to the average performance of 
their group peers. If not, this study unveils the different performance potentials for the 
different competitive strategies in the current industry. Ship owners and skippers can thus use 
these results to reflect on current business and change strategic course based on various 
performance indicators. 
 
Finally, this study has also implications for research, since it has applied and tested the rigid 
methodological approach of Ketchen and Shook (1996) in identifying clusters in strategic 
management research. Their approach tackles the main weakness of cluster analysis‟ reliance 
on researcher judgment, which subjects the validity of results to serious doubts. Ketchen and 
Shook (1996) believe that the key to surmounting this problem is the vigorous pursuit of both 
within- and between-method triangulation (Ketchen et al., 1996). Our study has illustrated 
that this practice leads indeed to highly valid cluster solutions. Therefore, future researchers 
should rigorously implement this approach. 
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6.2.2 Outcomes from the microworld of the Belgian fisheries system 
 
The microworld developed in this thesis serves the purpose of a learning laboratory for the ex 
ante evaluation of possible policy strategies in Belgian fisheries management. Hence, the 
outcomes of this microworld should not be interpreted as (exact) quantitative predictions of 
the future. Instead, the microworld should be used to learn more about the dynamic 
complexity of the fisheries system and options for fisheries management. Microworlds, as 
compared to the real world, offer a risk-free (Garvin, 2000; Keys et al., 1996; Kofman et al., 
1993; Senge, 1996) and controlled (Kim, 1995) environment in which policy strategies can be 
rehearsed and evaluated much faster than in real time (De Geus, 1997; Sterman, 2000). Based 
on these “rehearsing possibilities”, we have used our microworld to test if different 
configurations of the current policy instruments of the Belgian fisheries management system 
can be used to meet different management objective functions. The results of this study are 
positive as long as the interdependencies and often conflicting nature between objectives were 
taken into account when defining objective functions. Additionally, counterintuitive or 
surprising outcomes can and do occur in the microworld. Such outcomes are the result of 
“misperceptions of feedback” that occur when people‟s mental models are deficient in 
understanding the dynamic complexity of the system they are trying to manage (Sterman, 
2000). Therefore, we recommend using a form of simulation (such as our microworld) to test 
policy changes ex ante before implementing them in the real fisheries system. This practice 
would significantly limit the risk of implementing policies in the real fishing system that 
could result in unexpected and/or undesired outcomes. Playing in microworlds should 
“anticipate surprises” (Morecroft, 1984: 224). This study also illustrates the need for finding 
the right balance in combining policy instruments when attempting to best meet predefined 
management objectives, as the omission of certain policy instruments from the policy strategy 
can result in negative outcomes. This thesis, like the study of Greiner et al. (2000), asserts that 
it is very unlikely for one single policy instrument to be capable of solving a complex 
problem. Instead, the right mixture of policy instruments is necessary to achieve the desired 
outcome. Our microworld allows testing several possible mixtures. Finally, with some (small) 
changes to the microworld, other policy instruments or management systems outside the 
scope of the current microworld can be tested. For instance, replacing the common pool quota 
system of the microworld by an individual transferable quota system (ITQ) will allow 
comparing, ex ante, a whole different management system for its effects on the Belgian 
fisheries system. Our microworld certainly has a future role in advising fisheries 
policymakers, though this advice will not take the form of concrete answers to concrete 
problems. Instead, it will unveil the dynamic complexity of the fisheries system and prepare 
policymakers for alternative futures by bringing these futures to life. Moreover, our 
microworld can also enrich and/or perhaps even change policymakers‟ interpretation of the 
complex fisheries world (in other words, affect their mental models). However, effective and 
efficient ways in which mental models could be enriched and/or changed through the 
application of microworlds are still subject to speculation. 
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With the development and application of our microworld, we have introduced system 
dynamics to the Belgian fisheries research agenda and more specifically to the research 
agenda of the Institute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research (ILVO)
3
. This was an important 
step for ILVO, since ILVO researchers are seeking to give simulation models a central role in 
formulating a long-term strategy for the Belgian fisheries system (Polet et al., 2006). Our 
microworld has indeed proven very valuable since ILVO has learned more about options for 
fisheries management through playing in it. This is essential since Belgian fisheries are still, 
like many other fisheries, subject to mismanagement of varying proportions (Arnason, 2009). 
We also recommend using our microworld among various stakeholder groups within the 
fisheries industry. It can serve as a transitional object to spur debate and discussion of 
different strategies for the Belgian fisheries system (Morecroft, 1984). We believe these 
debates and discussions to be a key to enhancing the mutual understanding of the problems 
various stakeholder groups are currently facing. Such mutual understanding is crucial when 
developing a strategy for the future that is acceptable for all stakeholder groups. A first step 
towards this direction has already been taken; the Directorate-General of Maritime Affaires 
and Fisheries of the European Commission (DG MARE) has invited us to elaborate on its 
future value for the European Commission. We suggest creating a platform in which our 
microworld (and others) can serve as a transitional object while discussing potential fisheries 
management options. We also recommend using our microworld (and others) as a tool to 
introduce new recruits to the dynamic complexity of fisheries and options for management. It 
can also serve them when discussing options for fisheries management with senior staff. 
 
Our microworld can also be used for education. Besides introducing our microworld to actual 
decision makers or new recruits dealing with fisheries management issues, our microworld 
can also be of value to (university) courses related to fisheries management and even natural 
resource management. In these courses, our microworld can illustrate to students (1) the 
interlocking feedback loops between the fisheries system and the fisheries management 
system, (2) the short- and long-term effects policy instruments have on the fisheries system, 
(3) the interdependences and often conflicting nature of the different management objectives 
in fisheries management, and (4) counterintuitive outcomes in fisheries management due to 
misperception of feedback. In addition to these illustrative purposes, it can also be used to 
enhance and enrich debates and discussions (in small groups and/or through teacher-student 
interactions) about options for fisheries management. Last but far from least, our microworld 
gives students the opportunity to experience what it is to manage fisheries systems in real life 
through play. Teachers can use our microworld in combination with other complementary 
microworlds about fisheries- and natural resource management. Other such microworlds are: 
(1) Fish Banks, Ltd (Meadows et al., 2001) on how rivalry of competing fisheries affects the 
sustainability of renewable natural resources; (2) Moxnes‟ (1998a; 1998b) microworld on the 
exploitation of a single cod population in an isolated Norwegian fjord which teaches us that 
not only “tragedy of the commons” but also “misperception of feedback” results in 
overexploitation; and (3) Morecroft‟s (2008; 2007) microworld called “Fish and Ships” which 
deals with the puzzling dynamics of fisheries when managing fishing effort. 
                                                 
3
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6.2.3 Measurement of learning from the microworld 
 
Following Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan‟s (2007) classification of theoretic contributions of 
empirical research, this study is classified as a theory “tester” since it tests the highly 
important axiomatic belief in individual and organisational learning theory that decision 
makers do learn from using microworlds. However, our research does not prove that this is 
the case, at least not for decision makers who are not involved in the modelling process itself. 
The three main stakeholder groups of the Belgian fisheries system (policymakers, scientists 
and ship owners and skippers) did not learn from playing with our microworld about the 
effect policy instruments have on the fisheries system. This outcome contradicts the 
stakeholders‟ subjective report that they learned from the microworld about the effect policy 
instruments have on the fisheries system. They further stated that they have confidence in the 
microworld and perceived its behaviour as valid. Therefore, we must conclude that our 
“create-and-share”-approach (Kreutzer, 1995: 218) to developing a microworld has not 
resulted in double-loop learning outside of the modelling team. 
 
Similar studies, although often performed with students, come to similar conclusions of 
participants not learning from microworlds (e.g., Cameron et al., 2005; Drappa et al., 2000; 
Ellis et al., 2005; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Pfahl et al., 2001; Thomas et al., 
1991). This leads us to wonder whether “experience is the best teacher” (Wolfe, 1975a: 450) 
in simulation tasks that involve solving dynamic and complex problems. Several studies have 
concluded that experiential learning is so unstructured that the knowledge gained may be 
fragmentary and haphazard (e.g., Bell et al., 2002; Brown, 2001; DeRouin et al., 2004; Ely et 
al., 2007; Reeves, 1993; Wolfe, 1975a). Further, there is no assurance that the participants 
even learn the “right” thing (Drappa et al., 2000). As a result, the participants‟ interactions 
with the microworld should become more structured in order to obtain (or increase) learning 
effects (Bell et al., 2008; Wolfe, 1975a). Increasing learner control in this way may be an 
important challenge facing simulation-based training design. Effective guidance and support 
strategies for learning need to be identified and embedded in the design of simulation-based 
training (Bell et al., 2008; Cannon-Bowers et al., 2009; Wolfe, 1975a). However, it is our 
belief, together with many researchers, that guidance alone is not sufficient. It seems that the 
true value of microworlds lies within their capability to rehearse and visualise strategies 
(Morecroft, 1999) so they can be brought into debate and discussion (Morecroft, 1984) among 
stakeholders. This idea is backed by the study of Dill et al. (1963), which found that students 
remembered more vividly what they had learned from the interactions with other people than 
what they had learned from playing with the microworld. Hence, it seems that some form of 
human interaction, not only through guidance, is required in order to learn from microworlds 
(Bell et al., 2008).  
 
Although there are researchers who go one step further and believe that a certain form of 
“classroom atmosphere” or “learning community” is essential for learning (Katz, 1999; 
Webster et al., 1997), there are others (i.e., the naturalistic decision making movement) who 
argue that it is exactly this often unfamiliar and unrealistic “classroom/laboratory 
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atmosphere” which limits learning (Sweeney et al., 2000). They believe people can perform 
well in familiar, naturalistic settings yet perform the same type of task poorly in unfamiliar 
laboratory or training settings. Therefore, it is not clear yet to what extent the environmental 
context affects learning outcomes. Some also advocate group model building (e.g., Rouwette 
et al., 2002; Vennix, 1990; Vennix, 1996). This group claims that decision makers must be 
actively involved from the beginning of the modelling process in order to learn from a 
microworld (Pfahl et al., 2004; Warren et al., 1999). If they are not involved, the task of the 
modeller becomes much harder, and the likelihood of learning together with the 
implementation of the results is diminished (Richardson et al., 1999: 355). Group model 
building makes sense, but its main downside is its requirement of a vast number of different 
resources (i.e., skills, time, money, people, etc.). As a result, most modelling exercises still do 
not follow the principles of group model building. In the future, these resource limitations will 
most likely remain an obstacle in the development of other microworlds based on group 
model building. It is thus vital that research on learning from microworlds is not exclusively 
focused on learning from microworlds in group model building processes. 
 
6.3 Limitations 
 
This thesis bundles different research topics that have distinct designs and methods. Because 
of this, most of its limitations are research-topic related and can thus be found in each relevant 
chapter. We therefore discuss three more general limitations of this dissertation. 
 
6.3.1 Generalisation of the results 
 
The research findings above are not assumed to be universally applicable, mainly because this 
thesis is based on a single case study of the Belgian fisheries system. The study on strategic 
groups and the microworld and its outcomes both have limited timeframes. As for the 
outcomes of the microworld on the alignment of the real fisheries world with the desired 
world embedded in the policymaker‟s mental models through applying policy instruments, a 
nearly infinite number of mental models exist. This limits the possible generalisation of these 
outcomes. Last, generalising the results of the experiment about learning from our microworld 
is limited not only due by the Belgian scope, but also by the characteristics of our microworld 
itself and the rather small sample size used. Hence, a case-by-case basis will reveal whether 
our results can be generalised. This implies that for the results related to our strategic group 
study, there may be many more strategic groups beyond both (1) the geographic borders of 
the Belgian fisheries industry and (2) the ten-year timeframe of this study. Even the resources 
perceived to be the main sources of mobility barriers in the fishing industry can vary (slightly) 
in different empirical settings. Finally, the performance differences observed in our study may 
also be significantly different according to the differences in the external environment in 
which these groups operate. Nevertheless, the approach to defining strategic groups together 
with its underlying theory and methodology can be applied beyond the Belgian context. The 
microworld and its outcomes are more general than our study on strategic groups, as it is a 
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theoretical microworld however grounded in empirical research and findings of the Belgian 
fisheries system. This means that outcomes generated by the microworld can only be 
extrapolated to other fisheries systems where conditions are similar to that of the Belgian 
fisheries system. Following are the most important conditions that should be met for these 
results to be prevalent across empirical settings. First, since this microworld is all about the 
effect policy instruments (i.e., the fisheries management system) have on fisheries systems, it 
is obvious that our results are only applicable to fisheries systems that are managed through a 
similar form of management system. However, the policy instruments in the Belgian fisheries 
system are commonly used in many fisheries systems around the globe (Dankel et al., 2008; 
FAO, 2009b; Sterner, 2003). Second, the Belgian fishing industry is a highly industrialised 
fleet. Hence, the outcomes of the microworld are more relevant to fisheries systems that have 
equally industrialised fleets. The value of the results increases even more significantly if 
similar strategic groups can be identified. This may be the case for North Sea countries, since 
they have a significant share of beam trawlers. A final condition is the need for similarity in 
the scale of the fisheries system. The Belgian fisheries industry is a small industry that has no 
significant impact on most macroeconomic dynamics such as price-fixing. Last, our research 
on learning from microworlds is in its infancy. The results presented above are only a first 
contribution to evaluating learning from microworlds. It is unlikely that these results can be 
generalised. Further research on evaluating learning from microworlds is needed and will be 
published in due time. 
 
6.3.2 The reliability of the secondary data 
 
Except for the experiment on learning from microworlds, our research is mainly based on 
secondary data. However, the quality of this data can often be questioned, as data-checks 
frequently yielded conflicting results. Figures differed repeatedly across databases and reports 
from different institutions. Further inquiry into these databases also unveiled that conflicting 
data had been saved on occasion. For instance, queries sometimes produced a catch for a 
certain vessel in a certain area at a certain time but no complementary fishing effort. The 
accounting data was the most strikingly unreliable. Beside the voluntary nature of the data 
gathering, which definitely biases the data, we also regularly found discrepancies between the 
accounting data reported in these annual surveys and account data stated in the annual balance 
sheets of the shipping companies. Nevertheless, we had no choice but to use the data collected 
from these surveys as the few actual balance sheets we were able to collect were not 
representative of the whole industry. Note, however, that the purpose of this discussion is not 
to assign blame; it is simply to illustrate that the only data we could find had different degrees 
of reliability. We always made decisions that reduced these practices to an absolute minimum, 
although sources for data triangulation are rather limited. 
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6.4 Directions for future research 
 
This final section highlights potential avenues for future research. Although some of the 
previous chapters have already suggested some directions for future research, it is now our 
intention to point at research directions relate to the overall theme of this dissertation: 
directions for progress on the state of the art of learning from microworlds. 
 
This dissertation has emerged from the absence of a well structured body of evaluation 
research that examines whether any valuable “learning” takes place from the use of 
microworlds (Akili, 2007; Bakken et al., 1994; Bell et al., 2008; Cavaleri et al., 1997; Gosen 
et al., 2004; Gresse von Wangenheim et al., 2009; Huz et al., 1997; Raia, 1966; Sweeney et 
al., 2000; Tonks et al., 1997; Wolfe, 1976). The research presented here is, at its current 
stage, a first contribution to evaluating learning from microworlds. But this study did not 
reveal evidence that decision makers learn from using microworlds. This suggests that more 
work is needed to fully realize the potential of microworlds in learning processes. Yet 
researchers are left with little guidance on how to develop an effective “learning system”, 
because the factors that influence the effectiveness of simulation-based training remain 
unclear (Bell et al., 2008). One possible avenue for future research is to replicate our 
experiment in similar and/or different settings. Although such scientific research may be 
viewed as less valuable, the authors believe it is the only way to yield more generalised 
results in the future since, as in our study, research evaluating learning from microworlds 
typically has small sample sizes (e.g., Cavaleri et al., 1997; Drappa et al., 2000; Gresse von 
Wangenheim et al., 2009; Hung, 2008; Huz et al., 1997; Pfahl et al., 2001; Pfahl et al., 2004; 
Sindre et al., 2009). Replication would validate our results and further contribute to the 
“who”, “where” and “when” (i.e., the temporal and contextual factors) (Whetten, 1989) of the 
theory of learning from microworlds. 
 
Further, we recommend continuing to use experimental evaluation research in a quest to 
determine learning from microworlds. However, instead of testing if using microworlds result 
in learning, future research should focus more on testing which features of microworlds are 
essential to generate learning outcomes. These tests should also be combined with tests to 
determine which characteristics of the “users” and the “situation” (i.e., learning environment 
including guidance, human interactions, shared mental models and paradigms; see 
“conceptual framework” above) are essential for learning to occur from microworlds (Bell et 
al., 2008; Größler, 2004). Related to the features of the microworld, research should for 
instance test if differences in (1) scope, (2) level of dynamic complexity, (3) level of detailed 
complexity, or (4) user-friendliness of the interface of the microworld generate differences in 
learning outcomes. Related to the characteristics of the user, research should test if differences 
in (1) education, (2) job function, (3) age, (4) socioeconomic status (SES), (5) attitude 
towards microworlds, (6) attitude towards computers, or (7) attitude towards training results 
in differences in learning outcomes. Finally, relevant research questions related to the 
differences in situation are: (1) Do organisational shared mental models affect individual 
learning from microworlds?; (2) Does playing the microworld in teams instead of playing it 
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individually result in better learning effects?, (3) Does learning from microworlds increase 
with the intensification (i.e., duration, number of sessions)  of simulation-based training?, and 
(4) Is group model building the best (or perhaps only) way to obtain learning effects from 
microworlds? 
 
We recommend that these tests be performed only in rigidly controlled “before-after with 
control group”-experiments in which the experimental group(s) only differ(s) from the control 
group by exactly one characteristic of the microworld, users or situation (Größler, 2001; Pfahl 
et al., 2004). We believe that this form of experimental design is the only one that is able to 
causally link the observed learning effects to characteristics of the microworld, users or 
situation in a way that rules out all alternative hypotheses. 
 
Next, following Bell et al. (2008), we also recommend adoption of a more “process-based 
approach” to evaluating learning from microworlds. It is our belief that future research on the 
subject would be more effective if it would examine the actual processes or mechanisms that 
explain learning effects from these microworlds (i.e., a form of deutero-learning from 
microworlds). This would reveal the effect on learning of the following: the way in which (1) 
policy ideas are tested through the microworld (for instance: structured versus unstructured 
testing), (2) information feedback is presented/communicated by the microworld, and (3) 
information feedback is understood, interpreted and analysed by the subject using the 
microworld. Additionally, this would also make it possible to visualise how different 
characteristics of the microworld, users or situation affect these processes. Such insights 
would lead to strategies for increasing learning from microworlds. 
 
One last suggestion for future evaluation research on the efficacy of microworlds in learning 
processes is to assess whether, and how, these microworlds affect the actual behaviour and 
performance of its participants. Hence, research should not only be limited to discovering 
changes in participant‟s attitudes, thinking, skills and behavioural intentions (Sweeney et al., 
2000). Instead, future research should investigate how learning effects from microworlds can 
be transferred (more) effectively to the real system. How they can improve performance in 
similar real-life situations? In our case, this means how learning from our microworld about 
the effect policy instruments have on the fisheries system can be included in more effective 
and efficient fisheries management. 
 
We end this thesis with the recommendation that (small-scale) tests of learning should 
become mandatory in every study that uses simulation models as learning laboratories. These 
tests could take the form of a (small) evaluation survey and/or interview with the subjects 
who have used the microworld. Such tests are essential for the microworlds used in these 
studies, because the ultimate goal of a microworld is to stimulate learning. Therefore, learning 
is also the most important criterion for assessing its validity (Morecroft, 2008). Furthermore, 
these tests will be a great help in identifying the most urgent needs in future research on 
learning from microworlds. They will thus speed up the process of scientific inquiry by 
stimulating development of new theories on learning from microworlds and new subjects to 
be further rigidly tested. 
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